I have here attempted to settle to position of the Posterior Analytics within the so-called Organon of Aristotle, especially to fix the order of writing of the Prior and Posterior Analytics, and to clarify the thought of demonstration represented in i...
I have here attempted to settle to position of the Posterior Analytics within the so-called Organon of Aristotle, especially to fix the order of writing of the Prior and Posterior Analytics, and to clarify the thought of demonstration represented in it.
It is, now a well-known fact that the Proior and Posterior Analytics are the most essential works within the Organon. But seeing the fact that, whenever he has occasion to mention either Analytics, Aristotle himself refers to it simply under the title of "Ta Analytika", we are obliged to thick that the distinction between the Prior and Posterior must have been made by some later editor or commentator of Aristotle's logical works. If, thus, the division into Prior and Posterior can not be ascribed to Aristotle himself, is may be doubted with reason whether the two works were written really in such order as the present names indicate to us. The traditional view about this question is, of course, that the Prior is the earlier than the Posterior.
Examining the opinions of some famous scholars about this question, I have found that Maier and Gohlke agreed with the traditional view, and that Solmsen objected to it by showing considerable grounds of his argument. But Ross has refuted Solmsen's view strictly and in detail rebutting his grounds of argument one by one. As for me, even without Ross' strict refutation against Solmsen, I cannot help agreeing with the traditional view, for is seems to me unreasonable that such a great genius as Aristotle should have investigated the method of demonstration using the syllogistic method (in the Posterior Analytics), before he had established the formal method of syllogism (in Prior Analytics).
In the Posterior Analytics Aristotle investigated the method of acquiring scientific knowledge, by means of which we congnize the relation not only between propositions but also between things themselves, whereas the Prior Analytics was merely concerned with the conditions, under which we can derive a conclusion with necessity out of certain premises. In this sense the Posterior Analytics may be called epistemological logic, or as Ross called it, "materical logic". It is indisputable that every scientific investigation should be advanced by means of scientific reasoning, i.e. demonstration. Because we have, according to Aristotle, scientific knowledge of a certain fact, only when we know "that the cause from which the fact results is the cause of the very fact", and "that the fact cannot be otherwise than it is." In this sense Aristotle was right in saying: "Demonstration is a kind of syllogism which brings about scientific knowledge."
From such a characteristic of the demonstrative reasoning, we can see that the primary or ultimate premise in each science should be absolutely true. The main problems which I have treated in this treatise are, therefore, these:
1. What kind of fact or proposition can be the primary premise?―
The answer is that it is what is prior "in nature" or "in itself."
2. How can we get such a primary premise?―
The answer is that we can get it through the method of induction and ultimately through the inductive leap by "Nous".
3. What kind of form of demonstration is the most desirable?―
The answer is that the most ideal is the first figure of syllogistic form.