IFRS 도입 및 감사인의 IFRS자문에 따른 감사시간?감사보수의 차이 = IFRS Adoptions and Auditor`s IFRS Advisory Service, and their Relations with Audit Hours and Audit Fees

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study investigate the relations of IFRS adoptions, auditor`s IFRS advisory service and audit hours and audit fees. Specifically, a focus is given to clients buying auditor`s IFRS advisory service, and their IFRS service fee size (measured by aggregated IFRS advise fees divided by annual audit fees). In addition, changes of audit hours and audit fees after initial adoption of IFRS is also investigated. This paper covers expanded investigations some of which reconfirm the results of the previous studies, simultaneously adding more extended analysis and explanations, including ones based on interview with an experienced Big 4 audit partner having expertise in the IFRS audit and advisory work practice. Samples consist of 5,718 firm-years from 2008 to 2011 (consisting of auditor`s IFRS advisory service clients 1,732 firm-years and non-advisory service clients 3,986 firm-years). Results of this study generally indicate that the client firms buying auditor`s IFRS advisory services tend to have more audit hours and audit fees. This is consistent with the previous study (Ha and Lee 2012). Also, with respect to audit fees, the larger auditor`s advisory fee size, the lower audit hours and audit fees. Moreover, the larger auditor`s advisory fee size, the more discounts of hourly audit fees determined after controlling abnormal audit hours. Because of this additional analysis, I prudently note Ha and Lee(2012)`s explanations, which explains that higher audit hours and audit fees are arising from the auditor`s knowledge of key IFRS issues and the estimated audit fees to cover reasonable audit hours obtained during the IFRS advisory service services. I found that additional considerations should be given to the explanations, such as: (i) knowledge spill-over obtained during the IFRS advisory service would promote audit efficiency as well as audit effectiveness enabling to decrease audit hours, (ii) audit clients buying auditor`s advisory services tend to pay more audit fees. In this regards, I intend to expand the analysis employing propensity-score-matching method and excluding samples of 2 trillion won asset size clients. These excluded 2 trillion won asset samples are extremely complicated clients under IFRS reporting since Korean regulation newly requires them to report consolidated financial statements for quarterly report filings upon the IFRS adoptions. Previously, consolidated reporting have not been required quarterly report filings; it has been required only for annual report filings. In the additional results, I find that IfrsAdvDum variable has no significant relation with difference in audit hours and audit fees; it indicates that Ha and Lee (2012) results are mainly coming from effects of client characteristics rather than auditor`s behaviors with respect to audit hours and audit fees. Similar results are obtained when samples of 2 trillion won asset size are excluded. However, I find negative relations of auditor`s IFRS service fee sizes with audit hours and audit fees. Auditor`s IFRS service fee size would indicate size of the service scopes; I find that the larger scopes, the more knowledge spill-overs. This systematic relation is not changed even after employing propensity-score-matching method and exclusion of 2 trillion won asset size samples; it also indicates that auditor`s IFRS advisory service scope measured by IFRS advisory fee size has knowledge spill-over effects. In addition, I find audit hours and audit fees increase after intial IFRS adoptions. This result is also consistent with the previous study (Lee et al. 2012). However, my analysis include more expanded scopes by employing test variables of auditor`s IFRS advisory service dummy(IfrsAdvDum), auditor`s IFRS advisory fee size(IfrsAdvFee), and post-IFRS adoptions(PostAdopt) variables, all together. Also abnormal audit hours are used as additional test or control variables to evaluate their effects on audit fee premiums/discounts. By these expanded analyses, I find that increase of audit hours and audit fees after IFRS adoptions are deriving from overall increase of audit hour input levels, mainly coming from more expanded audit works as reported by Lee et al. (2012). However, I find no significant difference of audit hours and audit fees between preand post-IFRS adoptions for clients buying auditor`s IFRS advisory services. Since reasonable audit hours for IFRS audits cannot be estimated for each client firms, I do not make judgement whether such no significant difference of audit hours and audit fees indicates auditor IFRS advisory work`s no knowledge spill-over effects. According to discussion with audit partner who has experiences in IFRS advisory service and IFRS audit works, I find insights to explain the results: more complicated and larger size clients tend to buy auditor`s IFRS advisory services. Unless buying the auditor`s advises, large portion of them would not be able to complete their first IFRS financial statements by their own efforts. In the case, thanks to the auditor`s IFRS advisory works, the auditors could successfully finish the first IFRS audits. In the results, no-significant difference of audit hours and audit fees do not necessarily indicate that auditor`s IFRS advisory service does not have knowledge spill-over effects. Various more additional analyses are performed, which have more expanded explanations for the audit hours and audit fees changes related with auditor`s IFRS services. This study has contributions as follows. First, I expanded previous studies` explanations by adding various insights, which become more consistent with the previous studies and intuitive judgement based on the audit practices. Second, I additionally find that auditor`s IFRS service fee size (or service scope size) is related with audit efficiency since the larger service scope, the more knowledge spill-over. Post-IFRS adoption increases in audit hour and audit fee are also investigated in more expanded analyses. These expanded analyses would give more in-depth policy or regulatory implications in audit practices.

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