영업현금흐름의 가치관련성이 경영자 보상 계약에 미치는 영향 = A Valuation Role of Cash flows and Incentive Contracting

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구는 기업이 현금흐름의 가치관련성이 높을 때 이를 경영자 보상계약에서 반영하는지 여부를 검증함으로써, 선행연구에서 상대적으로 소홀하게 다루었던 기업가치평가와 경영자 보상계약에서의 영업현금흐름의 정보적 가치를 분석하고 있다. 분석 결과, 영업현금흐름의 가치관련성이 높은기업의 경우 경영자 보상계약에서 영업현금흐름의 가중치도 높은 것으로 나타났다. 이는 본 연구의 가설을 지지하는 결과로 영업현금흐름의 가치관련성이 높은 기업의 경우 그렇지 않은 기업에비해 영업현금흐름의 증가에 경영의 초점을 맞추게 되고, 따라서 경영자로 하여금 영업현금흐름의증가에 보다 많은 노력을 기울이도록 보상계약을 체결함을 시사하고 있다. 다음으로 재벌기업여부가 영업현금흐름의 가치관련성과 보상관련성 간의 관계에 미치는 영향에 대해 분석한 결과, 영업현금흐름의 가치관련성과 경영자 보상에서의 영업현금흐름의 가중치 간 유의한 양의 연관관계는비재벌기업에서만 발견되고, 재벌기업에서는 유의성이 사라졌다. 이는 재벌기업에서는 지배구조의특성에 기인한 비효율성이 존재하여 기업가치 극대화를 위한 경영자 보상계약 설계가 이루어지고있지 않음을 보여 주고 있다. 본 연구는 경영자 보상계약에서 영업현금흐름에 대한 정보가 어떻게역할을 하는지 보여 줌으로써 관련 연구의 확장에 기여함과 동시에, 영업현금흐름의 가치관련성이설명변수로서 종속변수인 기업의 특성에 미치는 영향을 분석함으로써, 선행연구에 추가적인 공헌점을 가질 수 있다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In this study, I investigate the role of cash flow from operation (CFO) in performance evaluationpurposes. Earnings and CFO are the recognized accounting indicators of firm performance.
Anecdotal and research evidence have established that earnings and cash flows have differentialimplications for firm performance. While the literature is replete with research that show thecontracting role of earnings, evidence on the relevance of CFO in incentive contracting is sparseand weak. The incentive plans of noted companies justify the link between CFO and executivereward on the logic that CFO is a key driver of success and stock return. From a valuation pointof view, CFO is useful because it is one of a key component of the firm performance. Marketparticipants, therefore, use the signal to update their beliefs about the outcome. So from acontracting point of view, management cash compensation would be sensitive to value relevanceof CFO. Using compensation and accounting data for a number of Korean firms over an 9－yearperiod from 2001 to 2009, I find that pay－sensitivity of CFO is higher for firms that exhibit highvalue relevance of CFO. Next, I examine whether the association between value relevance andcompensation weights of CFO is different between chaebol firms and non－chaebol firms. Thecontrolling families of a chaebol group have been criticized for running the affiliated firms as avehicle to enrich their own personal wealth, and not necessarily the wealth of shareholders in thoseindividual companies. It has been alleged that a chaebol sometimes instructs its member firm totransfer wealth to a member firm under financial distress via illegal related－party transactions.
Such ‘tunneling’ may be consistent with the interest of the controlling family and the group as awhole yet it is done at the expense of the minority shareholders of the firm. There are two papersclosely related to my second project. Campbell and Keys (2002) show that chaebol firms underperformnon－chaebol firms financially and that top executive turnover is not significantly relatedto firm performance for chaebol firms whereas it is for non－chaebol firms, suggesting that ifgroup chairman or controlling shareholder mandates top executives to pursue the interest ofchaebol as a whole, executive turnover might be insensitive to individual firm－level performance.
Kato et al. (2007) have found that cash compensation of Korean executives is significantly relatedto stock market performance only for non－chaebol firms, not for chaebol firms. Such evidencesuggests that if top executives of chaebol are mandated to pursue the interests of the overall group, and not the shareholders’ interest of the firm they work for, their cash compensation would be lesssensitive to value relevance of CFO, compared to those firms unaffiliated to any chaebol group.
I find that the association between value relevance and compensation weights of CFO remains stillsignificant only in non－chaebol firms, whereas the significance disappears in the chaebol firms,supporting for the hypothesis.

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