The Political Dynamics of U.S. non-proliferation Policy : the Case of North Korea = 미국 핵 비확산 정책의 정치동학: 북한사례

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Abstract
The Political Dynamics of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy: the case of North Korea.

Hyo-Jin Kim
Department of North Korean Studies
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Sung-Wook Nam (Prof.)
KOREA UNIVERSITY

The purpose of this research is to explore the dynamics of U.S. non-proliferation policy by focusing on North Korea’s nuclear crisis which is deeply entangled in international non-proliferation complexities, particularly in the international non-proliferation regime. This dissertation argues that resolving nuclear issues in North Korea is dependent on the situational context producing an agreement in multiple settings in Northeast Asia. This dissertation has attempted to tackle the puzzle of how U.S. nuclear policy on North Korea has worked in the context of non-proliferation and how to evaluate it, using KEDO as the main focal point. Regarding U.S. policies on North Korea, it has been shown in this dissertation that North Korea continues to be a headache in the Non-proliferation regime, especially for the U.S. Since the 1950s, American presidents have tried to resolve the North Korean problems by employing different approach strategies. Despite these serious attempts, the North Korean regime has been giving the U.S, as well as other countries and the non-proliferation regime, a hard time in dealing with the nuclear crisis.
As a source of explanation for the nuclear uncertainty management by the U.S. and the international regime, based on a variety of non-proliferation policies, this study tries to emphasize the importance of the actors’ perceptions, response to situation and the processes of decision-making within a very limited time, together with specific contexts under which decision makers choose policy alternatives. For this argument, this dissertation examines the overall North Korea nuclear program and the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy against North Korea in terms of the production of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the 1995 Agreement for the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). A controlled comparative case study of contextual factors examines how the U.S., South Korea and Japan, with asymmetric power, developed perceptions of threat and managed the crisis in order to suggest a joint solution to the North Korean nuclear threat.
It is also argued that various policy attempts to resolve North Korea’s nuclear threat turned into comparatively simple coercion and incentives matrix, referring to the Agreed Framework and KEDO mainly because the U.S. administrations were entrapped with a limited policy option, which were strongly influenced by contextual factors such as the structure of society, the nature of foreign policy institutions and the role of political leadership, which could be categorized on two levels; domestic and external situations. The processes and outcomes of nuclear uncertainty management were the results of the interplay of these three contextual factors.
Thus, this dissertation has tried to analyze the conduct of the U.S. nuclear policy on North Korea, in order to address the North Korean nuclear threat under both the Clinton (1993-2000) and the Bush (2001-2004) Administrations along with interpreting KEDO from a variety of perspectives. The capabilities of these two Administrations to carry out their preferred policies have been evaluated, in view of the constraints of implementation that largely influence their policies. In particular, attempts to evaluate KEDO were made, which faced the issue of different status involved countries. In so doing, both Administrations were deemed as the primary factors in their inclination towards a middle ground in dealing with North Korea, hence becoming similar towards the end of the Bush Administration. This dissertation also sought to identify the functions, constraints and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy on how to curb North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, particularly with regard to the policy approach and implementation strategies used by the Clinton and the Bush Administrations in terms of multilateralism and bilateralism, carrots and sticks, the use of economic, diplomatic and military means and the utilization of the international regime.
The two Administrations under analysis were chosen for the study because of both the remarkable differences and interesting similarities in their nuclear policies and approaches to the North Korean nuclear problem. The approach taken by the J.W. Bush Administration rested on a defensive realist perspective that rogue states, and those who engage in proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD), must be dealt with in a firmer way, such as with the use of military strategies to stop their operations. On the other hand, the Clinton Administration favored the use of diplomatic approaches and negotiations, with a leaning towards economic sanctions in resolving Pyongyang’s nuclear threat. Similarities between the two Administrations include their initial isolationist stand regarding the North Korean problem. The Clinton Administration seemed to attempt to build a sort of institutionalized scheme to absorb the security risks and to manage the nuclear uncertainty by providing light water reactors (LWRs) through KEDO.
The Clinton and Bush Administrations’ similarity lies in their initial policy positions during their term. That is, they both started with a policy of indifference towards North Korea. During his first presidential campaign, Clinton never made any mention of North Korea. The case was the same with Bush. However, subsequent events forced both the Clinton and Bush Administrations to address the North Korean threat. While Clinton was driven by the threat of the nuclear capabilities of North Korea, Bush was and using the threat of terrorism as the background for his actions in North Korea. Their approaches to the North Korean nuclear crisis have also been different. The Bush Administration deviated from the Clinton Administration’s policy of containment and engagement from the outset, by employing a conservative internationalist approach, based on a realist perspective, instead of Clinton’s liberal internationalist approach on institutionalism. Bush demanded that North Korea destroy its nuclear weapons before engaging or entertaining any diplomatic means; Bush used a multilateral approach, used economic and military sanctions instead of bilateral diplomacy and the carrot strategy utilized by Clinton; Bush ended Clinton’s Agreed Framework and the KEDO Clinton started.
The rationale for the North Korean nuclear program is contested. On one hand, it is argued that it serves as a defense mechanism for the regime. On the other hand, it is argued that the nuclear build-up is for the accumulation of power, and, in turn, to threaten other countries. This dissertation found that the most dominant motivators for North Korea in developing a nuclear program are concerned with economic survival and security defense. In the North Korean case, observers view that the country uses its nuclear program as a bargaining chip for economic assistance from other countries, especially the U.S. The reason for this is that North Korea’s economy has been in a continuous slump, and immediate regime survival largely depends upon its capacity to maintain a functioning economy. North Korea has experienced a major food crisis for more than a decade, and has failed to provide the basic necessities for existence, thus causing an increase in the black market economy, the spread of foreign currency, a surge in refugee flows across the Chinese border, widespread electricity shortages, and inadequate infrastructure undermining modernization attempts.
Overall, this dissertation found that the policies of the Clinton and Bush Administrations were limitedly effective in controlling North Korea’s nuclear matter without regards to policy options chosen by each of them. This research also found that compared to the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration was more likely to be affected by the prevailing global context.
This research will be a contribution to the existing body of literature on international theories, including area studies of Northeast Asia for a stability and comparative foreign policy. In addition, the dissertation will help practitioners understand the dynamics of non-proliferation regime and interactions of potentially nuclear proliferators, and provides insight on effectively how to deal with the nuclear uncertainty in producing a joint solution. It will serve as a humble explanation for practitioners and scholars to have a better idea of how to analyze and predict the dynamics of non-proliferation strategies and policies for enhancing a global security.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

국문 요약

The Political Dynamics of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy: the case of North Korea.
미국 핵 비확산 정책의 정치적 동학: 북한의 사례

통일정책전공 김 효 진
지 도 교 수 남 성 욱

본 논문은 북한의 핵 의지 사례를 통해 동북아에서 미국의 비확산(non-proliferation) 정책이 어떻게 구현돼 왔으며 핵 보유와 억지라는 불균형한 불확실성이 현재의 핵 비확산 체제 아래서 과연 효과적으로 관리돼 왔는지를 고찰하는 것을 주된 연구 목적으로 한다. 또한, 미 비확산 핵 투명성 확보를 통해 전세계 핵 관리의 안정성을 확보하고자 하는 현재의 핵 레짐과 미국의 핵 정책이 핵무기 개발을 추구하는 강한 핵 동기를 가진 국가들의 의도적인 핵 보유 의지와 핵 능력의 불확실성을 관리 가능한 체제의 규칙(Governance)을 집행, 유지하는데 내적인(internal) 한계가 있음을 밝힌다. 본 연구는 북한의 핵 개발 시도와 이를 억지하기 위한 미국의 대북 핵 정책과 전세계적 핵 레짐 속에서 1994년의 북미 합의와 그에 기초한 한반도 에너지개발기구(KEDO)가 어떻게 탄생했으며 어떤 기능과 역할을 하였으며 핵 레짐의 유지에 무슨 의미가 있는지를 규명한다.
동북아에 있어 미국의 비확산 정책은 냉전시기, 대소련 봉쇄정책의 일환이라는 글로벌 전략의 수단으로 작용해 왔다. 따라서, 동북아에서의 비확산 전략의 원칙은 미일동맹, 한미동맹이라는 일대일 양자동맹에 기초하여 권역별 방위체계를 수립한다는 미국의 대소련 방어전략(Grand principle)의 하위개념으로 작동하였다. 이 점은 특히, 동북아시아에서는 더욱 중요한 대공산권 안보개념이었다. 이는 구체적 비확산 전략의 집행이 상호방위 양자조약과 충돌하거나 배치할 수 없음을 의미한다.
그런데 북한의 핵 변수는 미국으로서는 준비되지도 학습되지도 못한 전대미문의 특수한 사례였다. 그러나 이러한 미국의 비확산 정책의 틀은 1980년대 후반 북한의 핵 개발 의혹이 본격화되면서 변화를 맞이하게 된다. 1990년대 클린턴의 민주당 정부는 북한과의 일대일 협상을 통한 핵 동결로 나아갔고, 뒤이은 부시의 공화당 정부는 초기 강경한 대북 노선을 택하게 된다. 이는 클린턴 정부 당시 체결된 제네바 합의와 한반도에너지개발기구(KEDO)의 이행과정에서 드러난 상호 신뢰형성의 실패에 대한 반작용의 결과였다. 그러나 부시 정부의 정책노선은 클린턴 정부가 취했던 전략과 유사한 방향으로 선회하게 된다. 이는 미 행정부의 외교정책 결정과정이 다양한 대내외 인자(influential factor)의 영향과 한계로부터 완전히 독립적이고 자율적일 수 없음을 반영한다. 구체적으로 미국의 대북 핵 정책은 미 행정부의 변화에 따른 정당 성향의 차이에 따라 이념적으로 변화한 것이 아니라 철저한 현실주의적 토대 위에 미국의 국가이익적 관점에서 무엇이 미국의 이익에 보다 더 부합하는가라는 질문에 답하는 과정으로 채택돼 왔음을 알 수 있다. 북핵 문제에 관한 한, 국제정치를 설명하는 이념적 논리로 방어적 현실주의와 공격적 현실주의 사이에서 변이의 과정을 거친 것으로 보였지만 이는 예측력 있는 이론이라기 보다는 문제와 상황을 이해하는 인식론적 차이에 불과하다.
본 논문은 북한 핵의 불확실성을 해결하기 위해 성사됐던 북미 핵 합의(제네바 합의)와 이후 한반도에너지개발기구(KEDO)의 설립과 집행, 신뢰붕괴로 야기된 청산에 이르기까지의 경험을 통해 미국이 학습한 것은 북핵 불확실성을 해소하기 위한 현실적 비확산 전략으로 보상을 통한 핵 수요 완화 협상과 주고받기(tit-for-tat game)식의 핵 동결의지 확인, 실천을 통한 최소한의 신뢰형성, 이를 통한 현상유지, 동일방식으로 이런 일련의 협상을 반복함으로써 얻어지는 현상유지의 지속, 즉 시간 벌기(끌기)로 핵 확산의 속도를 최소화하고자 하는 전략임을 주장한다.
미국의 핵 비확산 정책(Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy)은 미국 조야의 세계관을 반영하고 있다. 기본적으로 미국의 비확산 정책의 기초는 핵 무기를 보유코자 하는 핵 수요국과 핵 기술 및 핵 물질의 공급능력이 있는 공급국의 접점을 분리, 수요와 공급을 통제함으로써 국제적 핵 확산을 저지 및 안전을 확보하려는데 있다. 국제 비확산 체제 또한 이와 다르지 않다. 클린턴 정권은 경제적 보상으로 북한의 핵 요구(Demand)를 제거하려고 했다. KEDO는 대표적인 결과물이다. 그러나 이러한 양자협의에 기초한 대체전략은 실패했고, 부시 정권에서의 전략 수정은 핵 공급통제에 무게중심을 두는 것으로 나타났다. PSI(Proliferation Security Initiative)는 대표적 실행전략이다. 이는 관련국의 협조를 필수로 한다. 미국의 핵 통제정책이 일방적, 양자적 관계에서 다자적 협상에 의한 안보협력으로 진화했음을 반증한다. 미국은 북한의 핵 통제를 위해 전과 같이 양자관계로 회귀하지 않을 것임을 논리적으로 유추할 수 있다. 따라서 현재와 같은 6자 회담의 틀을 한동안 벗어나지 않을 것이다.
결국 북한의 핵 문제는 미국의 핵 정책의 구체적 차이와 상관없이 해결의 선택지가 넓지 않음을 알 수 있다. 본 논문은 다자협상을 통한 거래를 통해 핵 개발의 현재적 동결 외에는 현실적 대안이 없음을 밝힌다. 북한의 핵 개발 및 보유의지에 영향을 미칠 외생적 변수(예컨대, 체제붕괴, 북한 주민의 대량 이탈 등)가 일어나 핵 관리에 예측성이 사라지는 경우가 발생할 때까지는 어쩔 수 없이 북한 정권과의 현상유지적 기조가 핵 불확실성을 줄이는 방법 아닌 방법이 됐음을 말하는 것이다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

和文 要約

The Political Dynamics of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy: the case of North Korea.
米国の核不拡散政策の政治力学関係: 北朝鮮の事例

統一政策專攻 金 孝 珍
指導教官 南 成 旭


本論文は北朝鮮の核保有事例を通して、北東アジアにおける米国の核不拡散(non-proliferation) 政策の展開経過を確認し、現在の核不拡散体制下で、核保有と抑止という不均衡性と不確実性を、効果的に管理出来ているか考察することを、主な研究目的としている。
本研究は、北朝鮮の核開発計画と、それを抑止する米国の対北朝鮮核政策および全世界的な核体制の中で、1994年の米朝合意とそれを元にした朝鮮半島エネルギー開発機構(KEDO)の誕生、その機能および役割、また核体制の維持の含意を解明する。
北東アジアにおける米国の核不拡散政策は、冷戦時代には、対ソ連封鎖政策の一環であり、世界戰略の一手段であった。従って、北東アジアにおける核不拡散戦略の原則は、米日同盟、 韓米同盟という、一対一 の二者同盟を基礎とし、地域別防衛体系の樹立を求めていた。これは米国の対ソ連防衛戦略(Grand principle)の下位槪念にも当てはまる。特に、北東アジアでは、より重要な、対共産圈安全保障の槪念になっている。具体的には不拡散戦略の実行が、相互防衛や二者條約と衝突することは背馳しないことを意味する。
一方、北朝鮮の核保有という変数は、米国にとって、準備や予備知識のない前代未聞の特殊事例であった。米国の不拡散政策の枠組は、1980年代後半に北朝鮮の核開発疑惑が明かになって以降の変化に対応している。1990年代、クリントン民主党政権は、北朝鮮との二者協議による核凍結を選択した。一方、ブッシュ共和党政権は、初期には、強硬な対北朝鮮路線を選択した。これは、クリントン民主党政権時に締結された、ジュネーブ合意に基づく、朝鮮半島エネルギー開発機構(KEDO)の履行過程で表面化した、相互信賴樹立の失敗に対する反動といえる。しかし、ブッシュ政権の政策路線は、その後、クリントン政権の戦略と同方向へ旋回した。これは米国各政権の外交政策における意思決定過程が、多樣な対内外因子(influential factor)の影響と限界から、完全に独立的かつ自律的ではないことを意味していた。
具体的には、米国の対北朝鮮核政策は、米国の歴代各政権において、政党の政治性向の差異による理念的な変化ではなく、現実主義的な土台の上で、米国の国家利益に合意致するかどうかという観点から採択された。北朝鮮の核問題に関し、国際政治を説明する理念的論理では、防衛的現実主義と攻擊的現実主義の間の変異過程を経たことが明らかであるが、これは予測力ある理論というよりは、問題と状況を理解する認識論的な差異に過ぎない。
本論文では、北朝鮮の核の不確実性を解決するために成立した米朝核合意(ジュネーブ合意)、およびその後の朝鮮半島エネルギー開発機構(KEDO)の設立、履行、信頼崩壊により放棄され清算に至るまでの経験を通し、米国が学んだことは、北核の不確実性を解消するための現実的な核不拡散戦略は、補償を通した核の需要緩和協議、すなわち報復合戦(tit-for-tat game)方式を通じた核の凍結意思確認および、凍結実行を通じて最小限の信頼を形成することによる、現状維持、こうした一連の協議の繰り返しによる現状維持の持続、即ち、時間稼ぎにより核拡散の速度を最小化する戦略であるだと、主張したい。
米国の核不拡散政策(Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy)は、米国朝野の世界観を反映している。基本的には、米国の核不拡散政策の基本は、核兵器を保有したい核需要国と核技術及び核物質の供給能力をもっている供給圏との接点を分離することにより、需要と供給を統制し、国際的な核拡散の阻止と安全を確保することである。クリントン政権は、経済的補償により、北朝鮮による核要求(Demand)を回避した。KEDOがその代表的な産物であった。しかし、こうした二者協議に基づく代替戦略は失敗した。ブッシュ政権では、戦略を修正し、核供給の統制に重心を置いた。PSI(Proliferation Security Initiative)がその代表的な実行戦略である。これは、関連国の協力が必須である。米国の核統制政策が二者関係から、多者間協議による安保協力に進化したことが、それを反証した。米国は北朝鮮の核統制のため、過去のような二者関係に回帰しないことを、論理的に類推していた。従って、現在の六者会談の枠組は、当分の間、維持されることになる。
結局、北朝鮮の核問題について、米国が、核政策を通じて具体的に解決する選択余地が少ないは明白である。本論文では、多者協議を通じた取引が、核開発の凍結以外、現実的には代案が無いことも明らする。北朝鮮の核開発及び核保有意志に影響を与える外生的変数（例えば、体制崩壊、北朝鮮住民の大量離脱等)が生じ、核管理への予測性が消える事態が発生するまで、北朝鮮政権との現状維持基調が、核の不確実性を低下させる方法である。

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Chapter 1 Introduction ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1
• 1. Purpose ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
• 2. Arguments, Scope and Methodology ----------------------------------------------- 4
• 3. Literature Review of North Korea’s nuclear crisis and KEDO ---------------- 9
• 4. Sources of Data ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
• 5. Structure of the dissertation --------------------------------------------------------- 19
• Chapter 2 Theoretical Perspectives ---------------------------------------------------------- 20
• 1. Introduction ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 20
• 2. Realism: offensive realism vs. defensive realism ------------------------------ 24
• 3. Neoliberal Institutionalism ------------------------------------------------------------ 35
• 4. Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 42
• Chapter 3 U.S. nuclear policy towards non-proliferation ----------------------------- 48
• 1. Introduction ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 48
• 2. Development of the U.S. Nuclear non-proliferation policy ------------------- 50
• 2.1. The Beginning Period: 1945-1969 (From Truman to Johnson) --- 50
• 2.2. The Middle Period: 1969-1993 (From Nixon to J. Bush) -------- 60
• 2.3. The Recent Period: 1993-2009 (From Clinton to J.W. Bush) ---- 67
• 3. Key concepts on U.S. non-proliferation policy and its constraints --------- 75
• 3.1. Engagement --------------------------------------------------------------- 75
• 3.2. Consultation ---------------------------------------------------------------- 79
• 3.3. Coercion vs. Incentives --------------------------------------------------- 85
• 3.4. Constraints ------------------------------------------------------------------- 87
• 4. Conclusion: Towards a fresh look at U.S. Non-proliferation Policy --------- 92
• Chapter 4 North Korea’s Nuclear Quest ---------------------------------------------------- 94
• 1. Overview of North Korea’s Nuclear Crisis --------------------------------------- 94
• 2. Technological Path towards Nuclear Proliferation --------------------------- 101
• 2.1. The Plutonium Path ---------------------------------------------------- 107
• 2.2. The Uranium Path -------------------------------------------------------- 108
• 3. The North Korean Nuclear Pursuit ------------------------------------------------ 111
• 3.1. North Korea’s Motivations for a Nuclear Program --------------- 111
• 3.2. The 1st Phase: 1950~1980 --------------------------------------------- 126
• 3.3. The 2nd Phase: 1980~2000 -------------------------------------------- 129
• 4. 1st Nuclear Crisis: Towards the Agreed Framework ------------------------- 140
• 4.1. Situational Background ------------------------------------------------- 140
• 4.2. Growing doubts, conflicts and failing discussions --------------- 144
• 4.3. Towards the Agreed Framework -------------------------------------- 151
• 5. 2nd Nuclear Crisis: Broken Trust and Collapse of KEDO ----------------- 159
• 5.1. Background of North Korea’s Provocations ----------------------- 159
• 5.2. Challenges to the Agreed Framework ------------------------------ 168
• 5.3. Implications: Furthering the nuclear confrontation -------------- 173
• Chapter 5 U.S. Policies on North Korea’s nuclear proliferation ------------------- 179
• 1. Overview of U.S. Policies towards North Korea ------------------------------- 179
• 2. Bilateral approach: new intervention by Clinton Administration ------------- 182
• 2.1. Rationale: Towards the Agreed Framework ----------------------- 182
• 2.2. Strategies: Dismantling Nuclear Demand by Incentives --------- 189
• 2.3. Role of non-proliferation regime: NPT and IAEA ----------------- 192
• 3. Evaluation of KEDO ------------------------------------------------------------------ 195
• 3.1. Managerial perspective ------------------------------------------------- 197
• 3.2. Theoretical perspective ------------------------------------------------- 209
• 3.3. Functional perspective -------------------------------------------------- 214
• 4. Multilateral approach: Returning to Round table by Bush administration --- 224
• 4.1. Rationale: Towards the Six-Party Talks ----------------------------- 224
• 4.2. Strategies: Between Engagement and Confrontation ------------ 230
• 4.3. Evaluation of Bush’s policies ------------------------------------------ 241
• 5. Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 246
• Chapter 6 Dynamics of Northeast Asia in non-proliferation regime ------------- 249
• 1. Origin of Nuclear Threat in Northeast Asia -------------------------------------- 249
• 2. International non-proliferation regime -------------------------------------------- 255
• 2.1. Structure: Multilateral Treaties and Agreements ----------------- 255
• 2.2. Discussions: Weakness and limits of non-proliferation regimes - 265
• 2.3. North Korea’s case in non-proliferation regimes ------------------- 280
• 3. Nuclear Politics of Northeast Asia in non-proliferation regime -------------- 282
• 3.1. U.S.’s Role in Northeast Asia Context and its limitations ------- 282
• 3.2. Japan and South Korea’s dilemma --------------------------------- 289
• 3.3. China and Russia’s double stance --------------------------------- 296
• 3.4. North Korea in NPT and IAEA --------------------------------------- 302
• 4. Lessons for the Future: Hope for KEDO model redux ----------------------- 308
• Chapter 7 Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 311
• Appendices
• Appendix 1: Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula -- 326
• Appendix 2: Agreed Framework between the United States of America and ------ 327
• the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
• Appendix 3: KUALA LUMPUR STATEMENT Joint U.S.-DPRK Press Statement -- 330
• Appendix 4: Text of Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 ------------------------------------ 332
• References ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 339