지방자치단체간 재산세율경쟁에 관한 경험적 연구

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

  In 2004 the central government of Korea realized the property assessment value for the purpose of cooling down the excessive boom of real estate market, which resulted in increasing the local property taxes. Against the central governments tax policy, local governments had competitively begun to adopt the elasticity tax rate(ETR) to reduce the local residents tax burdens. This study tries to explain the diffusion patterns of local governments adopting ETR from the perspective of yardstick competition theory. This study also conducts a series empirical tests to show that intergovernmental yardstick tax-competition induces the local governments ETR adoptions. By using SAR model of spatial econometrics, we find the existence of intergovernmental yardstick tax-competition in local governments ETR adoptions, implying that local governments strategically mimick their neighboring local governments tax changes.

참고문헌 (Reference)

1 최병호, "지방정부간 재정적 이질성과 재산세율 경쟁: 정치적 조세경쟁 모형을 이용한 분석" 9 (9): 47-69, 2005

2 김현아, "지방소비세·지방소득세제 도입여부에 관한 연구" 서울: 한국조세연구원 2003

3 정유석, "지방세의 탄력세율제도의 실효성에 대한 연구" 18 : 187-203, 2006

4 김정훈, "지방교부세의 형평화 효과에 관한 연구" 서울: 한국조세연구원 2001

5 유재원, "보통교부세 기준세율의 정치경제적 의미" 31 (31): 23-37, 1997

6 유재원, "단체장 민선이후 자치단체의 정책변화: Peterson의 도시한계론 검증" 8 (8): 79-98, 1999

7 김광구, "공간 자기상관의탐색과 공간회귀분석의 활용" 한국정책분석평가학회 13 (13): 2003

8 Case, "” Journal of Public Economics" 285-307, 1992

9 Oates, "“The Allocative and Distributive Implications of Local Fiscal Competition Competition among States and Local Governments" Kincaid 1991

10 Burridge, "“Testing for a Common Factor in A Spatial Autoregression Model" 795-800, 1981

11 Ladd, "“Mimicking of Local Tax Burdens Among Neighboring Counties" 450-467, 1992

12 Case, "“Interstate Tax Competition after TRA86 ” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management" 136-48, 1993

13 Salmon, "“Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme ” Oxford Review of Economic Policy" 24-43, 1987

14 "“A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures ” Journal of Political Economy" 416-424, 1956

15 Wilson, J. D, "Theories of Tax Competition" 52 : 269-304, 1999

16 Brennan, "The Power to Tax Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution" Cambridge University Press 1980

17 Revelli, R, "Testing the Tax Mimicking versus Expenditure Spill-over Hypothesis Using English Data" 34 : 1723-1731, 2002

18 Brueckner, J, "Testing for Strategic Interaction among Local Governments: The Case of Growth Controls" 44 : 438-467, 1998

19 Maarten, A, "Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition Among Local Governments in the" International Tax and Public Finance 12 (12): 493-513, 2005

20 Heyndels, B, "Tax Mimicking Among Belgian Municipalities" 51 : 89-101, 1998

21 Hernandez-Murillo, R, "Strategic Interaction in Tax Policies Among States" 85 : 47-56, 2003

22 LeSage, J. P, "Spatial Econometrics" 1998

23 Besley, T, "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition" 85 : 25-45, 1995

24 Bordignon, M, "In Search of Yardstick Competition: A Spatial Analysis of Italian Municipal Property Tax Setting" 54 : 199-217, 2003

25 Das, D, "Finite Sample Properties of Estimators of Spatial Autoregressive" 82 : 1-26, 2003

26 Brueckner, J, "Do Local Governments Engage in Strategic Property Tax Competition?" 54 : 203-299, 2001