The purpose of this paper is to conduct an empirical analysis on legal limits and problems of the parliamentary inspection of local government (PILG) and determine policy implications. Assuming that obscure legal limits and problems of the PILG are ke...
The purpose of this paper is to conduct an empirical analysis on legal limits and problems of the parliamentary inspection of local government (PILG) and determine policy implications. Assuming that obscure legal limits and problems of the PILG are key issues, this paper chooses the case of Kyonggi province and conducts an empirical analysis. Unlike previous a priori assertions, not many cases were found where delegated and inherent functions of local government are undistinguishable. It was also found that excessive and overlapping requests for inspection materials by legislators are a major cause of ineffective government inspection. In order to substantially improve the process of the PILG, we need to exert significant efforts in developing systematic strategies - short run as well as long run - other than just controlling the inspection process and materials. In the short run, the National Assembly should clarify its supplementary role in the PILG and stop unlawful inspections. In the long run, the PILG should be abolished and local assemblies should have the authority to inspect the local administration. In this way, we can ensure the effectiveness of inspection and responsibility for local administration.