Two things are worth noticing from the first and second North Korean nuclear crises: negotiation strategies of North Korea and the United States faced with traditional security conflicts; structural changes of the international order in the Korean Pen...
Two things are worth noticing from the first and second North Korean nuclear crises: negotiation strategies of North Korea and the United States faced with traditional security conflicts; structural changes of the international order in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. This paper gives more attention to the latter than the former. Since the end of the Cold War, the balance of power in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia turned unfavorable to North Korea. In the beginning this situation was managed by diplomatic measures, but South Korea and the U.S. took a hard line towards North Korea in the second half of 1992. March 1993 the first nuclear crisis was broken out. October 1994 North Korea and the U.S. signed the Agreed Framework, which was not to resolve entirely the crisis because of negative influences of the domestic circumstances of both North Korea and the U.S. The sunshine policy of South Korea and the inter-Korean summit in June 2000 opened a door towards the peace and unification in the Korean Peninsula. October 2004 the second nuclear crisis was, however, provoked by the hawkish policy of the Bush administration and tension was built up by North Korean and US hard-line policies. South Korea and China, whose position in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia was beginning to be strengthened from the end of the 1990th, succeeded in persuading North Korea and the US to agree upon a peaceful resolution of crisis.