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      일제의 신사참배강요와 미 국무부의 대응, 1931~1937 = Japanese Enforcement of Shinto Shrine Worship in Colonial Korea and the U. S. State Department Response, 1931~1937

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A76538773

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      Since Japanese encroachment upon Manchuria in 1931, Japan gradually tried to enforce shintoism upon Korea. It is widely known that the Japanese project conflicted with American missionaries and Korean christian's religious conscience, the tension resulting in some human costs in late colonial period. But American diplomats were reluctant in sacrificing the amicable relations between the U. S. and Japan. This article deals with the dialogue between the State Department officials and Japanese ones, the area that has been neglected so far.
      In opposition to an assumption that Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was a crucial point in the U. S. and Japanese relations, there were many dialogue between two countries about the Shinto enforcement upon mission schools. At this time Japanese colonial government did not enforce Shintoism upon the schools in order to make positive images of Japan in the U. S. Joseph C. Grew, then US Ambassador to Japan, also evaluated Shintoism and concluded that Shinto worship is only patriotic ceremony.
      Actually, there came different situation with the coming of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. Before the war, Japan gradually steeped into militarism so that the government began to enforce the worship upon mission schools. William R. Langdon, consul in Seoul, wrote an interesting memorandum saying that the U. S. had only two options: whether SD follow Japanese order or involve into other countries' religious affairs. The implication is that U. S. did not have sufficient reason to intervene into Shinto affairs in colonial Korea except mission property rights. Other U. S. officials also agree to Langdon's approach. The U.S. 'neutrality' had a different message to each party. Koreans, American missionaries and Japanese. The post-World War Ⅱ cooperation between Japan and the U. S. dates back to the antebellum period as this paper shows.
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      Since Japanese encroachment upon Manchuria in 1931, Japan gradually tried to enforce shintoism upon Korea. It is widely known that the Japanese project conflicted with American missionaries and Korean christian's religious conscience, the tension resu...

      Since Japanese encroachment upon Manchuria in 1931, Japan gradually tried to enforce shintoism upon Korea. It is widely known that the Japanese project conflicted with American missionaries and Korean christian's religious conscience, the tension resulting in some human costs in late colonial period. But American diplomats were reluctant in sacrificing the amicable relations between the U. S. and Japan. This article deals with the dialogue between the State Department officials and Japanese ones, the area that has been neglected so far.
      In opposition to an assumption that Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was a crucial point in the U. S. and Japanese relations, there were many dialogue between two countries about the Shinto enforcement upon mission schools. At this time Japanese colonial government did not enforce Shintoism upon the schools in order to make positive images of Japan in the U. S. Joseph C. Grew, then US Ambassador to Japan, also evaluated Shintoism and concluded that Shinto worship is only patriotic ceremony.
      Actually, there came different situation with the coming of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. Before the war, Japan gradually steeped into militarism so that the government began to enforce the worship upon mission schools. William R. Langdon, consul in Seoul, wrote an interesting memorandum saying that the U. S. had only two options: whether SD follow Japanese order or involve into other countries' religious affairs. The implication is that U. S. did not have sufficient reason to intervene into Shinto affairs in colonial Korea except mission property rights. Other U. S. officials also agree to Langdon's approach. The U.S. 'neutrality' had a different message to each party. Koreans, American missionaries and Japanese. The post-World War Ⅱ cooperation between Japan and the U. S. dates back to the antebellum period as this paper shows.

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      목차 (Table of Contents)

      • Ⅰ. 머리말
      • Ⅱ. ‘만주사변’ 직후 신사참배 문제의 대두와 타협
      • Ⅲ. 1930년대 중반 신사참배 강요와 국무부
      • Ⅳ. 맺음말
      • 〈ABSTRACT〉
      • Ⅰ. 머리말
      • Ⅱ. ‘만주사변’ 직후 신사참배 문제의 대두와 타협
      • Ⅲ. 1930년대 중반 신사참배 강요와 국무부
      • Ⅳ. 맺음말
      • 〈ABSTRACT〉
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