비토행위자(veto players), 정책신뢰성, 그리고 세계 주식시장의 발달

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This article questions why there have existed considerable cross-national variations in the level and path of stock market development, despite an observable common trend that stock markets gained greater weight in the world economy and securities laws converged in many countries. Existing theories of stock market growth that emphasize levels of industrialization, legal traditions, and interest groups, are not satisfactory in explaining empirically observed realities. Therefore, I focus on veto players and international diffusion factors such as norms, regional proximity, and competitive concerns. Based on a time-series cross-section(TSCS) analysis of the size and activity of stock markets in 94 countries between 1960 and 2002, I show that the more veto players, the greater policy credibility, and hence, the higher growth of stock markets. This article provides some policy implications that policy credibility plays a critical role in boosting stock markets.

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