Factors Affecting the Onset of Economic Sanctions

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study argues that a state’s power is best conceptualized by considering how a state interacts with all other states in different networks within the international system. This social network explanation for national power is applied to economic sanctions, one of the most widely studied empirical phenomena in international relations, focusing on power explanations. The evidence from the empirical analysis of economic sanctions during the Cold War period shows that dyads with highly asymmetric national power seem to be less likely to be involved in economic sanctions. As power preponderance theorists argue, power preponderance will preserve peace because it reduces the uncertainties of prospective winners and losers in a dispute. The evidence from nonparametric model discrimination statistics and information criteria measures also shows that the sanctions models with new social network power measures have greater explanatory power than or statistically outperform models relying on attributional power measures, such as Correlates of War index and GNP.

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