은유의 진리값

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Objectivist semantists claim that metaphor has no truth value from the perspective of their truth theory. We reject this kind of claim and suggest that metaphor may be thought to have truth value if we take a new perspective of metaphor of conceptual metaphor theory. Within this theory, Lakoff and Johnson propose a new truth definition, as follows: we understand a statement as being true in a given situation when our understanding of the statement fits our understanding of the situation closely enough for our purposes. We think this definition may be broad enough to apply to all the cases of direct description and some cases of indirect description in which metaphor is included. But we think this definition may face a problem in dealing with virtual phenomena, not taking the blending theory into consideration. Therefore, we propose a kind of revised version, taking it into consideration, as follows: we understand a statement as being brue in a given situation when our understanding of the statement and our understanding of virtual entities in the virtual plane fit our understanding of the actual situation closely enough for our purposes. This version is thought to broad enough to impose truth value on metaphor.