국제무역체제의 탄력장치: GATT체제에서 WTO체제로의 이행과 이후 변화에 대한 연구 = Flexibility Measures in the World Trade System

국문 초록 (Abstract)

국제무역체제는 면책조항의 마련, 약한 분쟁해결기제, 그리고 주기적인 재협상의 메커니즘 도입과 같은 다양한 탄력장치를 마련하고 있는데, 그 이유는 무역자유화에 따른 국내 정치적 부담을 덜고 무역체제의 장기적 안정성을 높이기 위한 것이다. 그러나 GATT 시기의 말미에 나타났듯이, 탄력장치는 또한 보호주의의 수단으로 악용될 수 있다는 점에서 법규와 운영에 주의를 기울일 필요가 있다. WTO체제는 탄력장치 사용의 법적 제도적 기준을 엄격히 함으로써 이 문제를 해결하고자 했다. 그러나 WTO 체제 하에서도 역시 탄력장치가 적절한 기능을 한다고 보기 어려운데, 국가들이 세이프가드조치와 같은 합법적 탄력장치를 이용하는 것 보다 반덤핑과 상계관세 조치와 같은 무역조치들을 이용하여 국내산업을 보호하고자 한다는 사실에서 그 문제점을 확인할 수 있다. 이러한 탄력장치의 왜곡은, 반덤핑과 상계관세 등의 무역조치규정이 지나치게 느슨한 반면 세이프가드 협정의 법 조항과 적용이 지나치게 엄격하고 까다롭기 때문이다. 따라서 여타 무역조치의 내용과 적용을 보다 엄격하게 개선함과 동시에, 세이프가드의 발동요건이나 발동국의 입증 의무를 보다 유연하게 현실화할 필요가 있다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Most international institutions introduce various flexibility measures for adjustment, which decrease the risk of the collapse of the cooperative system and facilitate the achievement of the agreement ex ante. In the context of the international trading system, escape clauses (that allow temporary departure from the agreement), weak-punishment mechanisms (that allow efficient breaches), and regularly arranged renegotiation mechanisms are the examples of flexibility measures. In spite of the importance of these measures for managing domestic or external risks entailed by trade liberalization agreements, they also entail considerable costs when they are abused as protective measures, as was seen in the later GATT period. The legalized system of the WTO intends to minimize these costs, since it provides strict guidelines concerning the appropriate use of the measures. However, the experience of the last 10 years of the WTO reveals that the safeguard measure, which is designed to function as the key to the flexibility measures of the WTO system, does not work properly. Due to too strict and burdensome requirements for using safeguard measures, states tend to use other trade measures such as anti-dumping duties or countervailing duties rather than to resort to safeguard measures.

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