미국 비확산 정책 : 잃어버린 기회 : 북한사례를 중심으로 = US non-proliferation policy : the lost opportunity : a study on North Korea's nuclear weapon

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The major concern of this research focuses on why nuclear weapons have been proliferated in spite of the U.S. effort to prevent their spread through its non-proliferation policy, pursued unilaterally and multilaterally. To determine the causes of proliferation, this dissertation concentrates on two conditions, necessary and sufficient conditions. In other words, to transcend from aspiring nuclear states to nuclear states depends on the relationships between the necessary condition of the aspirant to be a nuclear state and the sufficient condition of the non-proliferation policy of US to stop the spread of nukes.
What this research concentrates on especially the U.S. non-proliferation policy is attributed that it has regarded non-proliferation policy as a national policy. We know that the U.S. was reasonable for passing the bills related to non-proliferation and making the international regimes to constrain or control the proliferation. Also, U.S. put its primary interest on stopping the threat of nuclear proliferation by 'rogue states' after the disappearance of rival, USSR, thanks to the end of cold war. Therefore, it is very important to analyze the influence and function of US non-proliferation policy.
Therefore, this dissertation examines whether the U.S. non-proliferation policy has functioned positively or negatively as a tool of stopping nuclear proliferation. Unfortunately, U.S. non-proliferation policy has lost coherency in pursuing the objective of prohibiting the spread of latent nuclear states because the importance of pursuing non-proliferation policy was determined by the change of foreign policy.
Therefore, this study tries to link the lack of coherency of U.S. non-proliferation policy with the key of transcending the latency of nuclear status. Again, the coherency of U.S. non-proliferation policy will determine whether the aspirants will be permitted or not becoming one of the nuclear states.
For proving this argument, the thesis uses the North Korean case as well as cases of other latent nuclear states to see whether they cross over the border of being a nuclear state or not. In order to predict where Pyoung-yang will go concerning the nuclear problem in the future, it was necessary to know the cause of incoherency of US non-proliferation policy by examining many cases. Through those cases, the paper draws a generality of the cause of incoherency on the US non-proliferation policy and links the uniqueness of each latent nuclear state, especially DPRK.
For the linkage between generality and specialty, it needs a modeling to explain the relationship between the necessary condition and sufficient condition in addition to the political regime of aspirant which brought into the difficulty of negotiation to deal with the nuclear problem.
According to the modeling, first, the aspiring nuclear state will determine whether to develop the nuclear weapons by estimating the threat caused by the swift change of internal and external environment. When the situation of necessary condition builds up, U.S. will lay out the proper policy to respond. But what is import ant in this process is that U.S. has dealt with the latent nuclear states differently in accordance with the regional interest. Therefore, if the sufficient condition of U.S. non-proliferation policy on the ability of aspirant has a negative effect, the proliferant can get the opportunity to cross over the line of nuclear states. Even though U.S. tries to respond positively on the proliferant because of regional interest, if US would lost the positive action on the latent nuclear state as the regional interest changes as a result of the international or regional environment, if U.S. also opted for an easy political access instead of technological access to overcome its vulnerability on the negotiation of closing nuclear development because aspirant regime is not democracy, which gives the aspirant independent behavior and voice on the process of negotiation, then the aspiring nuclear states will issue the nuclear problem again someday. Therefore, U.S. should keep the coherency of non-proliferation policy on even the aspirant which was bound up not to develope nuclear weapons by its non-proliferation policy.
With this framework, this dissertation tries to show the cause of Pyoung-yang's nuclear development, the US policy to control and prevent North Korea's nuclear development and the dynamics of the negotiation between the two to resolve the Pyoung-yang's nuclear issue.
U.S. was so principled to follow the procedure of NPT that it could not catch the opportunity to roll back North Korea's nuclear problem. Thanks to the U.S.'s late response, Pyoung-yang earned six years enough to develope nuclear weapons until it contracts IAEA safeguards after having entered the NPT. So, the suspicion of nuclear weapons raised more questions instead of apparent answer. US supported technological approach, the special inspection of IAEA and the mutual inspection between the South and North Koreas. But after North Korea declared its withdrawal from NPT, US amended the non-proliferation policy on North Korea. US accepted North Korea's request for rewards which are two 1,000MW light water reactors, supply of heavy oil and the effort to normalize the relationship between the two at the cost of closing current and future nuclear development. But the Agreed Framework allows North Korea to postpone the verification of past nuclear capability through IAEA's special inspection. Therefore, the question of North Korea's nuclear weapon still remains.
U.S. lost the opportunity to clean out the suspicion of the aspiring nuclear state through the special inspection and its reliable threat of military action when U.S. gave up the coherent policy to stop or roll back the nuclear development. This attitude on non-proliferation policy influenced negatively on the actor's future behavior as well as the behavior of such cases as India and Pakistan. The non-proliferation policy can be revised easily to make the latent proliferants consider the benefit of issuing nuclear development or testing nuclear weapons. For example, the Indian and Pakistan nuclear tests in May, 1998, North Korea's Missile test in August, 1998 and the issue surrounding underground facilities in Kum-chang-ri that same year can be thought of as the result of lack of coherent non-proliferation policy.
In conclusion, US non-proliferation policy should not end at getting the would-be nuclear state to enter the NPT. US must pursue with the follow up measures to clean out the suspicion of nuclear development. Also, the content of non-proliferation policy must not be revised in accordance with regional interest. The non-proliferation policy has to carve out its own independent sphere, not interrupted by the change of foreign policy. Otherwise, the latent proliferants will not quit risking nuclear development because they can endure the cost.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 目次 = iv
• <그림 目次> = vii
• <表 目次> = vii
• 제1장 서론 = 1
• 제1절 문제제기 = 1
• 제2절 문헌 검토를 통한 분석 모델링 = 12
• 제3절 논문구성 = 25
• 제2장 핵확산과 미국의 정책 = 27
• 제1절 핵확산의 원인 = 27
• 1. 안보적 위협 = 28
• 2. 기술이전과 발달 = 32
• 3. 국가위신: 전략적 필요성 = 34
• 제2절 미국의 비확산 정책 = 37
• 1. 예방 정책 = 37
• 2. 대응정책(counter- proliferation) = 45
• 제3절 핵의혹 국가와 미국의 이중적 태도 = 50
• 1. 핵개발 포기 = 51
• 2. 암묵적 수용- 이스라엘, 인도, 파키스탄 = 60
• 제3장 북한의 핵개발과 미국의 비확산 정책 = 65
• 제1절. 북한 핵개발의 원인과 전개과정 = 65
• 1. 안보위협 심화와 고립 = 65
• 2. 북한 핵기술 축적 및 발달과정 = 75
• 3. 체제 공고화와 안정도모 = 79
• 제2절 북한 핵개발의 국제여론화: IAEA 적극적 후원자로서의 미국 = 84
• 1. 북한에 대한 IAEA 핵안전협정체결 종용 = 85
• 2. IAEA 특별사찰과 남북한 상호사찰 지지 = 89
• 제3절 북한 핵개발의 현상동결: 핵투명성 기회의 상실 = 95
• 1. 先핵문제 해결을 위한 미국의 공세적 태도 = 95
• 2. 과거핵 현상규명 노력에 따른 교착상태 = 99
• 3. 위기고조와 해소: 현재· 미래핵 동결과 정치· 경제적 보상 = 105
• 제4장 미국의 對북한 비확산정책 형성 배경 = 113
• 제1절 이라크의 경험과 미국의 지역이익 = 113
• 1. 걸프전을 통한 이라크의 교훈 = 113
• 2. 동북아 지역의 중요성 = 118
• 제2절 북한체제의 특수성 = 130
• 1. 지도자 중심체제 = 130
• 2. 획일주의 사상 = 138
• 3. 상호의존성의 결여로 인한 반대급부: 경제적 수혜 = 141
• 제3절 미국내 다양한 기관의 의견조율 = 149
• 1. 행정부 = 149
• 2. 의회 = 157
• 3. 언론 및 여론의 반응 = 162
• 제5장 제네바합의의 영향과 결과 = 166
• 제1절 제네바 합의를 둘러싼 찬반 논쟁 = 166
• 제2절 제네바 합의이후의 미국의 좌절 = 172
• 1. 인도· 파키스탄 핵실험 = 173
• 2. 중국· 북한· 파키스탄의 삼각구도와 인도 = 181
• 제3절 제네바 합의 정신의 확장 = 187
• 1. 인· 파 핵실험이 제네바 합의에 미치는 함의 = 187
• 2. 금창리 지하 시설에 대한 미국의 과민 반응: 페리보고서 = 188
• 제6장 미국 비확산 정책 평가 = 197
• 제1절 핵물질의 경제적 이익과 군사적 이익간의 충돌 = 198
• 1. 1970년 3월 NPT 이전시기의 미국의 일방적인(unilateral) 핵정책 = 198
• 2. NPT 체결이후 미국의 적극적인 다자적(multilateral) 핵정책 = 204
• 3. 국제환경의 급격한 환경변화에 따른 선택적(selective) 핵정책 = 209
• 제2절 비확산 정책의 다양한 경로 = 213
• 1. 명제의 다양한 표현 = 213
• 2. 특수성의 일반화 = 222
• 제7장 결론 = 226
• 참고문헌 = 232
• 부록 = 257
• Abstract = 260