자기 관계적 부정성과 대자존재의 유물론 -에피쿠로스를 읽는 두 가지 방식- = “Self-Relational Negativity” and Materialism of “Being-for-self” - Two ways of reading Epicurus -

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This paper seeks to reinterpret the concept of ‘Clinamen’ found in the natural philosophies of Democritus and Epicurus, using Hegel’s notion of self-relational negativity. The article presents the following arguments to achieve this aim: First, it summarizes Hegel’s assessment of ancient atomism and Epicurean philosophy, with a focus on his lectures on the history of philosophy(2). According to Hegel, ancient atomism amalgamates the concepts of Parmenides’ existence and Heraclitus’ non-existence into two principles: atoms and void. It elevates these principles as the spiritual foundation of world constitution, which holds philosophical significance but is constrained by its external and mechanistic perspective on the relationship between atoms and void. The third chapter of this article examines how Hegel’s concept of ‘Being-for-Self’ in his Science of Logic critiques and reconstructs the principles of atomism. This examination delves into the movement of monads or self-relational beings (3). Marx's reinterpretation of Epicurus’ concept of Clinamen in his doctoral thesis, along with its extension and transformation into the creation of abstract self-consciousness, plays a pivotal role in comprehending Marx’s interpretation of Epicurus. The fourth chapter of this article centers its discussion on interpreting Marx’s perspective on Epicurus as the ‘Materialism of Being-for-Self’. To achieve this, the chapter analyzes Marx's concept of ‘Clinamen’ in his doctoral thesis, drawing on Hegel’s notion of self-relational beings. Marx's thesis aims to compare and contrast the atomism of Democritus and Epicurus, reconstructing Epicurus' materialism, which Hegel had devalued, as the dialectic of ‘Freedom and Necessity’ within self-consciousness. Consequently, Marx’s interpretation of Epicurus can be characterized as the ‘Materialism of Being-for-self’, which philosophically inherits Hegel’s dialectical method and transforms it within a materialistic framework (4).