Research on Industry-Education Integration Policies in Higher Vocational Education : An Analysis of Institutional Evolution Based on Practices in the Bohai Rim Region

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

As a central agenda of China's vocational education reform, industry-education integration has established a comprehensive policy framework at the institutional level. However, practical implementation often faces the governance paradox of ＂existing policies failing to yield substantive collaborative outcomes.＂ This study aims to address the fundamental theoretical question behind the phenomenon of ＂hot policies but difficult implementation＂: Why does deep collaboration rarely emerge spontaneously within highly institutionalized policy environments? Existing research either focuses solely on improving institutional design or appeals to moral incentives for stakeholder engagement, yet largely overlooks actors' strategic choices and their cumulative effects over time. Building on this, the paper incorporates key insights from rational choice institutionalism, integrates the Three-Helix Theory with the theory of gradual institutional change, and constructs an analytical framework encompassing ＂institutional provision → institutional embedding → incentive structures → behavioral equilibrium → path locking.＂ Through qualitative comparative studies of Yantai, Tianjin, and Tangshan cities in the Bohai Rim region along with their representative higher vocational colleges, the study systematically elucidates the evolutionary logic and differentiated operational mechanisms of industry-education integration systems across different governance structures. The study reveals that within a unified national institutional framework, disparities in local governance resources, administrative hierarchies, and industrial foundations give rise to three distinct forms of institutional embedding through different translation mechanisms, ultimately solidifying into stable behavioral equilibria. Yantai has developed an ＂administratively integrated deep embedding＂ structure leveraging the local government's strong administrative coordination capabilities and fiscal resource allocation: it reduces sunk costs associated with enterprises' specialized asset investments through shared financial burdens, redefines profit-sharing mechanisms between educational institutions and businesses via performance-based incentives, and achieves a ＂locked-in equilibrium＂ through significant internalization of exit costs. Although this equilibrium involves rhythmic mismatches between goal-oriented rationality and organizational rationality coupled with high integration costs, it is maintained through cross-departmental coordination mechanisms and periodic performance feedback. In contrast, Tianjin has established a ＂legislative platform-based embedding＂ model by utilizing its municipal autonomy to create regulatory certainty through policies like the *Tianjin Regulations on Promoting Industry-Education Integration in Vocational Education*, while reducing transaction costs via regional industry-education alliances, thereby forming a ＂coordinated equilibrium.＂ However, cyclical fluctuations in project-based funding and the complexity of multi-tiered administrative coordination limit collaboration depth to immediate benefit calculations, prompting enterprises to control dedicated asset ratios for strategic flexibility and hindering the development of a high-commitment structure akin to Yantai's. In Tangshan, facing resource constraints and pressures of industrial transformation, institutional frameworks primarily manifest as a ＂responsive adoption＂ of provincial policies, exhibiting a ＂structurally loose, shallowly embedded＂ pattern: fiscal support is highly initiative-driven but lacks binding force; corporate participation is driven by short-term labor needs; educational institutions adopt project-based cooperation strategies aimed at risk mitigation; ultimately resulting in a ＂defensive equilibrium.＂ The institutional tension primarily stems from the structural gap between resource capacity and institutional objectives. The theoretical contribution of this study lies in transcending the limitations of static institutional analysis by extending rational choice institutionalism into a temporal dimension, thereby revealing the micro-level mechanisms of institutional evolution. The research demonstrates that deepening industry-education integration cannot be achieved automatically through linear enhancement of institutional provisions alone; rather, it depends on the extent to which incentive structures reshape stakeholders 'benefit functions. Only when institutions can alter cost-benefit calculations through risk-sharing mechanisms, increase opportunity costs for non-participation via performance-linked incentives, and accumulate relationship-specific assets through repeated interactions do actors transition from ＂marginal exploration＂ to ＂deep commitment.＂ Conversely, if institutional provisions remain confined to rule declarations without being integrated into core resource allocation frameworks, they may reinforce existing low-commitment equilibria through ＂layered＂ mechanisms, creating a path dependence characterized by ＂strong provision but weak deepening.＂ Furthermore, this study revises the tri-helix theory's assumption of naturally blurred stakeholder boundaries, arguing that under administrative dominance, clearly defined boundaries and institutionalized risk-sharing mechanisms are prerequisites rather than outcomes for deep collaboration. It also distinguishes three equilibrium types— ＂lock-in,＂ ＂cooperative,＂ and ＂defensive＂ —providing a typological framework for understanding the operational logic of industry-education integration across different governance contexts. Based on the above findings, this paper argues that the key to overcoming the challenges in industry-education integration lies in moving beyond the simplistic approach of merely increasing institutional supply and shifting focus to the compatibility between institutional embedding quality and incentive structures. Policy design should aim to establish substantive mechanisms for risk sharing and benefit distribution, respect the governance capacities and industrial characteristics of different regions, and allow differentiated institutional evolution paths to achieve stable equilibrium under their respective constraints, rather than demanding uniform compliance with standardized frameworks.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Chapter 1: Introduction 1
• 1.1 Research Background and Problem Statement 1
• 1.1.1 Context: The Discrepancy Between Formalism and Collaborative Effectiveness 1
• 1.1.2 The Logical Evolution of National Institutional Frameworks 3
• 1.1.3 Challenges in Local Implementation: The Misalignment Between Institutions and Behavior 6
• 1.1.4 The Interpretive Boundaries and Problem-Oriented Approach in Academic Research 9
• 1.2 Research Objectives and Questions 13
• 1.2.1 Research Objective: To re-examine industry-education integration from the perspective of institutional evolution 13
• 1.2.2 Core Research Questions: The Progressive Logic of Institutional Provision, Actor Selection, and Evolutionary Pathways 16
• 1.2.3 Structure of the Thesis 20
• Chapter 2: Theoretical Background 23
• 2.1 Definition of Core Concepts and Legal Basis 24
• 2.1.1 Vocational Education: From Educational Types to Institutional Arrangements 24
• 2.1.2 Integration of Industry and Education: From Policy Discourse to Operational Mechanisms 26
• 2.1.3 Institutional Provision: How the State Shapes Conditions for Action 30
• 2.1.4 Institutional Embedding: The Mechanism for the Penetration and Establishment of Institutional Constraints 32
• 2.1.5 The Legal Basis for Industry-Education Integration in Higher Vocational Education 34
• 2.2 Theoretical Basis 39
• 2.2.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism: Incentive Structure and Behavioral Equilibrium 40
• 2.2.2 Three-Helix Theory: Structural Embedding through Multi-Party Collaboration 47
• 2.2.3 The Theory of Progressive Institutional Change: Path Locking and Evolutionary Mechanisms 58
• 2.3 Literature Review 66
• 2.3.1 From the Perspective of Policy and Institutional Design: From Institutional Provision to Decaying Explanatory Power 66
• 2.3.2 From the Perspective of Main Actors' Behavior: Strategic Choices in Institutional Operation 70
• 2.3.3 From the Perspective of Institutional Evolution: From Static Analysis to Dynamic Mechanisms 76
• 2.3.4 Limitations of Existing Research and the Necessity of Theoretical Integration 83
• Chapter 3 Research Design 89
• 3.1 Construction of the Analysis Framework 89
• 3.1.1 Theoretical Foundations of the Analysis Framework: From Discrete to Integrated 89
• 3.1.2 Structural Design of the Analysis Framework: Institution–Behavior–Evolution 93
• 3.1.3 Framework Transformation and Theoretical Advancement 101
• 3.2 Research Approach: From Feedback to Evolution 106
• 3.2.1 Reconstructing the Analytical Approach Under Theoretical Guidance 106
• 3.2.2 Levels of Analysis: Institutions, Actors, and Strategies 109
• 3.2.3 Explanation Chain: From Context to Result 112
• 3.3 Case Selection and Comparative Design 114
• 3.3.1 Bohai Rim Region: Institutional Homogeneity, Empirical Differentiation, and Theory-Oriented Case Selection 114
• 3.3.2 Three Institutions: Geographical Distribution, Administrative Levels, and Differentiated Integration 124
• 3.3.3 Case Configuration: Functional Division Between Detailed Description and Control Group 129
• 3.4 Data Sources and Analysis Methods 134
• 3.4.1 Research Methods and Analytical Approaches 134
• 3.4.2 Functional Layering of Multi-source Materials 137
• 3.4.3 Description of the interview implementation, data processing, and coding procedures 146
• 3.4.4 Analysis Strategy: From Strategy Selection to Institutional Evolution 211
• 3.5 Research Ethics and Boundaries 217
• Chapter 4 Research Results 221
• 4.1 Institutional Supply Structure: National Framework and Local Implementation 223
• 4.1.1 The Structural Composition of National Institutional Provision 223
• 4.1.2 Local Adaptation-Oriented Translation: Yantai's Fiscal Integration Path 232
• 4.1.3 Strategically Embedded Translation: Project-Based Governance in Tianjin 239
• 4.1.4 Transformation Pressure-Driven Translation: Tangshan's Adaptive Approach 244
• 4.1.5 Integration of Types of Institutional Supply Structures 249
• 4.2 Institutional Embedding: The Differential Penetration of Local Governance Structures 256
• 4.2.1 Administrative Integration-Based Integration: Yantai's Integrated Sectoral Coordination Mechanism 257
• 4.2.2 Strategically Embedded Integration: Tianjin's Vertical Penetration Mechanism 264
• 4.2.3 Pressure-transmission-based embedding: Tangshan's hierarchical response mechanism 270
• 4.2.4 Integration of Types of Institutional Embedding across Three Regions 274
• 4.3 Incentive Structure and Behavioral Choices: Rational Calculations of Institutions and Enterprises 279
• 4.3.1 High-intensity motivation and lock-in equilibrium 281
• 4.3.2 Medium-intensity Motivation and Coordinated Equilibrium 289
• 4.3.3 Low-intensity motivation and defensive equilibrium 299
• 4.3.4 Differences in Behavior Patterns and Construction of Equilibrium Types 306
• 4.4 Endogenous Tensions and Boundary Constraints in System Operation 310
• 4.4.1 Institutional Rigidness and Organizational Inertia 310
• 4.4.2 Institutional Flexibility and Resource Dependence 316
• 4.4.3 Lack of Institutional Frameworks and Behavioral Avoidance 319
• 4.4.4 Comparison of Types of Institutional Tensions Among the Three Cities 323
• 4.5 Type Model of Evolutionary Paths: The Generation Logic and Comparative Framework for Three Institutional Equilibria 327
• 4.5.1 Formation Mechanism of the Yantai Route 329
• 4.5.2 The Formation Mechanism of the Tianjin Path 333
• 4.5.3 Formation Mechanism of the Tangshan Path 336
• 4.5.4 Type Model of Evolutionary Paths 340
• Chapter 5 Discussion and Conclusion 346
• 5.1 Responses to Key Issues 346
• 5.1.1 Core Issue: Institutional Presence vs. Behavioral Deviation 346
• 5.1.2 Discovery One: The Three Forms of Institutional Embeddedness 351
• 5.1.3 Discovery Two: Incentive Gradient and Behavioral Equilibrium 355
• 5.1.4 Discovery Three: Institutional Tensions and Path Reproduction 358
• 5.2 Theoretical Contributions and Academic Dialogue 362
• 5.2.1 Rational Choice of Institutionalism: From Static to Dynamic 362
• 5.2.2 The Three-Helix Theory: From Structure to Mechanism 365
• 5.2.3 The Integrated Framework of "System–Behavior–Evolution" 369
• 5.3 Policy Implications and Practical Recommendations 372
• 5.3.1 National Level: Going Beyond Institutionally-Dense Supply 372
• 5.3.2 Local Level: Governance Capacity and Differentiation Strategies 375
• 5.3.3 Organizational Level: Strategic Adaptation Between Institutions and Enterprises 377
• 5.4 Research Limitations and Future Prospects 379
• 5.4.1 Research Limitations and Methodological Reflections 379
• 5.4.2 Future Research Directions 381
• epilogue 383
• References 385
• References 385
• Chinese literature 385
• English literature 393
• Policy documents and other materials 398
• Appendix A: Comparison Table between Interview Data Coding Tables and Original Text 403
• A.1 Coding Rules and Format Specifications 403
• A.1.1 Coding System 403
• A.1.2 Text Source Identification 403
• A.1.3 Structural Arrangement 404
• A.2 Yantai City Interview Coding Form (YT Series) 404
• A.2.1 General Table of Encoding Correspondences 405
• A.2.2 Detailed Text and Context Examples (Partial) 421
• A.3 Tianjin Interview Coding Form (TJ Series) 430
• A.3.1 General Table of Encoding Correspondences 431
• A.3.2 Detailed Text and Context Examples (Partial) 445
• A.4 Tangshan City Interview Coding Form (TS Series) 452
• A.4.1 General Table of Encoding Correspondences 465
• A.4.2 Detailed Text and Context Examples (Partial) 465
• A.5 Basic Information Form of Respondents 470
• A.5.1 Yantai City 471
• A.5.2 Tianjin City 475
• A.5.3 Tangshan City 478
• A.5.4 Encoding and Correspondence Between Respondents 481
• A.6 Summary Table of Middle-Level Structure Integration and Core Dimensions Correspondence 482
• A.6.1 Core Dimension 1: Institutional Incentive Structure 482
• A.6.2 Core Dimension 2: Subject Preference Structure 485
• A.6.3 Core Dimension 3: Structure of Behavioral Strategies 487
• A.6.4 Instructions for Using the Encoding 489
• Appendix B: Interview Outline 490
• B.1 Background of Outline Design 490
• B.2 General Interview Module 491
• Module 1: Location and Access 491
• Module 2: How Policies Are Implemented 492
• Module 3: How to Choose and Implement 492
• Module 4: Interaction in Collaboration 493
• Module 5: Changes and Expectations 494
• Module 6: Overall Perspective 494
• B.3 Supplementary questions for different subjects 495
• B.4 Instructions for Conducting Interviews 496
• B.5 Correspondence between the Outline and the Theoretical Framework 497