Do the Presence and Position of the Institutional Blockholder Affect Firm Performances? = 대주주 기관투자자의 존재와 위치가 기업성과에 영향을 미치는가?

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구는 우리나라 상장기업들의 기업성과가 대주주 기관투자자 존재와 위치에 따라 어떻게 영향을 받는 지를 분석한다. 표본은 2005년부터 2013년 동안 681개의 우리나라 상장기업 자료를 사용한다. 기업 내에서 1대부터 3대까지 대주주 기관투자자가 적어도 하나가 존재하는 경우, 우리는 대주주 기관투자자가 존재하는 경우로 간주한다. 기업 내에서 1대와 2대 대주주가 모두 기관투자자인 경우, 우리는 대주주 기관투자자 위치로 간주한다. 기업성과의 대용변수로써 토빈 Q와 총자산순이익률을 사용한다. 분석결과, 1대부터 3대까지 대주주 기관투자자가 적어도 하나가 존재하는 경우, 토빈 Q와 총자산순이익률에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 대주주로써 1대와 2대 기관투자자를 보유하는 경우, 토빈 Q와 총자산순이익률에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 나타났다. 이 같은 결과는 기관투자자가 경영자에 대한 감시활동을 수행하여 기업성과가 높아진다는 효율적 감시가설을 지지하는 것으로 볼 수 있고, 기업 내에서 기관투자자들의 행동주의 관점을 지지할 가능성이 있다는 것을 보여준다. 이 연구는 대주주 기관투자자 효율적으로 감시활동을 한다는 가설과 투자자 행동주의가 기업성과에 영향을 미친다는 견해를 확인하였다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study analyzes how the performance of Korean listed companies is influenced by presence and position of institutional blockholder. The sample uses 681 Korean listed company data from 2005 to 2013. If there is at least one institutional blockholder among first, second, and third blockholder within a firm, we regard it as the presence of institutional blockholder. If the first and the second blockholder are institutional blockholder within a firm, we regard it as the position of institutional blockholder. We use Tobin’s Q and ROA as substitutes for firm performances. When institutional blockholder has at least one among the first to the third blockholder, we found that it has a positive effect on Tobin’s Q and ROA. When the first or the second blockholder within a firm are institutional blockholder, we also found that it has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q and ROA. This result suggests that institutional investor support the efficient monitoring hypothesis that corporate performance is enhanced by monitoring, and there is a possibility of supporting institutional investor"s behavioral viewpoint within the firm. Our findings confirm the hypothesis that institutional blockholder monitors effectively and support the view that investor activism affects firm performance.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. Introduction
• Ⅱ. Literature review and hypotheses statements
• Ⅲ. Data and analysis methods
• Ⅳ. Empirical Results
• Ⅴ. Conclusion
• Reference
• 초록

참고문헌 (Reference)

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