부동산정책의 단기 변동성이 주택가격과 거래량에 미치는 영향 : 토지거래허가제 해제 및 재지정 사례를 중심으로*

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study uses the 2025 lifting and reimposition of Seoul's Land Transaction Permit System (LTPS)—two policy changes 39 days apart—as a natural quasi-experiment examining how a regulatory instrument's coercive force affects a behavioral variable (transaction volume) versus an outcome variable (price), and how an abrupt reversal affects market trust. Following Vedung (1998), the LTPS is a Stick instrument that directly governs transacting, not the price emerging from market aggregation—a gap compounded here by target mismatch: the instrument was designed for land, an exchange-value good, but is now applied to apartments, which combine use and exchange value. The study tests two hypotheses: volume and price will respond differently to the lifting and reimposition (policy congruence), and the reversal will erode policy credibility, causing price to move against the policy's intent and persist over time (policy credibility). Both are tested via difference-in-differences and negative binomial regression using Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport transaction data. Volume rose about 119.6% after the lifting and fell about 67.9% after the reimposition, robust across comparison groups, while price effects varied in direction and significance across comparisons and went unidentified in the most homogeneous one; the reimposition-driven price increase itself persisted for 26 weeks without decay. Findings reveal a structural gap when an instrument designed for one good is applied to a different one, and show that abrupt reversals can durably undermine market trust. Policy design should consider not only instrument intensity but target congruence and the predictability of policy change.