This study is designed to test property rights theory and political market theory in their predictions of the forces that initiate and influence efficiency improvement of SOEs undergoing privatization. The basic tenet of this paper states that althoug...
This study is designed to test property rights theory and political market theory in their predictions of the forces that initiate and influence efficiency improvement of SOEs undergoing privatization. The basic tenet of this paper states that although static in their nature, property rights theory and political market theory imply different time point at which efficiency improvement takes place in a privatized SOE. Concerned mainly with the absence of takeover market under state ownership, the property rights theory predicts that efficiency improvement will take place only after privatization has been completed. On the other hand, political market theory predicts the improvement takes place before privatization when the relative weighting on economic goals increases significantly inside the firm and managers begin to participate in the human capital market. This note concludes by examining value-added, the preferred measure of efficiency by many, and calls for an empirical analysis to test these hypotheses which may help academics and governments in further understand efficient implementations of privatization schemes.