A Game-theoretic Approach to the Interactions between the Mayor and the Council under the Asymmetric Information

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 논문은 게임이론에 기초한 시장-의회 상호작용 모형을 통하여, 시장-의회관계 유형 중에서 강시장제와 시장-의회 균형제를 분석하고 있다.
분석 결과, 첫째로 시장-의회 균형제에서는 게임이 비용(노력) 측면에서의 차이가 보다 균등하게 짜여 질수록, 승리를 위한 비용 지출성향은 더 커지게 된다. 강시장제에서는 게임이 비용 측면에서의 차이가 보다 균등하게 짜여 질수록, 의회는 지출성향이 커지는 반면 시장은 비용조건에 따라 지출(노력)을 늘리기도 하고 줄이기도 한다. 일반적으로는 게임당사자들의 비용(노력) 간 상관관계가 높게 나타날수록, 지출성향은 높아지게 된다. 승리확률은 양방의 정보가 완전히 알려진 경우와 양방이 서로 비대칭 정보를 가지고 있을 때 같아진다.
둘째로 강시장제에서는 의회의 지출성향 기대치가 시장-의회 균형제에서의 지출성향 기대치보다 작거나 같게 되고, 시장의 지출성향은 시장-의회 균형제에서보다 클 수도 있고 작을 수도 있다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

We made game theory-based interaction models between the mayor and the council. Among the mayor-council relationship typologies we analyzed the strong mayor form and the equivalent mayor-council form in the models.
First, under equivalent mayor-council form, as the conflict or bargain is more evenly matched in terms of the difference in costs, the propensities to spend need to be greater. Under strong mayor form, as the conflict or bargain becomes evenly matched, the council increases his propensity to spend, while the mayor may increase or decrease his outlay or effort depending on cost conditions. A player's expected probability to win under public information is the same as his expected probability to win under two-sided asymmetric information.
Second, under strong mayor form, the council's expected propensity to spend is equal to or smaller than the expected propensity to spend under equivalent mayor-council form, and the mayor's propensity to spend may be greater or smaller than that under equivalent mayor-council form.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Abstract
• Ⅰ. Introduction
• Ⅱ. Mayor-Council Relationship Typologies
• Ⅲ. The Basic Model
• Ⅳ. Public Information
• Ⅴ. One-sided Asymmetric Information
• Ⅵ. Comparisons of the Probabilities to Win and Profits under Three Regimes
• Ⅶ. Conclusion
• References
• 〈국문 초록〉
• 저자소개
• Appendix

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