기업지배구조의 합주(Orchestration) = 균형성과표(Balanced Scorecard) 개념 적용을 통한 기업 지배구조의 성과 분석

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Despite the growing importance of corporate governance practices, information in the areas of corporate ownership and board practices is still scarce. This study fills the research gaps by examining the effects of corporate governance structure on balanced investments, arguing that the effective governance structure enhances the balanced investments. Agency theory suggests that investors need to be concerned with the scopes of investments because of the significant benefits and risks associated with these important decision-makings. Agency theory, also, suggests that the interests of shareholders and mangers are more aligned when there are large bolckholders. Also, prior research shows that the presence of large blockholders enhances long-term investments. Thus, I examine whether the large blockholders enhance the balanced investments. A company’s board is the primary internal corporate governance mechanism responsible for setting investment policy and monitoring managers. Especially, outside directors have both willingness and abilities to monitor managers’self-serving behaviors. Outside directors often already have expertise relevant to monitoring managers and are experts in evaluating investment risks. Therefore, a stronger outside directorship gives managers as well as shareholders confidence that a firm will invest appropriate areas and yield benefits to both of them. Hence, I examine whether outside directors on board enhance the balanced investments. In terms of the structure and balance of ownership, foreign investors are now increasingly controlling corporate equity. In Korea, foreign investors are largest owners of corporations and control about USD 250 billion in stocks. Corporate governance research suggests that foreign investors are increasingly resorting to activism to press their demands. Theorists argue that these activism constrain managerial opportunism related to investment decisions. Thus, I examine whether foreign investors enhance the balanced investments. High aggregate equity holdings both institutional investors and foreign investors create liquidity problem. The difficulty of exit provides these investors with the incentive to exercise voice to influence the level and mix of investments. This creates a mutual dependence. Foreign investors depend on institutional investors’expertises on Korean firms, while institutional investors depend on foreign investors’ownership stakes-based power. This mutual dependence creates an additional vehicle for monitoring firm’s investment decision-making. Hence, I expect a firm’s institutional investors may moderate the relationship between foreign investors and balanced investments: the relationship will be stronger for firms with higher percentage of institutional investors’stock ownership.In fact, in recent years foreign investors have taken a strong interest in the boards on the firms in which they hold ownership, as a means of monitoring and controlling the investment actions of these firms’managers. Foreign investors are likely to invest in firms with adequate representation on outside directors because agency costs will be lower, and thus expected returns will be higher. Therefore, I expect that the proportion of outside directors on board moderates the relationship between foreign investors stock ownership and balanced investments: the relationship will be stronger for firms with higher percentage of outside directors.I use archival data-399 samples from Korean listed companies- to investigate the effects of corporate governance structure. In this study, I introduced balanced scorecard perspective to evaluate managers’investment activities. The balanced scorecard supplements traditional financial measurers with criteria that measures performance from three additional perspectives- those of customers, internal business processes, and learning and growth. The findings show that large blockholders have U-shaped relationship with balanced investments. These finding

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