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      Why Did Nuclear Dominoes Stop in Afghanistan?: Focusing on Threat, Capability, and Constraint

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A109092043

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      Why did the nuclear dominoes stop in Afghanistan? This paper is a logical analysis of this question. Nuclear dominoes are common in rival relations characterized by geographic proximity, ongoing military conflict, and mutual hostility. The U.S.– USSR–China–India–Pakistan cascade of nuclear weapons development is empirical evidence of this phenomenon. However, despite the development of nuclear weapons by its arch-enemy Pakistan, Afghanistan did not proliferate in response.
      This study identifies and validates the reasons why Afghanistan did not (or could not) develop nuclear weapons, categorized into threat, capability, and constraint factors. The most significant finding is that Afghanistan did not perceive Pakistan’s nukes as a threat in terms of intention. Of course, it is also possible to argue that Afghanistan lacked the capacity to bear the various costs of developing nuclear weapons and that structural constraints imposed by international nonproliferation commitments, great power coercion, and regional balance of power dynamics prevented it from doing so. However, the root cause was the symbiotic relationship between the Taliban regime and Pakistan, temporarily easing the enduring rivalry, resulting in a bias in threat perception. These findings are consistent with the constructivist view of the importance of “shared understanding” in threat perception and challenge the realist perception that nuclear dominoes are inevitable in rivalry relationships. They are also significant because they provide clues for peace and stability in East Asia, one of the regions most likely to experience nuclear dominoes.
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      Why did the nuclear dominoes stop in Afghanistan? This paper is a logical analysis of this question. Nuclear dominoes are common in rival relations characterized by geographic proximity, ongoing military conflict, and mutual hostility. The U.S.– USS...

      Why did the nuclear dominoes stop in Afghanistan? This paper is a logical analysis of this question. Nuclear dominoes are common in rival relations characterized by geographic proximity, ongoing military conflict, and mutual hostility. The U.S.– USSR–China–India–Pakistan cascade of nuclear weapons development is empirical evidence of this phenomenon. However, despite the development of nuclear weapons by its arch-enemy Pakistan, Afghanistan did not proliferate in response.
      This study identifies and validates the reasons why Afghanistan did not (or could not) develop nuclear weapons, categorized into threat, capability, and constraint factors. The most significant finding is that Afghanistan did not perceive Pakistan’s nukes as a threat in terms of intention. Of course, it is also possible to argue that Afghanistan lacked the capacity to bear the various costs of developing nuclear weapons and that structural constraints imposed by international nonproliferation commitments, great power coercion, and regional balance of power dynamics prevented it from doing so. However, the root cause was the symbiotic relationship between the Taliban regime and Pakistan, temporarily easing the enduring rivalry, resulting in a bias in threat perception. These findings are consistent with the constructivist view of the importance of “shared understanding” in threat perception and challenge the realist perception that nuclear dominoes are inevitable in rivalry relationships. They are also significant because they provide clues for peace and stability in East Asia, one of the regions most likely to experience nuclear dominoes.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 UN General Assembly, "“General Assembly Would Strongly Deplore South Asia Nuclear Tests under Terms of Draft Text Approved by First Committee,” GA/DIS/3134"

      2 Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a Bomb" 21 (21): 57-, 1996

      3 DFID, "Why Corruption Matters: Understanding Causes, Effects, and How to Address Them" DFID 27-28, 2015

      4 Greg Cashman, "What Causes War: An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict" Rowman & Littlefield 254-257, 2014

      5 Paul F. Diehl, "War and Peace in International Rivalry" The University of Michigan Press 29-32, 2001

      6 Dan Caldwell, "Vortex of Conflict: U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq" Stanford University Press 45-, 2011

      7 Ijaz Ahmad Khan, "Understanding Pakistan’s Pro-Taliban Afghan Policy" 60 (60): 141-, 2007

      8 Tim Weiner, "U.S. and China Helped Pakistan Build Its Bomb"

      9 J. David Singer, "Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma" 2 (2): 94-, 1958

      10 Paul Braken, "The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics" Macmillan 60-64, 2012

      1 UN General Assembly, "“General Assembly Would Strongly Deplore South Asia Nuclear Tests under Terms of Draft Text Approved by First Committee,” GA/DIS/3134"

      2 Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a Bomb" 21 (21): 57-, 1996

      3 DFID, "Why Corruption Matters: Understanding Causes, Effects, and How to Address Them" DFID 27-28, 2015

      4 Greg Cashman, "What Causes War: An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict" Rowman & Littlefield 254-257, 2014

      5 Paul F. Diehl, "War and Peace in International Rivalry" The University of Michigan Press 29-32, 2001

      6 Dan Caldwell, "Vortex of Conflict: U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq" Stanford University Press 45-, 2011

      7 Ijaz Ahmad Khan, "Understanding Pakistan’s Pro-Taliban Afghan Policy" 60 (60): 141-, 2007

      8 Tim Weiner, "U.S. and China Helped Pakistan Build Its Bomb"

      9 J. David Singer, "Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma" 2 (2): 94-, 1958

      10 Paul Braken, "The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics" Macmillan 60-64, 2012

      11 Andrew C. Winner, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction" 28 (28): 129-143, 2005

      12 James P. Klein, "The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns" 43 (43): 332-335, 2006

      13 Charles L. Thornton, "The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction" 9 (9): 135-152, 2002

      14 Eric S. Edelman, "The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment" 90 (90): 69-, 2011

      15 Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime" 4 (4): 478-482, 1995

      16 International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, "The Annual Report for 1998" 102-116, 1999

      17 Ahmed Rashid, "Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia" Yale University Press 2001

      18 Gary Goertz, "Taking ‘Enduring’ out of Enduring Rivalry: The Rivalry Approach to War and Peace" 21 (21): 299-, 1995

      19 T. V. Paul, "Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime" 16 (16): 2003

      20 Michael P. Colaresi, "Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation" Cambridge University Press 2007

      21 UN Security Council, "Statement by the President of the Security Council"

      22 David Holloway, "Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956" Yale University Press 1996

      23 Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea" W. W. Norton & Company 440-441, 2007

      24 Rensselaer W. Lee Ⅲ, "Smuggling Armageddon: The Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe" St. Martin’s Griffin 1998

      25 Francis J. Gavin, "Same as It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War" 34 (34): 2009

      26 김정섭, "Revisiting Extended Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula: The Limits of the Nuclear Umbrella and the Search for Conventional Deterrence" 21 (21): 2015

      27 Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, "Reimagining Afghanistan: Ways Forward" 9-, 2023

      28 Dan Altman, "Red Lines in Nuclear Nonproliferation" 24 (24): 2017

      29 James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War" 49 (49): 385-, 1995

      30 William R. Thompson, "Principal Rivalries" 39 (39): 196-200, 1995

      31 Raven Winters, "Preventing Repeat Offenders: North Korea’s Withdrawal and the Need for Revisions to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty" 38 (38): 1515-, 2005

      32 Moeed Yusuf, "Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons" Brookings Institution 2009

      33 Neha Kumar Tiwari, "Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Cannot Take Them Over" 17 (17): 2013

      34 Samina Ahmed, "Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices" 23 (23): 178-, 1999

      35 Olivier Roy, "Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?" Zed Books 152-160, 2002

      36 UN General Assembly, "Pakistan: Amendment to Draft Resolution (A/C.1/53/L.22)"

      37 John Kifner, "Pakistan Sets off Atom Test again, but Urges ‘Peace’"

      38 Congressional Research Service, "Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Congress" CRS 1-25, 2003

      39 Alexandre Debs, "Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation" Cambridge University Press 1-, 2017

      40 Nicholas L. Miller, "Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?" 23 (23): 33-73, 2014

      41 UN Security Council, "Letter Dated 5 June 1998 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council"

      42 Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Afghanistan, "Key Industries in Afghanistan"

      43 Samina Yasmeen, "Is Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb an Islamic Bomb?" 25 (25): 2001

      44 Sumit Ganguly, "India–Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan" 63 (63): 127-140, 2009

      45 Congressional Research Service, "India–Pakistan Nuclear Tests and U.S. Response" CRS 13-, 1998

      46 David L. Rousseau, "Identity, Power, and Threat Perception: A Cross-National Experimental Study" 51 (51): 744-766, 2007

      47 김재엽 ; 김종하, "How to Develop South Korea’s Conventional Deterrence Strategy" 18 (18): 2011

      48 Robert I. Rotberg, "Failed States in a World of Terror" 81 (81): 127-128, 2002

      49 Gary Goertz, "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns" 37 (37): 160-, 1993

      50 Philipp C. Bleek, "Does Proliferation Beget Proliferation? Why Nuclear Dominoes Rarely Fall" Georgetown University 2010

      51 Pamir Sahill, "Divided by Pakistan’s Border Fence, Pashtuns Lose Business, Rights, and Tribal Ties"

      52 SIGAR, "Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan"

      53 Ian Bowers, "Conventional Counterforce Dilemmas: South Korea’s Deterrence Strategy and Stability on the Korean Peninsula" 45 (45): 2020

      54 Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics" 20 (20): 73-, 1995

      55 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, "Conflict, War, and Peace: An Introduction to Scientific Research" SAGE Publications 99-, 2013

      56 Sungjoo Han, "China’s Nuclear Weapons: Development and Policy" 1 (1): 213-, 1977

      57 Michael S. Minor, "China’s Nuclear Development Program" 16 (16): 572-, 1976

      58 Francis J. Gavin, "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s" 29 (29): 105-106, 2004

      59 UN General Assembly, "Australia, Canada and New Zealand: Draft Resolution on Nuclear Testing"

      60 John Mueller, "Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda" Oxford University Press 2010

      61 Kim Sung-han, "Assessing U.S. Extended Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula" 25 (25): 2020

      62 James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances" 35 (35): 910-911, 1991

      63 Britannica, "Afghanistan: Civil War, Mujahideen-Taliban phase (1992–2001)"

      64 UN Security Council, "Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3890th Meeting, on 6 June 1998"

      65 Alastair Buchan, "A World of Nuclear Powers?" Prentice-Hall, Inc 13-14, 1966

      66 Rizwan Ladha, "A Regional Arms Race? Testing the Nuclear Domino Theory in the Middle East" (Spring) : 2012

      67 David Albright, "A Bomb for the Ummah" 59 (59): 49-55, 2003

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