The September 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement (IMA) and its early implementation demonstrated the practical feasibility of arms-control measures on the Korean Peninsula and were hailed as a breakthrough for peace. Nevertheless, a resumption of Nort...
The September 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement (IMA) and its early implementation demonstrated the practical feasibility of arms-control measures on the Korean Peninsula and were hailed as a breakthrough for peace. Nevertheless, a resumption of North Korean military provocations, coupled with repeated violations of the accord, eventually brought implementation to a halt. Armscontrol theory suggests that the conclusion and durability of such agreements depend on a complex interplay of factors, including the international environment, mutual trust and perceptions of force balance, domestic political will, and public opinion.
Building on this theoretical foundation, the present study identifies the forces that shaped both the formation and suspension of the September 19 IMA and analyzes how they operated within a structural framework. Combining Putnam’s two-level game approach with Kingdon’s multiple-streams framework, the analysis divides the policy trajectory into three phases: (1) Agreement Formation and Early Implementation, (2) Unstable Maintenance, and (3) Agreement Breakdown.
Findings indicate that the agreement was concluded under a favorable international negotiating climate, strong presidential commitment, a stable domestic political setting, and supportive public opinion. After the collapse of the 2019 Hanoi U.S.- North Korea summit, however, stalled denuclearization talks, accumulating North Korean violations, and a shift in Seoul’s North Korea policy following a change of administration converged to suspend implementation. By structurally unpacking this policy change process, the study highlights the institutional and political conditions required to enhance the prospects for successful future arms-control initiatives on the Korean Peninsula.