Under the current US antitrust laws unilateral refusals to deal should be deemed illegal only when they harm competition and consumer welfare. But the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act of Korea (MRFTA) does not clearly agree with this proposition...
Under the current US antitrust laws unilateral refusals to deal should be deemed illegal only when they harm competition and consumer welfare. But the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act of Korea (MRFTA) does not clearly agree with this proposition and Korean enforcement agencies and scholars often manifeslty states that unilateral refusals to deal could be deemed illegal even when they only harm competitors without reducing consumer welfare. This disagreement could be attributed to the differences between the economic and social background of the two nations. However, this article maintains that, even though Korean economy is not as big as that of US, Korea had better move towards more tolerant and economics-oriented antitrust policies against unilateral refusals to deal. The main reason for this proposition is that the current rigid rule against unilateral refusals to deal could protect inefficient enterprises at the cost of overall vitality of Korean economy. Economists, especially Chicagoans and post-Chicagoans, have poduced many researches that reveal the unreasonableness of the traditional rule against unilateral refusals to deal which were quite blind to the positive impact of such conduct upon efficiency and consumer welfare. As an example they demonstrated that the refusals to deal in the context of vertical integration could reduce production cost and transaction cost, and that the duty to deal could enhance consumer welfare only when there aren`t any competitive alternatives. Thus the economic reasoning for more tolerant rule against unilateral refusals to deal is quite evident, however, it will take time to move Korean antitrust polices towards that direction. Among other things Korean enforcement agencies should be prepared for the economic analysis to implement the new rules. In the long run Korean courts could train judges for the task. But in the short run they could still summon experts for the economic analysis that the new rules require.