Rice Control Policy of the U.S.Army Military Government in Korea,1945-1948

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This thesis aims to illuminate how the U.S. Army Military Government (hereafter USAMGIK) stabilized rice crisis of South Korea in liberated Korea. The rice crisis was the most critical economic issue after liberation because of the rapid increase of the urban population and the rising price of rice due to a shortage of rice and rampant rice profiteering. In early 1946, the USAMGIK implemented a system that combined both control economy and market economy policies. Since they were not able to regulate a free market economy, control of the social infrastructure was necessary to make the partial economic control policies successful. In May 1946, the USAMGIK established the national economic institutions for implementing the control economy, and the administration of rural and urban areas was reorganized for rice collection and distribution.
Since early 1946 when the USAMGIK dissolving the People's Committees, the USAMGIK collected rice through government offices in the provinces (to), counties (kun), and villages (myon) and merged the local private railways companies by placing them under the control of the Department of Transportation. Also in case of Seoul, a distribution system among the cho˘ng (a small administrative unit in urban area) was established to conduct a population census and to act as distribution centers for rice rationing.
The rice control policies, however, caused several problems in 1946 when they did not work efficiently. Rice producers suffered from the excessively high collection quotas and the coercive methods used to enforce them. Non- producers were faced with insufficient rations and irregular distribution. Therefore non- producers had to purchase additional rice in the free market at high prices and also the USAMGIK had no choice but to permit black market activities tacitly.
The complaints of people were exploded through the October Uprising in 1946. After the October Uprising, the USAMGIK took more positive steps to improve the system of rice control, accepting the demands of the producers and non-producers. While review board for collection quotas were established and the use of coercion in rice collection was forbidden, positive steps were taken to eliminate profiteers and "ghost" population. The investigation of the "ghost" population contributed to the development of the administration capacity of the Seoul city hall, pan- cho˘ng - ku- city hall and the invention of the tax sources. With the help of these measures, the USAMGIK in 1947 was more successful in rice collection.
The partial control policies were different from the proposals of the both the domestic rightists and leftists. Leftists argued on principle that the People's Committees and democratic organizations should be in charge of the rice supply while rightists argued that the rice policy should be market-based and that the official price system should be abolished. Since the October Uprising, the USAMGIK, rightists and leftists agreed on the rice control policies. Although rightists proposed that landlords collect the rice, leftists favored the use of democratic social organizations, and the USAMGIK preferred that tenants collect the rice. In short, the USAMGIK and rightists groups differed on the operation of the landlords system, and they and leftists groups differed about the political objectives of the system. It means that the USAMGIK did not deny the whole social reform and leftists and support extreme rightists.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS = 3
• ABSTRACT = 4
• Ⅰ. Introduction = 6
• Ⅱ. Rice Control Policy of the USAMGIK (1946) = 11
• A. Food Issue In Post-Liberation Period = 11
• B. Rice Control policy-Collection and Distribution = 19
• C. Establishment and Control of Social Infrastructure in the process of Rice Control = 25
• Ⅳ. Limits of Rice Control and Countermeasures of the USAMGIK = 36
• A. Korean Resistance to the Military Government, Autumn of 1946 = 36
• B. Reinforcement of Rice Controls (1947) = 40
• Ⅳ. Conclusion = 50
• Bibliography = 55
• List of Tables = 61