Political economy of the Swiss National Bank

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• Introduction = 1
• CHAPTER 1 A Reaction Function Study for the Swiss National Bank = 7
• 1.1 Introduction = 7
• 1.2 The Concept of Reaction Functions = 7
• 1.3 Reaction Functions for the SNB = 10
• 1.3.1 Existing Studies = 10
• 1.3.2 Reaction Functions for the SNB = 15
• 1.3.2a The Behavioral Model Underlying the Reaction Functions = 15
• 1.3.2b Choice of the Dependent Variable = 18
• 1.3.2c Choice of Independent Variables = 23
• 1.3.2d Time Period = 31
• 1.3.2e Periodicity = 33
• 1.3.2f Levels Versus Changes = 34
• 1.3.2g Lag Structure = 34
• 1.3.2h Lag Structure and Expected Signs of the Coefficients = 37
• 1.3.2i Summary of the Model and Comments = 38
• 1.4 The Data = 39
• 1.4.1 Definition and Measurement = 39
• 1.4.2 Data Plots = 40
• 1.4.3 The Problem of Seasonality and Stationarity = 45
• 1.4.4 Summary Statistics = 51
• 1.5 Results : How the SNB Behaved = 52
• 1.5.1 Outlining of the Estimation Procedure = 52
• 1.5.1a The General-to-Specific Strategy = 52
• 1.5.lb Testing and Evaluation = 53
• 1.5.1c Analysis of Parameter Stability = 57
• 1.5.2 Estimation Results = 61
• 1.5.2a Nonseasonal Differences with the Monetary Base as Dependent Variable = .61
• 1.5.2b Nonseasonal Differences with the Money Supply Ml as Dependent Variable = 69
• 1.5.2c Seasonal Differences with the Monetary Base as Dependent Variable = 34
• 1.5.2d Seasonal Differences with the Money Supply Ml as Dependent Variable = 79
• 1.5.3 Interpretation of the Regression Results = 87
• 1.5.3a Overview of the Results = 87
• 1.5.3b The Difference in Behavior Before and After 1980 = 87
• 1.5.3c Comparing Nonseasonal and Seasonal Equations = 89
• 1.5.3d Comparing Monetary Base and Ml Equations = 90
• 1.5.4 Other Model Specifications = 91
• 1.6 Conclusions = 92
• CHAPTER 2 Deficits and Money Growth : Empirical Evidence for Switzerland = 93
• 2.1 Introduction = 93
• 2.2 Budget Deficits and Money Growth = 94
• 2.2.1 Deficits and Interest Rates = 95
• 2.2.2 Deficits and Central Bank(In)Dependence = 96
• 2.2.3 Cyclical and Structural Deficits = 97
• 2.2.4 Deficits and Central Bank(In)Dependence Revisited = 98
• 2.3 Previous Studies on the Impact of Fiscal Policy Variables on Swiss Monetary Policy = 100
• 2.4 The Money Growth Equations = 105
• 2.5 The Fiscal Data = 108
• 2.6 Estimation Results = 114
• 2.7 Conclusions = 122
• CHAPTER 3 Elections and Monetary Policy : Is There a Political Monetary Cycle for Switzerland? = 125
• 3.1 Introduction = 125
• 3.2 Models of Politico-Economic Cycles : An Overview = 126
• 3.3 Application to Switzerland : Why Should There Exist a Political Monetary Cycle? = 128
• 3.4 Comparing Economic Conditions for Election and Nonelection Years = 130
• 3.5 Testing for Political Monetary Cycles = 133
• 3.5.1 Evidence from Reaction Functions = 138
• 3.5.2 Evidence from Autoregressive Model Specifications = 140
• 3.5.3 Evidence from Models Without Fixed Effects = 141
• 3.5.4 Free Estimation of the Optimal Cyclical Pattern = 144
• 3.6 Conclusions = 146
• CHAPTER 4 The Executive Central Bank Relationship : The Case of Switzerland = 147
• 4.1 Introduction = 147
• 4.2 The Legal Relationship between Executive and Central Bank = 150
• 4.2.1 Institutional Requirements for an Autonomous Central Bank = 152
• 4.2.2 Institutional Features of the SNB = 155
• 4.2.3 De Jure Dependence of the SNB = 160
• 4.3 Inflationary Performance as a Result of the Structure of the Executive = 163
• 4.3.1 Corporatism as Restraint on Private Rent-Seeking = 163
• 4.3.2 Supervision by a Committee to Isolate Monetary Policy from Short-Run Partisan or Electoral Pressure = 165
• 4.3.3 Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies = 166
• 4.4 Inflationary Performance as a Result of Characteristics of the Swiss Political Market for Monetary Policy = 168
• 4.4.1 Political Market for Monetary Policy = 168
• 4.4.2 Privileged Access of the Financial Sector : Capture Theory = 169
• 4.4.3 Example : The Role of Career Background = 170
• 4.4.4 Impact of Financial Sector as Constraint on Executive Influence = 172
• 4.5 De Facto(In)Dependence of the SNB : An Empirical Test = 173
• 4.5.1 Popularity of the Executive and Monetary Policy = 173
• 4.5.2 Party Affiliation or Personalities : Finance Ministers and Monetary Policy = 176
• 4.5.3 Regression Models and Estimation Procedure = 177
• 4.5.4 Estimation Results for Popularity Measures = 179
• 4.5.5 Estimation Results for Party Affiliation of Finance Ministers = 181
• 4.5.6 Estimation Results for Individual Finance Ministers = 184
• 4.6 Conclusions = 187
• Appendix to Chapter 4 = 188
• CHAPTER 5 Legislative Influence on Monetary Policy? The Case of Switzerland = 189
• 5.1 Introduction = 189
• 5.2 The Theory of Legislative Influence(or the 'New' Theory of Bureaucracy) = 190
• 5.2.1 'Old' Theory of Bureaucracy : Bureaucratic Discretion = 190
• 5.2.2 'New' Theory of Bureaucracy : Legislative Control = 193
• 5.3 Application of the 'New' Theory of Bureaucracy to Central Banks : Legislative Influence on the Federal Reserve = 197
• 5.3.1 The Institutional Background = 198
• 5.3.2 The Conventional Wisdom : Limits of Legislative Influence = 199
• 5.3.3 The Challenge : Legislative Influence on Monetary Policy 202
• 5.3.4 Evidence on Congressional Influence = 203
• 5.4 Legislative Influence on SNB Behavior? = 206
• 5.4.1 The Institutional Background = 206
• 5.4.2 Legislative Activity towards the SNB = 214
• 5.4.3 Evidence on Legislative Influence : An Empirical Test = 220
• 5.5 Conclusions = 233
• Appendix to Chapter 5 = 234
• List of Abbreviations = 249
• List of Tables and Figures = 251
• References = 255