스피노자의 『윤리학』에 나타난 인식과 자유

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In this essay I research the concept of Spinoza's human freedom and the relation between freedom and cognition. Spinoza defines freedom as causality of essence or nature. Freedom is existence and action by essence. And he conceive human essence as intellect. Then in him human freedom is the freedom of intellect. Freedom is not effect but cause. The human freedom is not the power of will but the power of intellect. It is the end of this essay to show how freedom is defined by the intellect, or how the intellect realize freedom. The intellect is the cognition of true knowledge. And the cognition is divided into true knowledge and untrue knowledge. Following Spinoza, true knowledge is adequate knowledge, and untrue knowledge is inadequate knowledge. Our question change into which cognition is related to freedom. Why the cognition of adequate knowledge realize freedom, and why the cognition of inadequate knowledge not?
For the answer to this question it is necessary to know where the intellect realize freedom. It is in affects that the intellect is related to freedom. The affects is a place where the human freedom is realized to the power, and where the cognition produce to effect. The method of this essay is to appreciate the effects of various cognitions in affects. There is various kinds of knowledge. If we appreciate the effects of each cognition, then we can distinguish which cognition realize freedom, and we can find why this is so.
For the appreciation of effects of each cognition in affects, we should know the relation between cognition and affects. In the first chapter of this essay we explain this relation following to Spinoza. By Spinoza's physiological explanation, cognition and affects are the ideas of affection of human body. But cognition express the constitution of the body, affects express changes of the power of existing of the body or the strive to preserve to its being. Whenever in the body the certain constitution of body happen, the power of existing of body is changed. Therefore cognition accompany with affects, but cognition is prior to affects, and, though not precise meaning of 'cause', cognition cause affects. Under this relation human freedom can be realized by cognition of true knowledge in affects. And from the classification of knowledge, adequate and inadequate, there follow the classification of affects, action and passion, and the classification of human state, freedom and servitude.
Before we appreciate the relation between adequate cognition and freedom, we should appreciate the fall of inadequate cognition. For it is necessary that we recognize the limits of untrue knowledge. The inadequate cognition follow from imagination. For the imagination only indicate the effect, but not explain it through the cause. In the inadequate knowledge from imagination there are two kinds. The first of this two kinds is illusion. I treat illusion in the second chapter of this essay. The illusion is confusion of real object with imaginary object of idea. It follows from the ignorance of cause of thing. In this illusions there is the illusion that we image to act freely or without any cause. The cause of this illusion of freedom is the our ignorance of our own behavior. There is this illusion in the judgement of absence of causes from the ignorance of causes. the freedom from this illusion is the freedom of will. The free will is faculty for this freedom. Then the freedom of will or the free will is the product of illusion. By the illusion of freedom we are subordinated under the passion. Because we conceive our own as only cause of our behavior, we complicate with more strong passion, for example 'repentance'. Therefore the illusion of freedom is the obstacle for true freedom.
In the chapter three of this essay I treat the second fall of imagination. It is universal notion. The universal notion is the notion formed by abstraction. It is inadequate, because the idea through abstraction do not agree with its object. The human freedom related to this universal notion is freedom as human end. We imagine universal man as perfect and as the model of human nature, and this model as end. We consider particular man as imperfect and as privation the properties the perfect man must has. The end is given us as prescript. The human nature is reason. One who is led by reason is the model of human nature. Following to Spinoza, it is free man. The reason dictate us to follow true good. Good is a mean to approach to model of human of nature. Therefore the faculty the idea of freedom as end has is the effects of the idea of good. How strong are the ideas of good and evil in affects? The ideas of good and evil are one sort of affects. The power of the idea of good and evil follow to the order of power of affects. Then an affect of good and evil can be restrained or taken away by an affect opposite to, and stronger then it. To us there are so many affects stronger then affects of good that force us not to follow to the dictate of reason. Therefore the idea of freedom as end is insufficient to arrive in human real freedom.
Thus there is certain limit in the knowledge and the ideas of freedom from imagination. It is fault to define human freedom by free will or teleological cause. If one recognize freedom of will, then one must conceive region that isn't under the control of one law of Nature. And if one recognize final cause, then one must invert the order of causality of Nature. But not only in Spinoza' metaphysical system but also in our scientific view Nature have only one causal order. Therefore it is error that one recognize nither free will nor final cause. This recognition is only the product of ignorance of true cause.
The human freedom defined as cause is the freedom of intellect. Only intellect has the power of mind and human potence realize human freedom. At intellect there are reason and intuition. Reason is the cognition of true cause, intuition is the cognition of essence of thing. In chapter four of this essay I treat reason and the effect of reason in affects. The cognition of cause is acquired through the common notion. The common notion is only one foundation of adequate knowledge in experience. It is evidence of agreement of our nature with external things. Therefore through the common notion we can transform the effects of external thing into the internal constitution of our nature. Then passion changes into action. The bad affects is diminished, the good affects is increased. This power of reason is the remedy of affects and the mastery over passion. It is the freedom of reason.
In chapter five of this essay I treat the cognition of essence of thing and the freedom occur from it. The essence of thing is the eternal form in God' idea. Therefore the cognition of our own essence is the discovery of our eternal life. The eternal life is freedom itself. Because it is the action by our essence itself. The cognition of our own essence accompany with the superior satisfaction and happiness. Spinoza call this happiness 'blessedness'. In the blessedness we are perfect, and determined only to action. In it we can agree with God, therefore external Nature. Here human freedom become God' freedom. Through the cognition of our own essence we recognize God' freedom as our own freedom.
Therefore the true human freedom is God' freedom. Then we must question what is God' freedom. The answer of this question I treat in the chapter six. The freedom of God is the identity between God' essence and God' existence. Because God exist only by his essence. And freedom of God is determination and production of all things from necessity of the divine nature. Because there is nothing that disturb God's production. And the essence of God that produce all thing is the power of God. Therefore God' power is the feature of God's freedom. Each things that has its own essence has the power univocal power of God. Through this power each thing is free, and become a part of God. In the fall of human being the power of intellect play a roll of participation in God.
Through the cognition by intellect we receive God' freedom and necessity as our freedom. Then, Spinoza says, we must expect and bear calmly both good fortune and bad. One consider this attitude as resignation. Of cause it is one kind of resignation. But this resignation is renunciation of imaginary desire, not of essential desire. Rather through this resignation we recover our essence in God. Recognition of God's necessity is a attitude of life that we do not renunciate our own individuality and could insure identity with God and could live as a part of Nature. Therefore the human freedom defined by intellect is appropriate for the life agree both with the order of Nature and with each human essence

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 목차
• 서론 = 1
• 1. 인식과 정서 = 7
• 1.1 인식과 정서의 기원 = 8
• 1) 기원에서의 동일성 = 8
• 2) 기원에서의 차이 = 15
• 1.2 인식과 정서의 관계 = 21
• 1) 동반 = 22
• 2) 선차성 = 23
• 3) 인과성 = 25
• 1.3 인식과 정서의 분류 = 27
• 1.3.1 참된 인식과 오류 = 28
• 1) 적합한 인식과 부적합한 인식 = 28
• 2) 지성과 상상 = 32
• 3) 인식의 분류 = 37
• 1.3.2 행동과 정념 = 40
• 1) 원인에 따른 구분 = 40
• 2) 본성상의 구분 = 44
• 1.3.3 자유와 속박 = 49
• 2. 착각과 의지의 자유 = 53
• 2.1 착각과 자유 관념 = 54
• 1) 자유 착각의 원인 = 55
• 2) 착각의 인식론적 특징 = 58
• 3) 자유 착각의 심리적 해석 = 62
• 2.2 의지의 자유 = 64
• 1) 의지의 절대성에 관하여 = 65
• 2) 신체에 대한 의지의 우월성에 관하여 = 70
• 2.3 의지의 자유와 정념 = 74
• 3. 보편 개념과 목적으로서의 자유 = 79
• 3.1 보편 개념과 목적 = 80
• 1) 보편 개념과 완정성 = 81
• 2) 완정성과 목적 = 84
• 3.2 목적과 자유인 = 88
• 1) 인간의 목적 = 88
• 2) 자유인의 요구의 정서적 원인 = 91
• 3.3 목적의 수단과 무능력 = 95
• 1) 목적을 위한 수단 = 95
• 2) 무능력 = 103
• 4. 원인 인식과 정서에 대한 정신의 힘 = 109
• 4.1 원인 인식과 외부 사물에 대한 적응 = 110
• 1) 원인 인식 = 110
• 2) 외부 사물에 대한 신체의 적응 = 116
• 4.2 정서에 대한 정신의 힘 = 118
• 1) 원인 인식 자체의 힘 = 119
• 2) 원인 인식에서 나온 정서의 힘 = 123
• 3) 신 인식에서 나온 정서의 힘 = 125
• 5. 본질 인식과 지복 = 128
• 5.1 본질 인식과 정신의 영원성 = 128
• 1) 본질 인식 = 129
• 2) 정신의 영원성 = 134
• 5.2 지복 = 136
• 6. 신적 자유와 신적 자유의 긍정에서 오는 삶의 태도 = 141
• 6.1 신의 자유와 신적 필연성 = 141
• 1) 신의 실존과 본질의 동일성 = 142
• 2) 신적 결정성 = 147
• 3) 신적 본질의 전개 = 153
• 6.2 신적 자유에 대한 인식이 가져오는 삶의 태도 = 156
• 1) 지성에 의한 신적 자유의 긍정 = 157
• 2) 체념 = 161
• 3) 자유인의 삶 = 164
• 결론 = 167
• 참고문헌 = 170
• Abstract = 173