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    LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DETERRENCE : WHY THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION KEPT THEM

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=T17545959

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    In 2018, the Donald J. Trump administration announced various policies to modernize existing nuclear systems and develop low-yield nuclear weapons. By contrast, the Joseph P. Biden administration sought to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons globally and the role they played in U.S. national security strategy. Despite this declaratory emphasis, the Biden administration chose to retain the W76-2, creating an apparent gap between stated policy and actual nuclear deployment decisions. This study explores drivers beyond the Biden administration’s decision, focusing on two factors drawn from two-level game theory: theoretical drivers within the context of strategic elements and practical drivers within domestic political issues. This study analyzes what role low-yield nuclear weapons play in the current strategic environment, based on theoretical concepts from deterrence theory and the escalation ladder. It focuses on the strategic environment related to Russia and China due to the relative weight of these two countries. It also examines how the Biden administration has specifically adjusted its low-yield nuclear weapons policy by considering partisan politics, budgetary issues, and political adjustment. This thesis suggests that the key components of the nuclear posture persist depending on long-term strategic conditions and institutional constraints, rather than on administrative short-term changes.
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    In 2018, the Donald J. Trump administration announced various policies to modernize existing nuclear systems and develop low-yield nuclear weapons. By contrast, the Joseph P. Biden administration sought to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons global...

    In 2018, the Donald J. Trump administration announced various policies to modernize existing nuclear systems and develop low-yield nuclear weapons. By contrast, the Joseph P. Biden administration sought to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons globally and the role they played in U.S. national security strategy. Despite this declaratory emphasis, the Biden administration chose to retain the W76-2, creating an apparent gap between stated policy and actual nuclear deployment decisions. This study explores drivers beyond the Biden administration’s decision, focusing on two factors drawn from two-level game theory: theoretical drivers within the context of strategic elements and practical drivers within domestic political issues. This study analyzes what role low-yield nuclear weapons play in the current strategic environment, based on theoretical concepts from deterrence theory and the escalation ladder. It focuses on the strategic environment related to Russia and China due to the relative weight of these two countries. It also examines how the Biden administration has specifically adjusted its low-yield nuclear weapons policy by considering partisan politics, budgetary issues, and political adjustment. This thesis suggests that the key components of the nuclear posture persist depending on long-term strategic conditions and institutional constraints, rather than on administrative short-term changes.

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    목차 (Table of Contents)

    • I. INTRODUCTION
    • A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION
    • B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION
    • C. LITERATURE REVIEW
    • D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES
    • I. INTRODUCTION
    • A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION
    • B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION
    • C. LITERATURE REVIEW
    • D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES
    • E. RESEARCH DESIGN
    • F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE
    • II. HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND: TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS
    • A. CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS
    • B. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
    • C. LIMITED NUCLEAR OPERATIONS AND WITHDRAWAL OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
    • D. LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS
    • III. CONCEPTUAL REVIEW: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS
    • A. THE LOGIC OF DETERRENCE: CAPABILITY AND CREDIBILITY
    • B. ESCALATION LADDERS AND THE ROLE OF LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS
    • IV. STRATEGIC DRIVERS OF U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY
    • A. THE CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
    • 1. Russia’s strategic environment
    • 2. China’s strategic environment
    • B. ANALYSIS OF RECENT NPRS
    • 1. 2010 NPR
    • 2. 2018 NPR
    • 3. 2022 NPR
    • 4. Analysis of the NPRs
    • 5. The U.S. Perception of Deterrence Gaps
    • V. POLITICAL DRIVERS OF U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY
    • A. PARTISAN POLITICS AND POLITICAL COORDINATION
    • B. BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS
    • C. ARMS CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS
    • D. SUMMARY OF KEY POLITICAL EFFECTS
    • VI. CONCLUSION
    • A. FINDINGS
    • 1. Enhancing the credibility of deterrence
    • 2. Political factors and coordination
    • 3. Comprehensive analysis and implications
    • B. THE LIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH
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