페레스트로이카와 保守主義 : 新保守主義의 登場 The Rise of Neo-Conservatism = Perestroika and Changes in Soviet Politics in the 1990's

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In The Grand Failure(1989), Zbigniew Brzezinski states that the current changes taking place in the Soviet Union will continue under Gorbachev's successor, that they are irreversible. His vision of the Soviet Union thirty years from now, while albeit, tongue in cheek, is quite possible.
Gorbachev appears to be consolidating his power, has placed his own people in politburo, has been elected as President, and has been able to push most of his more radical reforms through the Soviet political decision making bureaucracy. While the implementation of these reforms has not been so forthcoming, most analysts view Gorbachev's consolidation of power as a means to end-insuring that the policies will be successfully implemented. The first question, we must face, is whether Gorbachev will be able to continue to consolidate his power. The second, whether he will survive this process.
Yet a third question, is what role the soviet peoples' expectations play in this process and whether, in an era of increased political participation, the Soviet Union may be facing a mounting crisis reminiscent of the revolution of 1905. The radical intelligentsia, such as Boris Yeltsin, Gavriil Popov, and Yuri Afanasy'ev, as early as 1987, have been encouraging the general public to take a more active role in the democratic developments occurring in the Soviet Union and the public opposition to the Communist Party.
Gorbachev has taken steps to consolidate his political power base both in the Party and in the Congress. On 7 February, 1990, a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee voted to relinquish the CPSU's constitutionally guaranteed monopoly on power and to recommend the creation of a presidential form of government. This action negated Article 6 of the constitution which gave plenipotentiary power to the communist party in Soviet government in the past.
Gorbachev currently enjoys most of the powers exercised by his French and American counterparts, but without the constitutional checks and balances imposed under those countries' constitutions. Gorbachev, as the Party General Secretary and as the President, is endowed with all the requisite plenipotentiary powers necessary to implement a "dictatorship of perestroika."
All of this having been said, we still face a very real dilemma in any attempt to predict what will occur over the next decade in the Soviet Union. We know Gorbachev has consolidated his power. We know public expectations in the Soviet Union are running high and will play an increasingly important role in the direction that Soviet policies must take. Zbigniew Brzezinski has given us an idea of what the Soviet Union will look like in the early 21st century. Then ultimate question is therefore, "How do we get there from here?"
This paper will examine three different areas which the Soviet Union and its leadership must address if perestroika under Gorbachev is to succeed. It will first examine the apparent dichotomy between Soviet socialism and perestroika. Second, it will examine potential political developments in the Soviet Union and glasnost. Third, it will examine the problems associated with economic developments in the Soviet Union and glasnost. Third, it will examine the problems associated with economic development in the Soviet Union and government and public expectations-economic perestroika. All three of these areas will act as constrains on Gorbachev and can provide some ideas on where the Soviet Union is, can and will go under perestroika in the 1990's

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 머리말
• Ⅱ. 蘇聯社會主義와 페레스트로이카
• Ⅲ. 政治的 民主化와 페레스트로이카
• Ⅳ. 페레스트로이카의 90年代 進路 - 新保守의 登場
• Ⅴ. 맺는말