Re-regulation of Credit Rating Agency and Policy Implications This policy paper shows that the re-regulation of credit rating agencies may be addressed by looking at the incentive system among investors, firms and regulatory body. The regulatory refo...
Re-regulation of Credit Rating Agency and Policy Implications This policy paper shows that the re-regulation of credit rating agencies may be addressed by looking at the incentive system among investors, firms and regulatory body. The regulatory reform should be more aimed on enhancing the investors` incentive for monitoring credit rating agencies which provide the rating opinions as a third party. The shortcomings of current system are mostly driven by unprecedented regulatory reliance, undue monitoring efforts by investors and market capture driven by issuing firms in the reputed market. To lessen further distortion of incentive structures from the market perspective it may be necessary for the regulatory policy to be more directed toward lifting the market entry of new rating agencies, facilitating membership-based operations, and building up strong internal credit rating functions by institutional investors themselves. Also in order to establish more dynamic and diverse credit rating services in the long term it may be necessary for the reference to credit ratings set by external rating agencies to be substituted or driven by the reference to in-house or internal rating system of investors. Such market structural or behavioral change will in the end lead to reduce the systemic risks caused by the regulatory reliance on the external credit rating system as a whole.