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      일본의 한국 강제병합과 강대국들의 대응 1895~1910년 = Japan’s Annexation of Korea and Foreign Policy of Great Powers 1895-1910

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A82355170

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      Japanese scholars insist that the Protectorate Agreement of 1905 (=“Agreement”) and their annexation of Korea are all justifiable, and all other powerful nations then agreed. Germany who interfered with Japan (the winner of the Sino-Japanese War) by influencing the first triple intervention, however, never agreed on the Japanese annexation of Korean Peninsula. The major difference on policy in Korea between England and Germany was clearly shown in the report upon the contracting process of the “Agreement”. While the “Agreement” was proper for the English minister Jordan, the German minister Saldern’s report said it was wrong from the start.
      Japan won the Russo-Japanese War and they forced Korean government to sign the “Agreement” and emperor Gojong to abdicate, and finally annexed Korea. Some suggests that was because there wasn’t any benefit in return to them as was to United States or United Kingdom.
      But they strictly kept neutrality in the Russo-Japanese War unlike United States or United Kingdom, and reported the process of Japanese annexation of Korea in relatively neutral and objective points of view. When the “Agreement” was forced to be signed, they tried to find allies and to interfere with the Japanese invasion of Korean Peninsula, and as they couldn’t find any, there was no choice but to remain silent.
      In 1910, while Japan attempting to annex Korea, they organized the second triple intervention with United States and France, and opposed the annexation by insisting the maintenance of consular jurisdiction of in Korea. But the second triple intervention bore no fruit and eventually collapsed. The second Moroccan Crisis during 1911~1912 which aggravated conflict between Germany and France, the second Balkan Crisis and the Balkan War during 1912~1913, the breakout of The First World War in 1914, those chain of events was enough to distract the powerful nations’ attention from East Asia. Japan could rationalize the annexation of Korea by being a part of the winner of the First World War, so called ‘logic of power’, might outweighing logic so to speak.
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      Japanese scholars insist that the Protectorate Agreement of 1905 (=“Agreement”) and their annexation of Korea are all justifiable, and all other powerful nations then agreed. Germany who interfered with Japan (the winner of the Sino-Japanese War) ...

      Japanese scholars insist that the Protectorate Agreement of 1905 (=“Agreement”) and their annexation of Korea are all justifiable, and all other powerful nations then agreed. Germany who interfered with Japan (the winner of the Sino-Japanese War) by influencing the first triple intervention, however, never agreed on the Japanese annexation of Korean Peninsula. The major difference on policy in Korea between England and Germany was clearly shown in the report upon the contracting process of the “Agreement”. While the “Agreement” was proper for the English minister Jordan, the German minister Saldern’s report said it was wrong from the start.
      Japan won the Russo-Japanese War and they forced Korean government to sign the “Agreement” and emperor Gojong to abdicate, and finally annexed Korea. Some suggests that was because there wasn’t any benefit in return to them as was to United States or United Kingdom.
      But they strictly kept neutrality in the Russo-Japanese War unlike United States or United Kingdom, and reported the process of Japanese annexation of Korea in relatively neutral and objective points of view. When the “Agreement” was forced to be signed, they tried to find allies and to interfere with the Japanese invasion of Korean Peninsula, and as they couldn’t find any, there was no choice but to remain silent.
      In 1910, while Japan attempting to annex Korea, they organized the second triple intervention with United States and France, and opposed the annexation by insisting the maintenance of consular jurisdiction of in Korea. But the second triple intervention bore no fruit and eventually collapsed. The second Moroccan Crisis during 1911~1912 which aggravated conflict between Germany and France, the second Balkan Crisis and the Balkan War during 1912~1913, the breakout of The First World War in 1914, those chain of events was enough to distract the powerful nations’ attention from East Asia. Japan could rationalize the annexation of Korea by being a part of the winner of the First World War, so called ‘logic of power’, might outweighing logic so to speak.

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      목차 (Table of Contents)

      • Ⅰ. 서론
      • Ⅱ. 청일전쟁과 1차 삼국간섭
      • Ⅲ. 1차 영일동맹과 독일의 동아시아 정책
      • Ⅳ. 러일전쟁과 을사늑약
      • Ⅴ. 일본의 한국 병합에 대한 강대국들의 반응 - 2차 삼국간섭
      • Ⅰ. 서론
      • Ⅱ. 청일전쟁과 1차 삼국간섭
      • Ⅲ. 1차 영일동맹과 독일의 동아시아 정책
      • Ⅳ. 러일전쟁과 을사늑약
      • Ⅴ. 일본의 한국 병합에 대한 강대국들의 반응 - 2차 삼국간섭
      • Ⅴ. 결론
      • Abstract
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