The Determinants of Upfront Fees = Evidence from Chinese Debt Market

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구는 중국에서 형성된 개의 신디케이트론 샘플을 이용하여 정보투명 122 성과 대주의 보호 여부 (lender protection) 등이 신디케이트론의 비이자수익인 선불수수료 (upfront fee) 와 어떤 관련성이 있는가를 연구하였다. 선불수수료에 관련성이 높은 대출만기, 규모, 목적 등을 통제변수로 사용하였으며 특히 이자 율과 수수료간의 내생성을 고려하여 이를 통제하였다. 연구의 주요 결과로 첫 째, 중국 차입자에 대한 정보투명도가 떨어질수록 (즉 공적정보가 부재할수록) 중국 차입자는 높은 선불수수료를 지불하였다. 둘째, 대출계약이 커버넌트 (covenant)를 제공하거나 선순위일 경우 금융기관은 중국차입자에 더 많은 선 불수수료을 요구함을 알 수 있는데 이는 채무불이행의 가능성이 이러한 차입자의 경우 오히려 더 높다는 가설 (즉, the observed risk hypothesis) 을 뒷받침하고 있다. 이러한 결과는 이자율과 수수료의 내생관계를 통제하였을 때 나타나고 있으며 Dennis et al. (2000)의 주장처럼 대출계약 관련 변수를 분석할 경우 변 수 간 내생성을 통제하여야 한다는 결론을 제시하고 있다. 마지막으로 대출 규모 및 형식들도 중국 차입자의 선불수수료에 영향을 미치고 있음을 알 수 있다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In this paper, we investigate the effects of information transparency and lender protection on the lending premium of Chinese firms. The lending premium is reflected in the front-end payments. In the multivariate equation as well as the simultaneous equation model, more opaque Chinese borrowers, i.e. unrated and/or not listed borrowers, pay higher premium. Banks and other private lenders charge higher upfront fees to control potential adverse selection and moral hazard problems. While we find a strong negative relationship between upfront fees and lender protection proxies assuming loan spread is exogenous, the relationship becomes positive when they are modeled endogenously. This result is consistent with so-called "the observed risk hypothesis". Also when we model upfront fees and spread endogenously, the coefficient of loan maturity variable becomes significantly negative. Our results imply that, as Dennis et al. (2000) mention, simultaneous treatment of loan contract variables is necessary in order to avoid biases resulting from model specification.

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