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    감사위험과 감사보수의 관련성

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A100856879

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    Since Simunic(1980), a large body of research has examined the determinants of audit fees over the past 30 years. Most prior research following Simunic(1980) has explored a supply view of audit fee which assumes that higher audit risk is associated with more audit work and higher audit fees. However, since audit fees had been regulated by 1999 in Korea, there are not many studies which examine the determinants of audit fees. Based on both the audit risk model and prior research, this paper systematically identifies audit risk factors which may have an effect on audit fees and examines the relation between audit risk factors (inherent risk, control risk, and detection risk) and audit fees. According to the audit risk model. auditors decide the level of tolerable detection risk, based on targeted audit risk and the evaluation of the inherent and control risk of the auditee firms. If targeted audit risk is assumed to be constant, acceptable detection risk is inversely related to both inherent and control risk. Lower level of tolerable detection risk demands more audit hours to achieve the targeted audit risk which lead to higher audit fees from the auditor`s perspective. In this paper, the inherent risk factors include operation complexity and financial status of the auditee firms and the control risk factors include characteristics of both managements and board of directors. In this paper, it is hypothesized that higher inherent risk factors is associated with higher audit fees. We also hypothesize that characteristics of management such as managers` ownership percentage, the existence of managers` stock option compensation plan, and whether managers belong to the business group called Chaebo1 in Korea, have a significant positive effect on audit fees. Lastly, we hypothesize that characteristics of board of directors are significantly associated with audit fees. We don`t predict whether the risk factors are positively or negatively associated with audit fees. The supply viewpoint of auditing services may predict that more effective boards means lower control risk which leads to lower audit fees. However, the demand viewpoint of auditing services may demand higher quality of auditing service in order to effectively monitor management`s financial reporting process, which may lead to higher audit fees. This paper uses 2,724 firm-year data of the manufacturing firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange from 2000 to 2006. Our specific regression model is as follows: LN(FEE)=α+β1 LN(ASSETS)+β2 RECEIV+β3 INV+β4 FORSALES +β5 DEBT+β6 ROA+β7 LOSS+β8 MANOWN+β9 STOCKOP+β10CHAEBOL +β11 OUTDIR+β12 OUTTEN+β13 SUBCOM+β14 BODMEET+β15 BODACT +β16 AC+β17 BIG+β18 AUDITTEN+β19NONATFEE 30/∑/i=20βi IND +37/∑/i=31βt YEAR+ε. LN(FEE): the natural log of audit fees; LN(ASSETS): the natural log of total assets; RECEIV: receivables/total assets; INV: inventories/total assets; FORSALES: foreign sales/total sales; DEBT: total debt/total assets; ROA: return on total assets; LOSS: dummy variable indicating whether the firm had prior 3 consecutive year losses; MANOWN: management`s ownership percentage; STOCKOP: dummy variable indicating existence of stock option plan given to management; CHAEBOL: dummy variable indicating whether managers belong to the business group called Chaebo1; OUTDIR: ratio of outside directors on the board; OUTTEN: outside directors` tenure; SUBCOM: number of subcommittee on the board; BODMEET: number of board meetings; BODACT: ratio of outside directors attending board meetings; AC: dummy variable indicating whether audit committee exists; BIG: dummy variable indicating whether auditors are Big or not; AUDITTEN: auditor`s tenure; NONATFEE: dummy variable indicating existence of non-audit fees; IND: variables indicating the industry the firm belongs to; YEAR: variable indicating the year each observation belongs to. Based on the above regression model. Our main findings are as follows. First, our results show that among managers` chara
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    Since Simunic(1980), a large body of research has examined the determinants of audit fees over the past 30 years. Most prior research following Simunic(1980) has explored a supply view of audit fee which assumes that higher audit risk is associated wi...

    Since Simunic(1980), a large body of research has examined the determinants of audit fees over the past 30 years. Most prior research following Simunic(1980) has explored a supply view of audit fee which assumes that higher audit risk is associated with more audit work and higher audit fees. However, since audit fees had been regulated by 1999 in Korea, there are not many studies which examine the determinants of audit fees. Based on both the audit risk model and prior research, this paper systematically identifies audit risk factors which may have an effect on audit fees and examines the relation between audit risk factors (inherent risk, control risk, and detection risk) and audit fees. According to the audit risk model. auditors decide the level of tolerable detection risk, based on targeted audit risk and the evaluation of the inherent and control risk of the auditee firms. If targeted audit risk is assumed to be constant, acceptable detection risk is inversely related to both inherent and control risk. Lower level of tolerable detection risk demands more audit hours to achieve the targeted audit risk which lead to higher audit fees from the auditor`s perspective. In this paper, the inherent risk factors include operation complexity and financial status of the auditee firms and the control risk factors include characteristics of both managements and board of directors. In this paper, it is hypothesized that higher inherent risk factors is associated with higher audit fees. We also hypothesize that characteristics of management such as managers` ownership percentage, the existence of managers` stock option compensation plan, and whether managers belong to the business group called Chaebo1 in Korea, have a significant positive effect on audit fees. Lastly, we hypothesize that characteristics of board of directors are significantly associated with audit fees. We don`t predict whether the risk factors are positively or negatively associated with audit fees. The supply viewpoint of auditing services may predict that more effective boards means lower control risk which leads to lower audit fees. However, the demand viewpoint of auditing services may demand higher quality of auditing service in order to effectively monitor management`s financial reporting process, which may lead to higher audit fees. This paper uses 2,724 firm-year data of the manufacturing firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange from 2000 to 2006. Our specific regression model is as follows: LN(FEE)=α+β1 LN(ASSETS)+β2 RECEIV+β3 INV+β4 FORSALES +β5 DEBT+β6 ROA+β7 LOSS+β8 MANOWN+β9 STOCKOP+β10CHAEBOL +β11 OUTDIR+β12 OUTTEN+β13 SUBCOM+β14 BODMEET+β15 BODACT +β16 AC+β17 BIG+β18 AUDITTEN+β19NONATFEE 30/∑/i=20βi IND +37/∑/i=31βt YEAR+ε. LN(FEE): the natural log of audit fees; LN(ASSETS): the natural log of total assets; RECEIV: receivables/total assets; INV: inventories/total assets; FORSALES: foreign sales/total sales; DEBT: total debt/total assets; ROA: return on total assets; LOSS: dummy variable indicating whether the firm had prior 3 consecutive year losses; MANOWN: management`s ownership percentage; STOCKOP: dummy variable indicating existence of stock option plan given to management; CHAEBOL: dummy variable indicating whether managers belong to the business group called Chaebo1; OUTDIR: ratio of outside directors on the board; OUTTEN: outside directors` tenure; SUBCOM: number of subcommittee on the board; BODMEET: number of board meetings; BODACT: ratio of outside directors attending board meetings; AC: dummy variable indicating whether audit committee exists; BIG: dummy variable indicating whether auditors are Big or not; AUDITTEN: auditor`s tenure; NONATFEE: dummy variable indicating existence of non-audit fees; IND: variables indicating the industry the firm belongs to; YEAR: variable indicating the year each observation belongs to. Based on the above regression model. Our main findings are as follows. First, our results show that among managers` chara

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 나종길, "회계감사인의 산업별 전문성과 회계감사보수와의 관계" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 33-68, 2006

    2 신현한, "최고경영자의 교체에 따른 경영성과 변화" 한국재무학회 16 (16): 231-256, 2003

    3 신현한, "최고경영자에 대한 감사지 역할의 변화: 아시아 금융위기를 전후로 한 비교" 한국전략경영학회 7 (7): 1-26, 2004

    4 강내철, "지분법 감사위험이 감사보수와 감사시간에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 18 (18): 35-56, 2009

    5 안홍복, "이익정보의 유용성과 기업소유지배구조의 관련성" 한국산업경영학회 20 (20): 1-37, 2005

    6 김준철, "이사회구조 및 기업집단의 그룹본부가 경영자보상에 미치는 영향" 한국전략경영학회 8 (8): 21-38, 2005

    7 최관, "이사회 및 감사위원회의 특성과 회계부정 간의 관계에 관한 실증분석" 한국공인회계사회 48 (48): 351-389, 2008

    8 이동기, "이사회 구조가 연구 개발투자에 미치는 영향" 한국경영학회 30 (30): 1251-1263, 2001

    9 김병호, "우리나라 기업에서 이사회의 구성이 이익 조정에 미치는 영향에 대한 실증적 연구: 이익의 상향과 하향 조정 유인의 경우를 중심으로" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 1-32, 2006

    10 신현한, "외부감시주체와 기업가치" 한국재무학회 17 (17): 41-72, 2004

    1 나종길, "회계감사인의 산업별 전문성과 회계감사보수와의 관계" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 33-68, 2006

    2 신현한, "최고경영자의 교체에 따른 경영성과 변화" 한국재무학회 16 (16): 231-256, 2003

    3 신현한, "최고경영자에 대한 감사지 역할의 변화: 아시아 금융위기를 전후로 한 비교" 한국전략경영학회 7 (7): 1-26, 2004

    4 강내철, "지분법 감사위험이 감사보수와 감사시간에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 18 (18): 35-56, 2009

    5 안홍복, "이익정보의 유용성과 기업소유지배구조의 관련성" 한국산업경영학회 20 (20): 1-37, 2005

    6 김준철, "이사회구조 및 기업집단의 그룹본부가 경영자보상에 미치는 영향" 한국전략경영학회 8 (8): 21-38, 2005

    7 최관, "이사회 및 감사위원회의 특성과 회계부정 간의 관계에 관한 실증분석" 한국공인회계사회 48 (48): 351-389, 2008

    8 이동기, "이사회 구조가 연구 개발투자에 미치는 영향" 한국경영학회 30 (30): 1251-1263, 2001

    9 김병호, "우리나라 기업에서 이사회의 구성이 이익 조정에 미치는 영향에 대한 실증적 연구: 이익의 상향과 하향 조정 유인의 경우를 중심으로" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 1-32, 2006

    10 신현한, "외부감시주체와 기업가치" 한국재무학회 17 (17): 41-72, 2004

    11 최관, "외부감사보수의 적정성에 관한 연구: 피감사회사의 특성별 분석과 외국과의 비교를 중심으로" 7 (7): 61-86, 1998

    12 박종일, "비정상 감사보수와 감사품질이 비정상 감사시간에 미치는 영향" 한국공인회계사회 (45) : 119-159, 2007

    13 박종일, "비정상 감사보수 및 감사시간이 감사품질에 미치는 영향" 2006

    14 이상철, "대리인문제와 기업지배구조가 회계이익의 정보성에 미치는 영향" 한국관리회계학회 8 (8): 1-37, 2008

    15 이화진, "기업지배구조가 보고이익의 질, 경영성과 및 기업가치에 미치는 영향" 51-82, 2005

    16 정구열, "기업소유구조와 이익의 정보효과" 한국경영학회 31 (31): 10-1727, 2002

    17 최관, "감사인의 유형과 감사품질: 감사보수와 감사시간을 중심으로" 23 (23): 49-75, 1998

    18 노준화, "감사인 유지제도가 감사보수에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 29 (29): 207-230, 2004

    19 이상철, "감사위원회와 회계투명성" 아카넷 2008

    20 박종일, "감사위원회 특성과 감사노력 간의 관계" 한국공인회계사회 (43) : 119-154, 2006

    21 조문기, "감사위원회 제도가 이익의 정보효과에 미치는 영향" 한국공인회계사회 (41) : 95-121, 2005

    22 이상철, "감사위원회 도입이 이익조정에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 28 (28): 143-172, 2003

    23 신호영, "감사위원회 도입과 이익조정의 관련성에 관한 연구" 한국회계정보학회 24 (24): 43-66, 2006

    24 권수영, "감사보수의 결정요인과 감사보수체계 변화로 인한 효과분석" 한국회계학회 26 (26): 115-143, 2001

    25 이세용, "감사보수 자율화 이후 감사보수의 결정요인에 대한 연구: 감사서비스와 기업지배구조의 영향을 중심으로" 30 : 239-271, 2005

    26 박재완, "감리지적 기업의 경영자, 이사회 및 외부감사인 특성" 한국공인회계사회 (49) : 163-203, 2009

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    연관논문

    연구자 네트워크맵

    공동연구자 (7)

    유사연구자 (20) 활용도상위20명

    인용정보 인용지수 설명보기

    학술지 이력

    학술지 이력
    연월일 이력구분 이력상세 등재구분
    2022 평가 계속평가 신청대상 (등재유지)
    2017-01-01 등재 우수등재학술지 선정 (계속평가)
    2013-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2010-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2008-01-01 등재 등재 1차 FAIL (등재유지) KCI등재
    2006-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2004-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2001-07-01 등재 등재학술지 선정 (등재후보2차) KCI등재
    1999-01-01 등재 등재후보학술지 선정 (신규평가) KCI등재후보
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    학술지 인용정보

    학술지 인용정보
    기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
    2016 1.45 1.45 1.48
    KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
    1.64 1.69 2.793 0.2
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