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      Financial Crisis, Accounting Conservatism and Corporate Ownership Structure

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A104470768

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      n this paper, we examine how controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentives affect the level of conservatism during crisis and non-crisis periods. While previous studies have extensively investigated the link between corporate governance and firm value during crisis, not much attention has been given to the link between corporate governance and conservatism during crisis. Extending the recent study which documents a negative relation between the ownership-control wedge and conservatism, we further examine the channel through which controlling shareholders pursue self-interested behaviors at the expense of minority shareholders by using the crisis setting in Korea.
      A set of literature on the effect of economic crisis shows that firms with weaker corporate governance suffer more during crisis because the controlling shareholders’ incentives to expropriate minority shareholders go up as the expected return on investment falls during the crisis period. This exacerbating-effect argument implies that the negative effect of the ownership-control wedge on conservatism should be more pronounced during the crisis period, relative to non-crisis period. However, it is possible that the crisis unravels problems related to corporate governance in a firm and promotes greater investor awareness about such problems. The prediction is that the expropriation activities by controlling shareholders will be limited during crisis due to higher monitoring by investors, which we call the mitigating-effect argument. Given these conflicting arguments, it is an empirical question whether the negative effect of the wedge on conservatism will be exacerbated or mitigated during crisis.
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      n this paper, we examine how controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentives affect the level of conservatism during crisis and non-crisis periods. While previous studies have extensively investigated the link between corporate governance and fir...

      n this paper, we examine how controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentives affect the level of conservatism during crisis and non-crisis periods. While previous studies have extensively investigated the link between corporate governance and firm value during crisis, not much attention has been given to the link between corporate governance and conservatism during crisis. Extending the recent study which documents a negative relation between the ownership-control wedge and conservatism, we further examine the channel through which controlling shareholders pursue self-interested behaviors at the expense of minority shareholders by using the crisis setting in Korea.
      A set of literature on the effect of economic crisis shows that firms with weaker corporate governance suffer more during crisis because the controlling shareholders’ incentives to expropriate minority shareholders go up as the expected return on investment falls during the crisis period. This exacerbating-effect argument implies that the negative effect of the ownership-control wedge on conservatism should be more pronounced during the crisis period, relative to non-crisis period. However, it is possible that the crisis unravels problems related to corporate governance in a firm and promotes greater investor awareness about such problems. The prediction is that the expropriation activities by controlling shareholders will be limited during crisis due to higher monitoring by investors, which we call the mitigating-effect argument. Given these conflicting arguments, it is an empirical question whether the negative effect of the wedge on conservatism will be exacerbated or mitigated during crisis.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 심호식, "지분율 괴리도와 공시 정보의 빈도 사이의 관계" 한국회계학회 35 (35): 39-74, 2010

      2 이아영, "불성실공시가 타인자본비용에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 33 (33): 127-158, 2008

      3 박상수, "부실공시기업의 이익정보 유용성에 관한 연구" 대한회계학회 13 (13): 303-327, 2008

      4 이문영, "대규모기업집단 소속기업의 이사회 특성과 공시 빈도 사이의 관계" 한국회계학회 37 (37): 279-320, 2012

      5 Rajan, R. G., "Which capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian crisis" 11 (11): 40-48, 1998

      6 Choi, J. -H., "Value relevance of discretionary accruals in the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998" 30 (30): 166-187, 2011

      7 Haw, I. M., "Ultimate ownership, income management, and legal and extra-legal institutions" 42 (42): 423-462, 2004

      8 Bae, K. -H., "Tunneling or value added? Evidence from mergers by Korean business groups" 57 (57): 2695-2740, 2002

      9 Faccio, M., "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations" 65 (65): 365-395, 2002

      10 Claessens, S., "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations" 58 (58): 81-112, 2000

      1 심호식, "지분율 괴리도와 공시 정보의 빈도 사이의 관계" 한국회계학회 35 (35): 39-74, 2010

      2 이아영, "불성실공시가 타인자본비용에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 33 (33): 127-158, 2008

      3 박상수, "부실공시기업의 이익정보 유용성에 관한 연구" 대한회계학회 13 (13): 303-327, 2008

      4 이문영, "대규모기업집단 소속기업의 이사회 특성과 공시 빈도 사이의 관계" 한국회계학회 37 (37): 279-320, 2012

      5 Rajan, R. G., "Which capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian crisis" 11 (11): 40-48, 1998

      6 Choi, J. -H., "Value relevance of discretionary accruals in the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998" 30 (30): 166-187, 2011

      7 Haw, I. M., "Ultimate ownership, income management, and legal and extra-legal institutions" 42 (42): 423-462, 2004

      8 Bae, K. -H., "Tunneling or value added? Evidence from mergers by Korean business groups" 57 (57): 2695-2740, 2002

      9 Faccio, M., "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations" 65 (65): 365-395, 2002

      10 Claessens, S., "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations" 58 (58): 81-112, 2000

      11 Ball, R., "The role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and loss recognition" 44 (44): 207-242, 2006

      12 LaFond, R., "The information role of conservatism" 83 (83): 447-478, 2008

      13 Basu, S., "The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings" 24 (24): 3-37, 1997

      14 Kim, M. -I., "Separation of ownership and control and accounting conservatism,Evidence from Korea" 2014

      15 Lemmon, M. L., "Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value, Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis" 58 (58): 1445-1468, 2003

      16 Kim, J. -B., "Ownership structure, business group affiliation, listing status and earnings management,Evidence from Korea" 23 (23): 427-464, 2006

      17 Zmijewski, M, "Methodological issues related to the estimation of financial distress prediction models" 22 (22): 59-82, 1984

      18 Goh, B. W., "Market pricing of banks’ fair value assets reported under SFAS 157 during the 2008 economic crisis" Singapore Management University 2009

      19 LaFond, R., "Managerial ownership and accounting conservatism" 46 (46): 101-135, 2008

      20 Laeven, L., "Is there a diversification discount in financial conglomerates?" 85 (85): 331-367, 2007

      21 Goh, B. W., "Internal controls and conditional conservatism" 86 (86): 975-1005, 2011

      22 Ramalingegowda, S., "Institutional ownership and conservatism" 53 (53): 98-114, 2012

      23 Anderson, R. C., "Founding-family ownership and firm performance, Evidence from the S&P 500" 58 (58): 1301-1328, 2003

      24 Gompers, P., "Extreme governance, an analysis of dual-class firms in the United States" 23 (23): 1051-1088, 2010

      25 Khan, M., "Estimation and empirical properties of a firm- year measure of accounting conservatism" 48 (48): 132-150, 2009

      26 Ball, R., "Earnings quality in UK private firms, Comparative loss recognition timeliness" 39 (39): 83-128, 2005

      27 Berndt, T., "Earnings management in the financial crisis" University of St. Gallen 2010

      28 Agarwal, S., "Earnings management behaviors under different economic environments, Evidence from Japanese banks" 16 (16): 429-443, 2007

      29 Francis, J., "Earnings and dividends informativeness when cash flow rights are separated from voting rights" 39 (39): 329-360, 2005

      30 Givoly, D., "Does public ownership of equity improve earnings quality?" 85 (85): 195-225, 2010

      31 Fan, J., "Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia" 43 (43): 35-72, 2005

      32 Bae, K. -H., "Do controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence" 105 (105): 412-435, 2012

      33 Hong, H. A., "Divergence of cash flow and voting rights, opacity, and stock price crash risk,International evidence" Queen’s University 2012

      34 Claessens, S., "Disentangling the incentives and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings" 57 (57): 2741-2771, 2002

      35 McNichols, M. F., "Discussion of the quality of accruals and earnings, the role of accrual estimation errors" 77 (77): 61-69, 2002

      36 Johnson, S., "Cronyism and capital controls, evidence from Malaysia" 67 : 351-382, 2003

      37 Fan, J., "Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings" 33 (33): 401-425, 2002

      38 Lin, C., "Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure" 104 (104): 1-22, 2012

      39 La Porta, R., "Corporate ownership around the world" 54 (54): 471-518, 1999

      40 Johnson, S., "Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis" 58 (58): 141-186, 2000

      41 Baek, J. S., "Corporate governance and firm value, evidence from the Korean financial crisis" 71 (71): 265-313, 2004

      42 Joh, S. W., "Corporate governance and firm profitability,evidence from Korea before the economic crisis" 68 (68): 287-322, 2003

      43 Gigler, F. B., "Conservatism, optimal disclosure policy, and the timeliness of financial reports" 76 (76): 471-493, 2001

      44 Watts, R. L., "Conservatism in accounting part I, Explanations and implications" 17 (17): 207-221, 2003

      45 García Lara, J. M., "Accounting conservatism and corporate governance" 14 (14): 161-201, 2009

      46 Ahmed, A., "Accounting conservatism and board of director characteristics,An empirical analysis" 43 (43): 411-437, 2007

      47 La Porta, R., "A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 2000. Investor protection and corporate governance" 58 (58): 3-27, 2000

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      2027 평가예정 재인증평가 신청대상 (재인증)
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      기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
      2016 0.99 0.99 1.25
      KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
      1.35 1.43 2.629 0.29
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