모종삼(牟宗三)의 원선론(圓善論) 연구 - 덕복일치(德福一致)의 존유론적(存有論的) 해석에 대한 비판적 고찰 = A Study on Mou Zongsan`s Theory of Yuanshan 圓善: Critique of Ontological Interpretation on the Unity of Virtue and Happiness

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In this article, I try to shed light on the ontological theory of yuanshan 圓善 (the highest good) of Mou Zongshan from the epistemological point of view. According to Mou, although every religion sets forth a limitless and transcendental being as premise, it is not right to objectify, substantialize, and personalize it as Christianity. In this regard, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, that affirm wuxianzhixin 無限智心 as the limitless and transcendental being without objectification, substantiation, and personification in Chinese religious tradition, can resolve the problem of yuanshan concerning the unity of virtue and happiness. However, as Buddhism and Taoism have no concept of renti 仁體 as the noumenal substance with creativity and omnipresence, they are not able to be regarded as yuanjiao 圓敎 (the highest teaching) to reveal yuanshan. Only the main stream of orthodox Neo-Confucianism except Cheng-Zhu 程朱 school, which stemmed from Confucius and Mencius, can settle the problem of the highest good as the unity of virtue and happiness. However, I conclude in this paper through a final analysis as follows: siwujiao 四無敎 as the highest teaching is not a real embodiment of yuanshan, but a solution in the level of mental state. In the case of siyoujiao 四有敎, as the unity of virtue and happiness is not secured necessarily, we cannot acknowledge the moral substance of renti ontologically, which we need to “postulate” in Kantian sense.