Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China. : Submitted by Mr. Cox of California, Chairman . 1-3

목차 (Table of Contents)

• [Volume. 1]----------
• CONTENTS
• ALL-VOLUME OVERVIEW = ⅰ
• CHAPTER 1. PRC Acquisition of U.s. Technology
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 2
• THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRC GOVERNMENT = 4
• COSTIND: The CCP's Use of Corporations for Military Aims = 8
• CCP Supremacy Over the State, the PLA, and the Economy = 9
• DEVELOPMENT OF THE CCP'S TECHNOLOGY POLICIES = 10
• The 863 and Super-863 Programs: Importing Technologies for Military Use = 10
• Biological Warfare = 11
• Space technology = 11
• Military Information Technology = 11
• Laser Weapons = 12
• Automation Technology = 12
• Nuclear Weapons = 12
• Exotic Materials = 12
• The 16-Character Policy: 'Give Priority to Military Products'
• The PRC's Use of Intelligence Services to Acquire U.S. Military Technology = 19
• METHODS USED BY THE PRC TO ACQUIRE ADVANCED U.S. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY = 20
• The 'Princelings' = 22
• Acquisition of Military Technology from Other Governments = 25
• Russia = 25
• Israel = 25
• The United States = 26
• Joint Ventrures with U.S. Companies = 27
• Acquisition and Exploitation of Dual-Use Technologies = 30
• Front Companies = 33
• Direct Collection of Technology by Non-Intelligence Agencies and Individuals = 36
• Illegal Export of Military Technology Purchased in the United States = 42
• PRC Purchase of Interests in U.S. Companies = 44
• methods Used by the PRC to Export Military Technology from the United States = 46
• PRC Incentives for U.S. Companies to Advocate Relaxation of Export Controls = 48
• THE PRC'S EFFORTS TO ASSIMILATE ADVANCED U.S. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY =51
• U.S. GOVERNMENT MONITORING OF PRC TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATES = 53
• CHAPTER 2. PRC Theft of U.S. Thermonuclear Warhead Design Information
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 60
• PRC THEFT OF U.S. THERMONUCLEAR WARHEAD DESIGN INFORMATION = 66
• THE PRC'S NEXT GENERATION NUCLEAR WARHEADS = 69
• THE IMPACT OF THE PRC'S THEFT OF U.S. THERMONUCLEAR WARHEAD DESIGN INFORMATION = 72
• Mobile and Submarine-Launched Missiles = 72
• Acceleration of PRC Weapons Development = 73
• Effect on PRC Nuclear Doctrine = 77
• Multiple Warhead Development = 77
• Proliferation = 78
• Russian Assistance to the PRC's Nuclear Weapons Program = 78
• HOW THE PRC ACQUIRED THERMONUCLEAR WARHEAD DISIGN INFORMATION FROM THE UNITED STATES: PRC ESPIONAGE AND OTHER PRC TECHNIQUES = 80
• HOW THE U.S. GOVERNMENT LEARNED OF THE PRC'S THEFT OF OUR MOST ADVANCED THERMONUCLEAR WARHEAD DESIGN INFORMATION = 83
• The "Walk-In" = 83
• THE PRC'S FUTURE THERMONUCLEAR WARHEAD REQUIREMENTS: THE PRC'S NEED FOR NUCLEAR TEST DATA AND HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS = 84
• U.S. GOVERNMENT INVESTINGATIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN INFORMATION LOSSES = 87
• Investigation of Theft of Design Information for the Neutron Bomb = 87
• Investigation of Thefts of Information Related to the Detection of Submarines and of Laser Testing of Miniature Nuclear Weapons Explosions = 87
• Investigation of Theft of Design Information for the W-88 Trident D-5 Thermonuclear Warhead = 90
• Investigation of Additional Incidents = 91
• THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AT THE U.S. NATIONAL WEAPONS LABORATORIES = 92
• NOTIFICATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS = 95
• CHAPTER 3. High Performance Computers
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 98
• HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS = 102
• MILITARY OBJECTIVES CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRC'S INTERIST IN HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS = 106
• U.S. HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS HAVE THE GREATEST POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE PRC'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES = 107
• Existing PRC Nuclear Weapons = 107
• New PRC Nuclear Weapons = 109
• Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship = 110
• TRANSFER OF HPC TECHNOLOGY CAN BENEFIT PRC INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES = 112
• Sensors for Surveillance, Target Detection, and Target Recognition = 112
• Sensor Platforms for Aerial and Space-Based Reconnaissance = 113
• Cryptology = 113
• TRANSFER OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY TO THE PRC COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE MANUFACTURE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, MISSILES, AND OTHER WEAPONS = 114
• Missiles = 114
• Chemical and Biological Weapons = 114
• Information Warfare = 115
• TRANSFER OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY TO THE PRC COULD SUPPORT ATTAINMENT OF OTHER PRC MILITARY OBJECTIVES = 116
• Command, Control, and Communications = 116
• Meteorology for Military Operations = 117
• Cartography for Military Operations = 117
• Military Training Systems = 118
• NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER USE BY THE PRC MILITARY = 118
• U.S. EXPORT POLICY HAS GRADUALLY RELAXED CONTROLS ON HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS = 119
• Some Reviews That Contributed to High Performance Computer Policy Changes in 1996 Have Been Criticized = 121
• The Stanford Study = 121
• Defense Department Review of Military Applications for HPCx =123
• Institute for Defense Analyses Technical Assessment = 125
• Defense Department Proliferation Criteria = 126
• Details of the 1996 High Performance Computer Export Control Policy Changes = 127
• Export Administration Act Provisions and Export Administration Regulations Currently Applicable to High Performance Computers = 129
• The Second Stanford Study = 131
• Arms Export Control Act Provisions and International Traffic in Arms Regulations Currently Applicable to Computers = 131
• CONCERNS OVER HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER EXPORTERS' ABILITY TO REVIEW END-USERS IN THE PRC PROMPTED THE REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION = 132
• The U.S. Government Has Conducted Only One End-Use Check for High Performance Computers in the PRC = 134
• Some U.S. High Performance Computer Exports to the PRC Have Violated U.S. Restrictions = 137
• New World Transtechnology = 138
• Compaq Computer Corporation = 139
• Digital Creations = 139
• Lansing Technologies Corporation = 139
• HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPPUTERS AT U.S. NATIONAL WEAPONS LABORATORIES ARE TARGETS FOR PRC ESPIONAGE = 140
• U.S. National Weapons Laboratories Have Failed to Obtain Required Export Licenses for Foreign High Performance Computer Use = 140
• PRC Students Have U.S. Citizen-Like Access to High Performance Computers at the National Weapons Laboratories = 141
• MANY TYPES OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PRC THAT COULD FACILITATE RUNNING PROGRAMS OF NATIONAL SECURITY IMPORTANCE = 142
• THE PRC HAS A LIMITED CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS = 144
• U.S. HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER EXPORTS TO THE PRC ARE INCREASING DRAMATICALLY = 144
• THE PRC IS OBTAINING SOFTWARE FROM U.S. AND DOMESTIC SOURCES = 146
• POTENTIAL METHODS OF IMPROVING END-USE VERIFICATION = 147
• Tagging = 148
• Technical Safeguards = 149
• Other Possibilities = 150
• TECHNICAL AFTERWORD: Changing High Performance Computer Technology Is Making Export Control More Difficult = 152
• CHAPTER 4. PRC Missile and Space Forces
• CHAMPTER SUMMARY = 172
• INTRODUCTION = 174
• THE PLA'S BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES = 176
• Development of the PLA's Ballistic Missile Forces = 176
• The Soviet Union's contribution to the PLA's Ballistic Missile Force = 176
• The Role of Qian Xuesen in the Development of the PRC's Ballisitc Missile and Space Programs = 177
• Development of the PLA's Intermediate-and Short-Range Ballistic Missiles = 179
• The PLA's Current 'East Wind' Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles = 182
• The PLA's Future 'East Wind' Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles = 185
• The PRC's Medium-and Short-Range Ballistic Missiles = 187
• Stolen U.S. Technology Used on PRC Ballistic Missiles = 191
• The PRC's Strategic forces Doctrine = 192
• The PRC's Opposition to U.S. Missile Defenses = 194
• The PRC's Acquisition of Foreign Ballistic Missile Technology = 196
• The PRC's Indigenous Ballistic Missile Design Capabilities = 197
• PRC Missile Proliferation = 198
• Iran = 198
• Pakistan = 199
• Saudi Arabia = 199
• THE PRC'S MILITARY AND CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM = 199
• The PRC's Commercial Space Launch Program = 206
• The PRC's Future Space Launch Capabilities = 209
• PRC Space Weapons = 209
• The PRC's Manned Space Program = 210
• The PRC's Communications Satellite Programs = 210
• The PRC's Use of Foreign components on Communications Satellites = 213
• The PRC's Reliance on Western Communications Satellites = 215
• PRC Use of Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs) = 216
• The PLA's Reconnaissance Satellite Program = 217
• The PRC's Other Military Satelite Programs = 218
• The Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) Satellite = 219
• The Role of PLA General Shen Rongjun and His Son in APMT = 223
• SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE PRC'S BALLISTIC MISSILE AND ROCKET TECHNOLOGY = 225
• Background = 225
• Propulsion Systems = 227
• Airframes = 228
• Ballistic Missile and Rocket Stages = 228
• Guidance Systems = 228
• Ground Support = 230
• Systems Integration = 231
• Payload = 231
• Conclusion = 232
• [Volume. 2]----------
• CONTENTS
• ALL-VOLUME OVERVIEW = ⅰ
• CHAPTER 5. Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 2
• OPTUS B2, APSTAR2 LAUNCH FAILURES: PRC GAINS SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE FROM HUGHES INVESTIGATIONS = 6
• THE PROHIBITION AGAINST TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN FOREIGN LAUNCHES = 8
• International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the U.S. Munitions List = 8
• Department of Defense Monitoring Role = 9
• OPTUS B2 = 10
• The Optus B2 Licenses = 10
• The Optus B2 Fails To Achieve Orbit = 12
• Failure Investigation Teams = 14
• Failure Investigation Begins = 14
• Hughes' Export Administrators Deal with the Licensing Question = 17
• A 'Political' Business Solution = 21
• The Optus B3: Hughes' Efforts to Improve the Long March Continue = 36
• APSTAR 2 = 40
• The Apstar 2 License = 40
• The Apstar 2 Failure = 40
• Failure Investigation Teams = 42
• Failure Investigation Schedule = 42
• The Need for a License = 42
• Commerce Department Conference = 46
• Same Fairing Failure Identified by Hughes = 47
• A 'Political' Business Solution, Again? = 48
• The Commerce Department Approves Data Release to the PRC = 50
• Hughes Tries to Get the PRC to Accept Its Findings = 51
• CIA Analyst Visits Hughes = 56
• A 'consolidated Solution' = 58
• Final Failure Investigation Report Released to the PRC by the Commerce Department = 60
• Implementing the 'Consolidated Solution' = 64
• U.S. Government Actions following the Apstar 2 Launch failurre = 66
• Defense Department Assessments of Damage to National Security = 68
• Damage to National Security from the Apstart 2 Failurre Investigation = 69
• Damage to National Security from the Sharing of Coupled Loads Analysis = 72
• Damage to National Security from Providing the PRC with Information Concerning Deficiencies in the fairing, and Resultant Improvements to PRC rockets and Ballistic Missiles = 73
• Other Information Learned by the PRC, and Defense Department Reaction = 74
• State Department Assessments of Damage to National Secuirty = 75
• Damage to National Security Identified by the Select Committee's Technical Consultant = 85
• CHARLIE TRIE, THE PRC, AND HUGHES ELECTRONICS = 87
• FURTHER INVESTIGATION WARRANTED = 88
• TECHNICAL AFTERWORD: Nose Fairings on rockets and Ballistic Missiles = 90
• CHAPTER 6. Satellite Launches in the PRC: Loral
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 96
• INTELSAT 708 LAUNCH FAILURE: LORAL INVESTIGATION PROVIDES PRC WITH SENSITIVE INFORMATION: OVERVIEW OF EVENTS = 100
• The PRC's Launch Failure Investigation = 107
• The Asia Pacific Telecommunications Insurance Meeting = 107
• The PRC's Creation of an 'Independent Review Committee' = 108
• The Independent Review Committee's Meetings = 109
• The Independent Review Committee's Report = 110
• Substance of the Preliminary Report = 110
• The Report Goes to the PRC = 112
• Defense Department Analyst Discovers the Activities of the Independent Review Committee = 113
• Loral and Hughes Investigate the Matter = 114
• The Aftermath: China Great Wall Industry Corporation Revises Its Findings on the Cause of the Accident = 114
• U.S. Government Assessments of the Independent Review Committee's Report, and Referral to the Department of Justice = 115
• DETAILS OF THE FAILED LONG MARCH 3B-INTELSAT 708 LAUNCH AND INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES = 116
• Background on Intelsat and Loral = 116
• Intelsat = 116
• Loral Space and Communications = 117
• Space Systems/Lorral = 118
• Intelsat 708 Launch Program = 118
• The Intelsat 708 Launch Failure = 119
• Events Leading Up to the Creation of the Independent Review Committee = 121
• The Goverment Security Committee Meeting at Loral = 124
• The Apstar 1A Insurance Meeting = 128
• The April 1996 Independent Review Committee Meetings in Palo Alto = 129
• Meeting on April 22, 1996 = 129
• Meeting on April 23, 1996 = 131
• Meeting on April 24, 1996 = 132
• United States Trade Representative Meeting on April 23, 1996 = 132
• The April and May 1996 Independent Review Committee Meetings in Beijing = 134
• Meeting on April 30, 1996 = 134
• Members' Caucus at the China World Hotel = 134
• Meeting on May 1, 1996 = 138
• The Independent Review Committee Preliminary Report = 140
• Writing the Report = 140
• Loral Sends the Draft Report to the PRC = 140
• The contents of the Draft Report = 141
• Notification to Loral Officials That a Report Had Been Prepared = 142
• Loral Review and Analysis of the Independent Review Committee Report = 143
• The Final Preliminary Report is Sent to the PRC = 144
• Another Copy of the Report is Sent to Beijing = 145
• Loral Management Actions After Delivery of the Report to the PRC = 146
• Defense Department Official Discovers the Activities of the Independent Review Committee = 147
• Meeting with the Defense Technology Security Administration = 148
• Meeting with the State Department = 148
• Reynard's Telephone Call to Loral = 149
• Loral Management Discovers the Independent Review Committee Report Has Been Sent to the PRC = 150
• Loral's 'Voluntary' Disclosure = 151
• Investigation by Loral's Outside Counsel = 151
• Loral Submits Its 'Voluntary' Disclosure to the State Department = 151
• The PRC Gives Its Final Failure Investigation Report = 157
• Assenssments By U.S. Government Agencies and Referral to the Department of Justice = 158
• Defense Department 1996 Assessment = 158
• Central Intelligence Agency Assessment = 159
• Department of State Assessment = 159
• Defense Technology Security Administration 1997 Assessment = 159
• Interagency Review Team Assessment = 160
• Outline of What Was Transferred to the PRC = 161
• Independent Review Committee Meeting Minutes = 161
• Independent Review Committee Preliminary Report = 162
• Loral's Inaccurate Instructions on Releasing Public Domain Information to Foreigners = 162
• Instructions to the Independent Review Committee Regarding Public Domain Information = 162
• State Department Views on Public Domain Information = 164
• The Defense Department Concludes That the Independent Review Committee's Work Is Likely to Lead to the Improved Reliability of PRC Ballistic Missiles = 164
• The Cross-Rertilization of the PRC's Rocket and Missile Design Programs = 166
• The Independent Review Committee Aided the PRC in Identifying the Cause of the Long March 3B Failure = 167
• The PRC Implemented All of the Independent Review Committee's Recommendations = 168
• The Independent Review Committee Helped the PRC Improve the Reliability of Its Long March Rockets = 171
• AFTERWORD: U.S. COMPANIES' MOTIVATIONS TO LAUNCH SATELLITES IN THE PRC = 172
• CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS = 176
• TECHNICAL AFTERWORD: Technical Aspects of Technology Transfer During the Loral Failure Investigation: Background = 194
• CHAPTER 7. Protecting Sensitive Information at PRC Launch Sites
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 218
• PROTECTING SENSITIVE INFORMATION AT PRC LAUNCH SITES: BACKGROUND = 220
• U.S.-PRC Bilateral Agreement = 220
• Export Licenses for PRC Launching of U.S. Satellites = 220
• Defense Department Monitors = 222
• UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS ALLOWS OPPORTUNITIES TO GAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING U.S. SATELLITES AND OTHER CONTROLLED TECHNOLOGY = 222
• INADEQUACY OF CURRENT SAFEGUARDS = 227
• SAFEGUARDING U.S.-BUILT SATELLITES AND U.S. ROCKET TECHNOLOGY AT PRC LAUNCHES = 237
• Country-to-Country Agreements = 237
• Export Licenses = 237
• THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SAFEGUARDING U.S. TECHNOLOGY AT LAUNCHES = 238
• DEFICIENCIES OBSERVED IN THE CURRENT SYSTEM = 239
• U.S.-PRC Technical Discussions Occur Prior to the Issuance of Export Licenses = 239
• Technology Transfer Control Plans and Security Plans Vary Throughout the Space Industry = 239
• Temporary Assignments of Defense Department Monitors Disrupt Continuity of Launch Site Security = 240
• An Inadequate Number of Defense Department Monitors is Assigned to PRC Launches = 242
• Uneven Prior Technical Experience of the Defense Department Monitors = 244
• Inadequate Headquarters Review of Monitor Reports = 245
• Lack of headquarters' Support = 246
• Lack of Intermediate Sanction Authority = 247
• Conflicting Industry Priorities = 249
• Satellite Manufacturers, Not the Defense Department, Supervise Site Security Personnel = 250
• Reliance on Private Contractor Security Is Inadequate = 250
• Insufficient Numbers of Security Guards at PRC Launche Sites = 252
• CORRECTING SECURITY DEFICIENCIES = 253
• The 1999 Defense Authorization Act = 254
• EXCERPTS FROM DEFENSE DEPARTMENT MONITORS' REPORTS OF SECURITY LAUNCHES OF U.S. SATELLITES = 255
• CHAPTER 8. The Role of Commercial Space Insurance in Technology Transfer to the PRC
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 268
• THE ROLE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE INSURANCE IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE PRC = 270
• Insurance Aspects of the Long March 3B-Loral-Intelsat 708 Failure = 270
• The Formation of the Independent Review Committee = 276
• The April 15-16, 1996 Insurance Meeting in Beijing = 289
• The Space Insurance Industry's Involvement in the Release of the Independent Review Committee's Interim Report = 292
• CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS = 298
• TECHNICAL AFTERWORD: The Commercial Space Insurance Industry = 300
• NOTES = 312
• [Volume. 3]----------
• CONTENTS
• ALL-VOLUME OVERVIEW = ⅰ
• CHAPTER 9. Statutory and Regulatory Controls: The Export of Out Militarily Sensitive Technology
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 2
• STATUTORY AND REGULATORY CONTROLS: THE EXPORT OF OUR MILITARILY SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY = 6
• Export Administration Act = 6
• National Security Controls = 9
• Foreign Policy Controls = 10
• Short Supply Controls = 10
• CONTROLS MAINTAINED IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONS = 11
• COCOM (Coordinationg Committee on Multilateral Export Controls) = 11
• Wassenaar Arrangement = 14
• Australia Group = 17
• Missile Technology Control Regime = 18
• Nuclear Suppliers Group = 19
• ENHANCED PROLIFERATION CONTROL INITIATIVE = 20
• EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS = 21
• ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT = 24
• INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS = 24
• OMINBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988 = 25
• ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996 = 25
• EXPORT LICENSES FOR MILITARILY SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE = 26
• Export License Processing Until December 1995 = 27
• License Processing Since Executive Order 12981 in December 1995 = 29
• Pre-License Checks and Post-Shipment Verifications = 31
• Roles of Other Departments and Agencies in Commerce's Export Licensing Policy = 32
• Department of State = 32
• Department of Defense = 33
• Central Intelligence Agency = 34
• Enforcement = 34
• Voluntary Disclosures = 35
• Penalties for Violation of the Export Administration Regulations = 35
• Penalties Under the 1979 Act (Expired Since 1994) = 35
• Administrative Sanctions = 36
• Penalties Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act = 37
• Customs Enforcement = 37
• Commodity Classification Requests Under the Commerce Control List = 37
• EXPORT LICENSES FOR MILITARILY SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE = 39
• Procedures for Referral to Other Departments and Agencies of Requests to Export U.S. Munitions List Items = 39
• Commodity Jurisdiction Process = 41
• Registration of Exports = 42
• Congressional Oversight and Required Reports = 42
• Foreign-Origin Items with U.S. Content = 43
• Enforcement = 44
• Penalties for Violations of the Arms Export Control Act and ITAR = 44
• Voluntary Disclosures = 45
• BLUE LANTERN Checks = 45
• EXPORT CONTROL POLICY TOWARD THE PRC = 46
• Background = 46
• Launch of Satellites on PRC Rockets = 47
• Satellite Launches in the PRC Following Tiananmen Square = 49
• Missile Proliferation Sanction on the PRC = 53
• U.S. Munitions List Changes Regarding Satellites = 55
• Relaxation of Satellite Export Rules = 55
• The Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee Recommends Moving Satellites to Commerce Department Jurisdiction = 57
• The 1996 Transfer of Jurisdiction Over Commercial Satellites to Commerce = 60
• The 1999 Return of Jurisdiction Over Commercial Satellites to the State Department = 62
• High Performance Computers = 64
• Machine Tools = 70
• Treatment of Hong Kong = 71
• John Huang, Classified U.S. Intelligence, and the PRC = 73
• CHAPTER 10. Manufacturing Processes: PRC Efforts to Acquire Machine Tool and Jet Engine Technologies
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 80
• MANUFACTURING PROCESSES: PRC EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE MACHINE TOOL AND JET ENGINE TECHNOLOGIES = 82
• PRC TARGETING OF ADVANCED MACHINE TOOLS = 84
• Export Controls on Machine Tools = 86
• Export Administration Regulations = 88
• The PRC's Machine Tool Capabilities and Foreign Acquisitions = 88
• CASE STUDY: McDONNELL DOUGLAS MACHINE TOOLS = 89
• Findings of the U.S. General Accounting Office = 89
• The U.S. Government's Actions in Approving the Export Licenses = 92
• Intelligence Community Assessments = 94
• Changes to the Trunkliner Program = 98
• Discussions in the Advisory Committee for Export Policy = 99
• The License is Isssued = 100
• McDonnell Douglas's Plans = 102
• McDonnell Douglas's Limited role at the Machining Center = 102
• Trunkliner Program = 102
• Commerce Department Delays Investigating Machine Tool Diversion for Six Months = 103
• The Commerce Department's Actions in April 1995 = 103
• The Commerce Department's Actions in October 1995 = 104
• Allegation that the Commerce Department Discouraged the Los Angeles Field Office's Investigation = 105
• The Office of Export Enforcement's Los Angeles Field Office's Request for a Temporary Denial Order Against CATIC = 107
• PRC Diversion of Machine Tools = 108
• CATIC Letter Suggests Trunkliner Program at Risk = 108
• CATIC's Efforts to Create the Beijing Machining Center with Monitor Aerospace = 109
• Diversion of the Machine Tools to Nanchang Aircraft Company = 112
• Nanchang Accepts Responsibility = 114
• CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS = 117
• PRC TARGETING OF U.S. JET ENGINES AND PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY = 123
• CASE STUDY: GARRETT ENGINES = 128
• PRC Targeting of Garrett Engines = 129
• U.S. Government Approval of the Initial Garrett Engine Exports = 131
• Commerce Department Decontrol of the Garrett Jet Engines = 132
• The Interagency Review of the Proposed Export of Garrett Jet Engines = 134
• Consideration of Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative Regulations = 135
• Consideration of COCOM and Export Administration Regulations = 137
• Resolution of the Garrett Engine Controversy = 140
• THE PRC CONTINUES TO ACQUIRE JET ENGINE PRODUCTION PROCESSES = 143
• TECHNICAL AFTERWORD: The PRC's Acquisition of Machine Tools, Composite Materials, and Computers for Aircraft and Missile Manufacturing = 144
• CHAPTER 11. Recommendations = 166
• NOTES = 178
• APPENDICES = 206
• THE INVESTIGATION = 206
• MEMBERS AND STAFF = 214
• H. RES. 463 = 220
• HEARINGS AND MEETINGS = 229
• INTERVIEWS, DEPOSITIONS, AND DOCUMENT REQUESTS = 235
• GLOSSARIES = 246