5.16군사정부기 미 대한원조정책의 성격과 AID-유솜의 역할 = 초기 울산공업단지 건설과정을 중심으로

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Contrary to previous understanding, the U.S. policy of Korean aid was actually shifting during the Kennedy administration. The magnitude of Korean aid which included aiding 600,000 Korean troops was becoming a burden for the U.S., and was preventing the U.S. government from adopting its new foreign aid policy to Korea immediately. The U.S. government planned to commence the policy shift in Korea in 1964, which was essentially a switch from military aids to economic aids, accompanied by an establishment of a long-term aid plan as well as an offer of a development loan. The reason that the U.S. government did not actively support the first 5-Year Economy Development Plan in the early years of the “5.16” Military regime was not only because it differed in opinion of developmental strategy with the military government, but also because it was hard to shift its entire aid policy to Korea immediately.
The Ulsan Industrial Complex(UIC), which also included the central factories for the first 5-Year Economy Development Plan, shows us how the Kennedy administration’s foreign policy was shifting at the time. In this transitional period, AID-USOM played more than an active role, by mediating American civilian investments for the UIC, and forcing changes in the military government’s initial plans for construction. This was a strategy of the U.S. foreign aid office designed to compensate for any problem that might arise due to the shift in policy itself. In the end, UIC was constructed not with the U.S. government’s development loan as hoped by the Korean military government, but with U.S. private -and direct- investments aggressively mediated by the U.S. foreign aid authorities.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 머리말
• 1. 5.16군사정부기 미 대한원조정책의 성격
• 2. 밴플리트 사절단 방한의 맥락과 AID의 소극적 입장
• 3. AID의 개입과 울산공업지구 구상의 굴절
• 맺음말
• 참고문헌
• Abstract