Monitoring System으로서의 임금구조 및 성과급이 대리인비용과 기업가치에 미치는 영향 = The Effects of Wage Compensation Structures as Monitoring Systems on the Agency Costs and the Firm Value

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study analyzes the agency problems of the employees and the firm value from the wage structures and the compensation structures. Among the various monitoring mechanisms, the wage structures and the performance-based compensation systems were chosen in this study to find out whether they work as the effective incentive systems for the reduction of agency costs in Korean firms. The main results of this study are as follows. The Age/Wage structure was found to have a positive relationship with the firm value. This result suggests that the Age/Wage structure is used in Korean firms mainly for the control of the employees` moral hazard, not for the direct improvement of the productivity itself. The performance-based compensation system was also positively related to the firm value, which means that the formal performance-based compensation system is actually used in Korean firms as an effective incentive systems for the reduction of the employees` moral hazard. This study is the first-ever attempt to examine the effectiveness of the monitoring(incentive) systems using the actual compensation data from the existing firms. This study is important because it opens up a possibility for the new line of empirical accounting researches based on the firm-specific empirical data collected from each individual firms.