Two decades passed since the first nuclear crisis in 1993 when the North Korean nuclear problem first arose. Though the international community sought to guide North Korea toward denuclearization by diplomacy through dialogues, at present, this approa...
Two decades passed since the first nuclear crisis in 1993 when the North Korean nuclear problem first arose. Though the international community sought to guide North Korea toward denuclearization by diplomacy through dialogues, at present, this approach has virtually failed. In the past, between the Republic of Korea and North Korea, there have been numerous agreements, such as the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (1992), and the Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (1994). After the second nuclear crisis (2003), there were the 19 September Joint Statement, 13 February Agreement, and the 3 October Agreement through the Six-Party Talks; however, the reality is that none of the above are being executed.
During this time period, North Korea enhanced its nuclear capabilities through three nuclear tests and secured not only plutonium reprocessing capabilities but also highly enriched uranium. North Korea boasts that it has diversified, miniaturized, and reduced the weight of nuclear warheads. Now, North Korea boldly proclaims itself a nuclear power in its constitution, and has declared “Byeongjin” policy, a parallel pursuit of nuclear and economic development. North Korea has pushed the US to recognize its nuclear power status, and boldly insisted to discuss nuclear arms reduction with the US.
Since 2008, the Six Party Talks produced no results, and relevant agreements did not produce the promised functions. As a result, solving the North Korean nuclear issue through diplomatic means is becoming all the more difficult. Calls for nuclear armament are rising fast in certain sectors in Korea. They argue for 1) the ROK’s nuclear armament, 2) the reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons, and 3) the termination of the joint declaration of denuclearization. However, at the same time, some argue that, given the ROK’s current heavy reliance on the international community, any attempt to secure nuclear weapons is a difficult path to take. Some call for more proactive measures while maintaining the current denuclearization policy, and these voices reflect the present complex situation.
This paper reviews arguments for and against nuclear armament. First, from the proponent’s perspective, it matches the sentiment among the Korean people, and can be seen as a feasible alternative to be used to negotiate for North Korea to give up nuclear weapons, force China to shift its North Korea policies, and to enhance the US’ extended deterrence. However, from the opponent’s perspective, organic nuclear armament is realistically impossible, reintroducing the US’ tactical weapons involves numerous problems, and should the ROK face strong opposition from the US, it can create critical security risks stemming from the fracture in the ROK-US Alliance. The paper concludes that the appropriate course of action is, on the foundation of adhering to the policy of denuclearization, to search for ground-breaking shift the nuclear policy paradigm.
In addition, this paper also includes a policy proposal to the Park Geun-hye administration regarding strategies against North Korean nuclear. In order to demand that North Korea give up its nuclear and receive international support, the administration should devise alternatives while adhering strongly to the goal of denuclearization. The current North Korean nuclear problem requires more comprehensive measures beyond solving just the nuclear problem. Therefore, it requires implementing dual strategies: one, likened to western medicine, which directly addresses the North Korean nuclear issue itself, and the other, likened to Korean traditional medicine, which addresses not just the nuclear issue but also relevant problems at the same time. As a result, the Park administration’s nuclear strategy needs to pursue a two-track approach. The first track is to make the US’ extended deterrence more concrete and to en...