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다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In this paper, we investigate the impact of differences between book income and taxable income (hereafter, book-tax differences) on management earnings forecast accuracy and bias, incorporating the role of financial analysts. Specifically, this paper examines the effect of book-tax differences on management earnings forecasts accuracy and bias. Furthermore, we investigate how the number of analysts affects the relation between management earnings forecasts properties (i.e., accuracy and bias) and book-tax differences. We analyze the hand-collect data of management earnings forecasts for future operating income during fiscal years 2002-2009, from Financial Supervisory Service`s Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System (DART). Our results are given as follows. First, we find that the accuracy of management earnings forecast decrease in the book-tax differences. Also, we show that management earnings forecasts exhibit greater optimistic biases when book-tax differences are relatively high. In sum, book-tax differences not only generates the error of management earnings forecast, but also creates the optimistic forecasting behavior of corporate manager. Based on the prior studies, we predict that a lager book-tax differences decreases the persistence of current earnings, thereby creates a relatively large information asymmetry between manager and outside investors about firm`s future earnings. This information asymmetry which is generated by the differences between book and taxable income is expected to induce a manager to provide less accurate and more optimistic earnings forecasts. Therefore, the systematic associations between management earnings forecasts properties (accuracy and bias) and book-tax differences are consistent with our expectations. Second, as the number of analysts following the firm increases, we find that the relation between management earnings forecasts properties (accuracy and bias) and book-tax differences lessens. We specifically find that the negative association between the management earnings forecasts accuracy and book-tax differences decreases when the number of analysts is relatively high. In addition, the positive relation between the management earnings forecasts bias and book-tax differences gets less positive as the number of analysts increases. These results indicates that a relatively large number of analysts following reduces the distortions induced by book-tax differences because the information asymmetry between a manager and outside shareholder about future earnings diminishes as the number of analysts increases. These findings also stress that our first findings that a larger book-tax differences generate management earings forecast errors and bias are mainly induced by information asymmetry between manager and outside investors regarding firm`s future earnings. Managers communicate information about firms` financial situations to outside investors through two important channels, that is, mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Both mandatory and voluntary disclosures are the main sources from which firm investors gets relevant (or valuable) information that is used in judgment. A considerable literature has, in fact, find that both types of disclosure significantly affects stock prices, and contains value-relevant information about a firm. This paper, by demonstrating the systematic association between the properties of voluntary disclosed information (management earnings forecasts accuracy and bias) and mandatory disclosed information (book-tax differences), provides a new insight about the manager`s disclosure policy. In particular, prior literatures which deal with the relation between voluntary disclosure and mandatory disclosure concentrate mainly on the quantitative aspects (i.e., occurrence or frequency) of voluntary disclosure. Our research adds a new insight by focusing on the management earnings forecast accuracy and bias (i.e., qualitative aspects of voluntary disclosure). By establishing the fact that a relatively large number of analysts following the firm lessens the relation between management earnings forecasts properties and book-tax differences lessens, we also document the analysts` behavior which enhances the quality of management earnings forecasts. It provides a useful information for the outside investors because the result shows the important role of financial analysts as a prominent information intermediaries in the capital market.

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참고문헌 (Reference)

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