해군력이 러일전쟁에 미친 영향 : 한반도 안보를 중심으로 = The Influence of Naval Power upon the Russo-Japanese War

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

At the end of the 19th century, Great Britain parted from its splendid isolation policy and extended friendly gesture to Japan which was eager to eliminate Russian influence from Korea and Manchuria. Since the end of the 19th century, Japan had common interests with Great Britain in the Far East in preventing Russia from expanding southward. Russian policy of southward expansion had fatally threatened the interests of both Great Britain and Japan in terms of Manchuria and Korea. As the result of such a situation, Japan approached Britain and signed an alliance with Great Britain in 1902. With the success of the defensive alliance with Great Britain, Japan made France as well as Germany declare a neutral position from Russia, which was one of the Tripartite. Anglo-Japanese alliance thus made a strategic environment favorable to Japan and encouraged Japan to attack Russia. During Russo-Japanese war, Great Britain gave many aides to Japan as an ally.
The purpose of this research is to clarify the role of naval power upon the Russo-Japanese War which was begun by surprise attacks at sea and ended by naval battles. The contents of this research include the background and causes of Russo-Japanese War, process of the naval battles and elements of victory of naval battles. The time period of the research is from the year of Tripartite(1895) when Russia and Japan began to collide directly to the year of 1905 when the Russian Baltic Fleets were destroyed completely at the battle of Tsushima.
The research method is literature analysis based on the specialized books, documents, research papers on the Russo-Japanese war. In order to analyze the roles of naval powers in the war, Kenneth Waltz's 3 images concept was adopted, which consists of individual level, national level and international level.
The research consists of 6 chapters: chapter 1 is introduction; chapter 2 is analytical frame work; chapter 3 analyses the background and causes of the war, the process of the war and the struggle for initiative on the naval battle to have the command of the sea; chapter 4 explains how the naval powers influenced the war; chapter 5 introduces lessons from the war; chapter 6, the last chapter, presents strategic options and directions for contemporary Korea.
The results induced from the research are as follows. The individual level, as Von Clausewitz argued, consists of 3 elements called Trinity, which is ① government, ② military commander and his troop, ③ people's passion. Russia could not achieve Trinity while Japan succeeded. The Russo-Japanese war was a totally fallible war for Russia because Baltic fleet was sent to wrong places, let alone wrong time. 'Wrong place' means that the Russian fleet was remote from Vladivostok squadron and 'wrong time' means that Baltic fleet was too late to rescue Russian fleet in port Arthur. Therefore it was natural that Russia was defeated.
From the analysis of national level, which means naval powers in this study, Japan used her navy aggressively for achieving the command of the sea through decisive battles at sea while Russia insisted on 'fleet-in-being' strategy. The strategy confined her fleet in fortress in spite of Russia's superior naval power, which might be used to interdict sea lanes of Japanese communication and landing on the Korean peninsular and Manchuria.
From the analysis of international level which means naval diplomacy. Japan could defeat Russian fleets one by one through Anglo-Japanese alliance which provided Japan with favorable strategic environment even though Japan had inferior naval power. Moreover, Japan could pre-plan the war and make a surprise attack as well as continued fighting thereafter with the help of Anglo-Japanese alliance. Thus, Japan could achieve her victory in the war. Great Britain not only supported positively the enhancement of the Japanese naval forces which was a critical element in defeating Russian Baltic Fleets in the battle of Tsushima, but also stood strongly by the side of Japan through the war. In diplomatic field, Great Britain did not allow the Russian Baltic Fleets passing through Suez Canal for Asia, and did not supply the required war materials as well as coals. Without the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Japan could not have had battleships nor have financial support for the war, without which Japan might not have thought of the war and surprise attack to Russian navy at Incheon Korea as well as Port Arthur.
The best of the best diplomatic policy is to have and keep an alliance with super ultra power while the worst of the worst diplomatic policy is to impair a strong relationship with the super ultra power. Korea is in a military alliance with USA, which is the only ultra super power. The ROK-US alliance is thought to be the prop of war restraint on the Korean peninsular and the only means to prevent military intervention from our neighbor countries. In this context, keeping a stable ROK-US alliance is assumed to be the utmost strategy favorable to Korea. The alliance is desirable in order not to give North Korea and our neighboring countries any misperception, which might be the result of the weakening relationship between ROK and US.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Abstract
• 제1장 서 론
• 제1절 연구의 목적 1
• 제2절 연구방법및 범위 4
• 1. 연구의 방법 4
• 2. 연구의 범위 5
• 제2장 전쟁에 관한 이론적 고찰
• 제1절 선행연구 검토 7
• 1. 전쟁에 대한 선행연구의 경향 7
• 2. 러일전쟁에 대한 선행 연구 9
• 제2절 전쟁분석 이론 검토 11
• 1. 전쟁분석 이론과 왈츠의 3 Images 11
• 2. 해군력에 관한 이론적 검토 15
• 제3절 분석의 틀 37
• 제3장 전쟁의 원인과 경과
• 제1절 전쟁의 배경과 원인 40
• 제2절 해전경과 43
• 1. 주도권 확보 : 기습공격 43
• 2. 제해권 확보 : 함대봉쇄 45
• 3. 결정적 승리 : 함대결전 49
• 제4장 해군력이 러일전쟁 승패에 미친 영향
• 제1절 개인적 수준 53
• 1. 전쟁지도부 53
• 2. 전장지휘관 63
• 3. 국민의 의지 69
• 제2절 국가적 수준 70
• 1. 해양전략의 목표 70
• 2 해양통제의 방법 75
• 3 해양통제의 수단 86
• 제3절 국제적 수준 90
• 1. 영일동맹과 세력전이 91
• 2. 삼국간섭의 와해와 러프동맹의 한계 107
• 제5장 러일전쟁이 한반도 안보에 미친 영향
• 제1절 동북아 역학 구도와 한반도 안보 112
• 1. 대북억제능력 확보와 한미동맹 114
• 2. 대주변국 협력과 한미동맹 118
• 3. 동맹을 고려한 해군력 건설 125
• 제2절 해군전략의 현대적 유용성 128
• 1. 해양통제 전략 129
• 2. 군사력투사 전략 134
• 3. 한국 해군전략의 선택 137
• 제6장 결 론 139
• 참고문헌 147