道德的 行爲의 責任 및 非難에 관한 硏究 : It's Function to Cope with the Morally Responsible Conduct = A Study on 'Blameness'

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Most of the traditional moralists were contented with merely responding to the question:“what kind of action is morally right, obligatory or good?”, without any further concern if they were favored, or not. They firmly believed that the a priori conscience could meet such affairs. Regrettably, with the rise of the ethical scepticism the moral conduct was destined to lose its value and reputation. I wonder if the moral responsibility for conduct could carry out it's expected role as yet.
Accordingly, this paper intends to investigate the real modes of blameness for wrong-doing, in order to ascertain the state of things. The ethical interest in the‘blameness’sooner or later was focused on the problems of it's justification.
First part of this paper covers the theories justifying the legal punishment, of which the refutation between the retributivism and utilitarianism was compromised by a third theory as follows: utilitarianism has advantage over retributivism in justifying the criteria of punishment, while the latter has advantage over the former in justifying a particular punishment.
The outcomes achieved through studying‘punishment’were applied directly to the‘bla-meness’, but it were not so successful as the former. Although we tried to define the universal blameworthiness, but we failed to get a satisfactory answer. Since blamewot-hiness has been formed through the repetition of‘blame’, most of which consist in emotive expression, we have some restrictions in justifying it only with the aid of utilit-arianism. It is also doubtful if a particular blame could be justified under the viewpoints of retributivism.
While the accused stands always inferior to judge who has authority by law, in case of blameness, the superior, the inferior and the middle together can be engaged in blaming one another and it is also possible that the actions‘blame’take place during the absence of the blamed.
The modality of‘blame’can be classified into three kinds: monologue, indirect and direct narration. They were analyzed through insight and analogy. The most efficient case of‘blame’in order to protect traditional morality is, when the superior stands in the supe-rior position. In the cases of the rest, the expected function of‘blame’become degener-ated with the increasing emotive elements and also is challenged by the general symptoms of today: the breach of good faith in the authority, the anomie of the social rules and the fall of spiritual values, etc.
We may imagine many ways to meet this crisis. 1) One of them is that social system might be reestablished in conformity with authority in general or definite principles of behavior. 2) On the contrary we can expect a new horizon opened through a new definition of morality.
The prerational, customary and group morality asserts that moral rules are to be defined by reference to the sanctions and accordingly the person who breaks the rules invites hostility, contempt and ostracism and internally experiences feelings of guilt, shame or remorse. But we'd better pursue to the new morality that requires us to be reflective and autonomous. As a matter of fact, most of us are rather inclined to value persuasion and discussion than contempt and hostility. It seems that this testifys the fact that our conc-eption of morality has already been accustomed to the new morality to some degree.
When we are in the position to blame one another, we should choose rather utilitarianism than retributivism in justifying‘blame’.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 序言
• Ⅱ. 罰의 正當化
• Ⅲ. 非難의 正當化
• Ⅳ. 結言
• Abstract