정당지지 변동, 공천 실수, 그리고 단기비이양식 제도에서의 정부의 이점 = Partisan Swings, Nomination Errors, and the Government Advantage in SNTV

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Previous literature has argued that governing parties are advantaged under SNTV because they use state resources to overcome the coordination problems created by the electoral system. Parties must anticipate the number of votes they will win, nominate an appropriate number of candidates, and then divide their votes among those nominees. Previous literature has focused on the latter two elements. This paper asks whether a superior ability to anticipate election results is part of the governing party`s advantage. Using data from all national and local SNTV elections in the democratic era in Taiwan, I find that the ability to turn votes into seats is correlated with previous election results, a pattern we would not expect to see if parties ignored everything but anticipated future results. Any change, whether support for the party increases or decreases, is associated with fewer victories than might otherwise be expected. There is no difference between governing and opposition parties, implying that predictive capacity is not a major element of the government`s advantage. However, this paper does uncover the mechanics of this advantage. Governing parties nominate more aggressively, but, unlike for opposition parties, excess nominees do not cause lower than expected numbers of victories for governing parties.