서로 다른 유통경로구조 하에서 기업들의 순차적 품질의사결정

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구는 서로 다른 시점에 제품을 출시하는 선발기업과 후발기업의 제품 품질에 대한 포지셔닝 결정이 다양한 유통경로구조 하에서 어떻게 달라지는지를 조사하였다. 이를 위해, 수직적 차별화 모형(vertical differentiation model)에 기초하고 네 가지 상이한 유통경로구조 하에서 순차적으로 제품을 출시하며 품질수준을 결정하는 경쟁기업들로 구성된 게임이론연구모형을 분석하였다. 분석 결과, 기존 선행연구들에 의해 제시된 결과들과는 다른 흥미로운 결과들이 도출되었다. 첫째, 기업의 제품들이 돌립적인 공통의 소매상을 통해 판매되는 유통경로구조하의 제품품질수준과 소매상을 거치지 않고 직접 판매되는 유통경로구조의 품질수준이 서로 동일한 반면, 한 기업의 제품만을 배타적으로 취급하는 각각의 소매상을 통해 판매되는 경우에는 그 제품품질수준이 소매상을 거치지 않고 직접 판매되는 유통경로구조의 품질수준에 비해 높게 책정되며 제품들 간 품질수준의 차이가 다른 유통 경로구조들에 비해 감소하게 된다. 이러한 결과는 독립적인 소매상의 존재가 독점기업의 제품라인 내에서 제품들간 품질경쟁의 경우에는 품질수준결정에 영향을 미치는 요소가 단순히 독립적인 소매상의 존재가 아닌 소매상들간의 경쟁임을 보여준다. 둘째, 선발기업과는 달리 후발기업의 경우에는 한 제조업체의 제품만을 배타적으로 판매하는 각각의 소매상을 통해 제품을 공급함으로써 한 공통의 소매상을 통해 제품을 판매하는 유통경로구조뿐만 아니라 심지어 소매상 없이 직접 제품을 판매하는 유통경로구조보다도 더 높은 수익을 올리게 된다. 셋째, 후발기업의 반응(response)을 예지(foresight)하는 선발기업이 제품의 품질수준을 결정할 때, 후발기업이 또 다른 제조업체인 경우에는 후발기업의 품질수준보다 높은 품질수준의 제품을 생산함으로써 더 높은 수익을 기대할 수 있는 반면. 후발기업이 소매상인 경우에는 제품의 품질수준을 소매상의 스토어 브랜드 품질수준보다 낮게 책정함으로써 더 나은 수익을 얻을 수 있다. 넷째, 선발기업의 제품 품질결정 시 후발기업의 반응을 예지할 수 있는 능력의 가치(value)가 후발기업이 또 다른 제조업체인 경우보다 소매상인 경우에 훨씬 크다. 이러한 결과들을 통해 경영실무자들에게 제시하는 시사점들을 논의하였다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

There is a long list of marketing literature that investigates the effect of channel structures on channel member prices and profits. On the other hand, another research stream in marketing examines a firm`s product positioning decision in various contexts. However, far less research explores the impact of channel structures on the firm`s vertical positioning (i.e., positioning by quality) decision. Villas-Doas (1998) reveals that a channel structure affects the product quality decision of the manufacturer designing its product line to target multiple consumer segments with distinct preferences for quality. He shows that the quality difference among products in a product line may become magnified in a decentralized marketing channel. However. Villas-Boas (1998) has focused on a monopolistic firm`s product line design problem. but not competing firms` vertical positioning decision. In this study, we examines how the structure of distribution channels may influence the vertical positioning strategies of finns that introduce their product sequentially. We analyze the problem with a game theoretic model composed of the vertically differentiated finns, who strategically choose the quality level of their product sequentially wider four different types of channel structures (1. the channel in which two manufacturers sell their product directly to target consumers, 2. the channel in which two manufacturers sell their product through a monopoly common retailer. 3. the channel where two manufacturers sell their product through two exclusive retailers, who are restricted to selling only one manufacturer`s product. 4. the channel in which one manufacturer sells its product through a common retailer, who introduces own store brand atid strategically chooses the quality level of the store brand relative to the manufacturer`s product position to maximize total category profit). From the analysis. we find that the changes in channel structure have effects on the firms` optimal quality decision and, thus, their profits. Our main results are as follows. First, we find that compared to the first channel structure without any retailer, the quality level of the products increases when two manufacturers sell their product through two exclusive retailers respectively, but doesn`t change when they sell their product through a common retailer. And the quality difference between two products becomes smaller when two manufacturers sell their product through two exclusive retailers relative to the other two channel structures. This result suggests that in contrast to Villas-Boas`s (1998) finding, the important driver that changes the quality decision of the firms making vertical positioning decisions sequentially is not simply the existence of an independent retailer but competition at the retail level. Second, we find that the second mover who introduces its product later makes more profit by selling its product through an exclusive retailer than by selling the product under the other channel structures, On the contrary. the first mover is always best off selling its product directly to target consumers without any intermediaries. Third. as Moorthy (1988) shows in his paper, we also find that becoming the higher quality firm is more profitable for the first mover, who anticipates the second mover`s best response. than being the lower quality firm when the second mover is another competing manufacturer. In contrast to Moorthy`s (1988) finding, however, we find that being the lower quality firm becomes more profitable strategy when the second mover is the retailer introducing a store brand. Lastly, the value of the first mover`s foresight about the second mover`s response is much higher when the second mover is the retailer introducing a store brand than when it is another manufacturer. This result emphasizes the importance of the manufacture`s ability of incorporating the retailer`s response with a store brand into its quality decision.

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