자원배분의 효율성과 공평성 그리고 분권화된 메카니즘에 의한 실현가능성에 대한 연구

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Title: Efficiency and Consistency for Locating Multiple Public Facilities.
이 논문은 양의 외부성을 가지는 공공시설을 어떻게 입지하여야 효율성과 정합성(consistency)이라는 두가지 기본적 규범조건을 충족시킬 수 있는가를 연구하고 있고 이와같은 성질을 만족하는 바람직한 자원배분을 찾는 앨고리즘과 분권화기구를 찾는 것을 목적으로 한다. 그 결과 효율성의 필요충분조건으로 국부적안정성(local stability), No-envy, 다양성임을 보였고, 단순한 지역공공재게임을 통하여 강한내쉬균형(strong Nash equilibirum)들의 집합이 효율적인 자원배분 집합과 일치함을 보였다. 아울로 효율적이고 정합적인 자원배분 메카니즘을 만들어내 주는 앨고리즘을 개발하였다.
이 논문은 "Efficiency and Consistency in Locating Multiple Public Facilities"라는 제목으로 Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 138, Issue 1에 게재되었고 (January 2008, Pages 165-183), 아래 웹주소에 등록되었다. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.03.006

Title: Coalitionally strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings.
이 논문에서는 다수대상선택문제(후보자선출, 회원권결정, 자격인정문제 등)에서 사회선택규칙을 연구한다. 선호체계가 분리가능하다는 가정하에서(separability), 집단적 조작이 불가능한 투표규칙을 찾아내는 것이 주요과제이다. 주요결과에서 집단적 조작이 불가능한 투표규칙을 특성화하였다.

이 논문은 Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, Volume18 Issue4, 43 - 51, 2007년 12월에 게재되었고 아래의 웹사이트에 등록되었다.
http://es.re.kr/eng/inc/download.php name=JETEM_18_4_03.pdf

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Title: Efficiency and Consistency for Locating Multiple Public Facilities.
Barbera and Bevia (2006) introduce a notion of consistency between a global decision governing community-wise consumptions and local decisions by individual communities. They consider a simple model of community division and location of (local) public facilities. A location is chosen from a real line. Members of a community have single-peaked preferences over the line and the size of the community does not affect members' welfare (no congestion effect).
Given a set of agents, their preferences, and a fixed number of communities to form, a social choice function determines a community division and locations of public facilities for individual communities. The function is efficient if its decision does not allow any further welfare enhancement (making all agents weakly better off and at least one better off). It is consistent if any local component (a community and the location of public facility for this community) of its global decision coincides with the local decision made by applying the function for this community only.
We offer simple necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency and decentralizability of efficient decisions a la the first and the second welfare theorems. Next, building on a constructive argument used by Barbera and Bevia (2006) in their proof of Proposition 1, we define an algorithm that can be used to design efficient and consistent social choice functions.
Our conditions for efficiency are composed of the following four axioms: no-envy (everyone weakly prefers the location in his own community to the location in any other community), local stability (there is no community where some members voluntarily move out and all remaining members agree on relocating their facility), and two diversity conditions, location diversity and community diversity.
The decentralizability result is obtained, using strong Nash equilibrium, in a game of community division and local public goods provision, similar to the game considered by Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1997a,b). As in Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1997a,b), players are partitioned into communities each of which consists of players with the same strategy choice. However, our model differs crucially from theirs in that there is no externality or rivalry and the number of communities that can form is exogenous. Considering this game, we study the relationship between efficient decisions and strong Nash equilibria, while the main objective of Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1997a,b) is to study conditions for existence of strong Nash equilibria in a more general environment than ours.

This paper was published in Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 138, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 165-183, entitled "Efficiency and Consistency in Locating Multiple Public Facilities".
Website address (doi address) of this paper is below:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.03.006

Title: Coalitionally strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings.
We study "social choice rules" that are not manipulable through coalitional preference misrepresentations, in the framework of multiple objects choice (e.g. candidate selection, membership, and qualification problems) with separable preferences (weak ordering). We characterize a family of voting rules that satisfy coalitional strategy-proofness, which requires that no group of agents can benefit simultaneously by jointly misrepresenting their preferences.

This paper was published in Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, Volume18 Issue4, 43 - 51
Website address of this paper is below:
http://es.re.kr/eng/inc/download.php name=JETEM_18_4_03.pdf