The purpose of this research is to examine the characteristics and traits of military negotiations between South and North Korea that were conducted until today and to suggest a plan for development of inter-Korean military negotiation. This goal will...
The purpose of this research is to examine the characteristics and traits of military negotiations between South and North Korea that were conducted until today and to suggest a plan for development of inter-Korean military negotiation. This goal will be accomplished by comparing the changes of the inter-Korean agendas for military negotiation during the period before and after the 「June 15 South-North Joint Declaration」 in 2000. As is generally known, due to a common bias of ideological particularity, 'agendas of negotiation' had been dismissed as means of either diplomacy or threat rather than a conveyance of message. Such preconceptions posed limitations to the research itself, thereby hindering a comprehensive apprehension of inter-Korean military negotiations. This paper is an attempt to comprehensively understand the military negotiations between South and North Korea. In other words, it makes an endeavor to contribute to a much comprehensive understanding of inter-Korean military negotiations by analyzing the 'agendas of negotiation' that had been neglected all the while due to research that were focused upon 'negotiation behaviors'.
Therefore, this research examined the changes of inter-Korean agendas for military negotiation during the period before and after the Joint Declaration in 2000. The subjects of analysis are as follows: First, the significance and background of inter-Korean military negotiation were scrutinized to apprehend the main agendas of military negotiation between South and North Korea. Second, change of inter-Korean agendas for military negotiation were analyzed to shed light on the characteristic transformations of inter-Korean agendas for military negotiation before and after the Declaration. Finally, the characteristics of agendas as well as traits of military negotiations were analyzed through comparison of the altered characteristics of inter-Korean agendas for military negotiations during this period.
First of all, military negotiations between North and South Korea were established against the backdrop of political-diplomatic, economic, and military settings. However, the settings of military negotiations before and after the 2000 Joint Declaration were similar yet different. Military negotiations prior to the 「June 15 South-North Joint Declaration」 were mainly effected by political-diplomatic backgrounds, whereas those posterior to the Declaration were mostly influenced my economic environments. Such difference has been revealed through changes in inter-Korean agendas of military negotiations. In other words, 'intrinsic agendas of military negotiation' became the principle negotiation agenda prior to the Joint Declaration in order to achieve political-diplomatic goals. Since the Declaration, however, 'realistic agendas of military negotiation' were the chief negotiation agendas for the purpose of attaining political·economic goals. As a result, principle agendas of negotiation prior to June 15th included 'Peace Agreement and Agreement on Non-aggression', 'Team Spirit', and 'arms reduction and military confidence building'. On the other hand, 'connecting railways', 'suspension of propaganda activities and removal of propaganda instruments, prevention of accidental maritime conflict on the West Sea' and 'arms reduction and military confidence building' were selected as main agendas after June 15th Declaration.
Moreover, two different results were yielded from the analysis on the main inter-Korean agendas of military negotiation that was based on 'a point of reference of inter-Korean agendas of military negotiation'. Throughout the period before and after the 「June 15 South-North Joint Declaration」 there were no significant changes to the 'genuineness' and 'equitability' of the agendas, while 'performance' exhibited a distinct change. This implies that 'genuineness', which analyzed the 'contents of negotiation agendas', and 'equitability', which analyzed the 'method of agenda negotiation', were both sustained during this period. However, a category that analyzed the 'execution of results of agenda agreement'-'performance'-underwent change. This suggests that such transformation was caused solely by the execution of the results of the agenda agreements, rather than by alternations in the contents of negotiation agendas or methods of negotiation. Therefore, whereas the agendas of military negotiations prior to the Joint Declaration were 'declaratory agendas of military negotiations' that dealt with but did not execute the 'intrinsic agendas of military negotiation', those posterior to the Declaration were 'pragmatic agendas of military negotiation' that pursued actual benefits by implementing 'realistic agendas of military negotiation'.
Finally, the characteristics of inter-Korean agendas of military negotiation before and after the Declaration in 2000 exhibited continuance as well as change in traits such as 'duplicity of negotiation agendas and contents of agendas', 'heterogeneity of order of agenda negotiation', 'disproportion between parties in agenda negotiation', and 'performance of results of agenda negotiation'. The first three among the four traits were maintained, while 'performance of results of agenda negotiation' showed changes. In addition, the characteristics of military negotiations between the two Koreas were influenced by the changes in performance. Although 'intrinsic agendas of military negotiation' were selected prior to the Joint Declaration, inter-Korean military negotiations focused on political goals, thus they became 'nominal military negotiation' that degenerated into mere 'declaratory agendas of military negotiation'. Meanwhile, after the Declaration in 2000, both Koreas chose 'realistic agendas of military negotiation', thus military negotiations during this period were those of 'pragmatic military negotiations' from which the involved parties derived political and economic benefits by executing military agreements related to economic cooperation within grounds that no security threats would be involved.
In conclusion, the 'nominal military negotiation' prior to the 2000 Joint Declaration that dealt with the 'intrinsic·declaratory agendas of military negotiation' was transformed after the Declaration into 'pragmatic military negotiation' that dealt with 'realistic·pragmatic agendas of military negotiation'. This transformation signifies progress of inter-Korean military negotiations in that agreements were put into practice. Unfortunately, however, pragmatic changes of inter-Korean military negotiations was distant from 'military benefits'. During the course of their military negotiations, South and North Korea concentrated on 'benefits external to military domains' rather than 'military benefits'. Military negotiations were utilized in behalf of 'political benefits' prior to the Joint Declaration. After the Declaration, however, it was used in the interest of 'economic·political benefits', especially 'economic benefits'. Therefore, in order to induce progress in inter-Korean military negotiations, it is essential to discuss agendas of military negotiations that deal with 'military benefits' derived from pure motives. In other words, military negotiation between South and North Korea can develop into 'substantial military negotiation' that execute 'intrinsic agendas of military negotiation' when 'pragmatic military negotiation' since the Joint Declaration extends beyond 'economic·political benefits' to 'military benefits' that contribute to alleviating military tension within the Korean Peninsula.