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다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

We examine the allocation of prizes in contests in which the number of contenders affects the prizes and costs. We assume that there are two groups of contenders. The government allocates a prize to the two groups, and the contenders in each group respectively compete for the prize. Examining the prize allocation in such contests, we obtain the following results. The aggregate effort increases in the prize share of the larger group. In contests with size effects through costs, the aggregate resource expended in the contests and the aggregate payoffs are independent of group size distribution if the prize is allocated in proportion to group size. The integration of contests with size effects through prizes can yield higher aggregate effort and payoffs than the decentralized contests.

참고문헌 (Reference)

1 Moldovanu, B., "The optimal allocation of prizes in contests" 91 : 542-558, 2001

2 Konrad, K. A., "Strategy and dynamics in contests" Oxford University Press 2009

3 Baik, K. H., "Strategic groups and rent dissipation" 39 : 672-684, 2001

4 Katz, E., "Rent-seeking for budgetary allocation : Preliminary results for 20countries" 60 : 133-144, 1989

5 Lee, S., "Prize allocation in contests with size effects" 2 (2): 212-215, 2012

6 Gradstein, M., "Orchestrating rent seeking contests" 109 : 536-545, 1999

7 Glazer, A., "Optimal contests" 26 : 133-143, 1988

8 Krugman, P., "International economics: Theory and policy" Addison and Wesley 2004

9 Lee, S., "Endogenous sharing rules in collective-group rent-seeking" 85 : 31-44, 1995

10 Dasgupta, A., "Designing an optimal contest" 14 : 587-603, 1998

1 Moldovanu, B., "The optimal allocation of prizes in contests" 91 : 542-558, 2001

2 Konrad, K. A., "Strategy and dynamics in contests" Oxford University Press 2009

3 Baik, K. H., "Strategic groups and rent dissipation" 39 : 672-684, 2001

4 Katz, E., "Rent-seeking for budgetary allocation : Preliminary results for 20countries" 60 : 133-144, 1989

5 Lee, S., "Prize allocation in contests with size effects" 2 (2): 212-215, 2012

6 Gradstein, M., "Orchestrating rent seeking contests" 109 : 536-545, 1999

7 Glazer, A., "Optimal contests" 26 : 133-143, 1988

8 Krugman, P., "International economics: Theory and policy" Addison and Wesley 2004

9 Lee, S., "Endogenous sharing rules in collective-group rent-seeking" 85 : 31-44, 1995

10 Dasgupta, A., "Designing an optimal contest" 14 : 587-603, 1998

11 Lee, S., "Contests with size effects through costs" 23 : 1190-1193, 2007

12 Eggert, W., "Contests with size effects" 22 : 989-1008, 2006

13 Baik, K. H., "Collective rent seeking with endogenous group sizes" 13 : 121-130, 1997

14 Nitzan, S., "Collective rent dissipation" 101 : 1522-1534, 1991

15 Brandenburger, A., "Co-opetition" Bantam Doubleday Dell 1998

16 Congleton, R. D., "40 Years of research on rent Seeking 1" Springer-Verlag 2008

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학술지 이력

학술지 이력
연월일	이력구분	이력상세
2023	평가예정	해외DB학술지평가 신청대상 (해외등재 학술지 평가)
2020-01-01	평가	등재학술지 선정 (해외등재 학술지 평가)
2019-01-01	평가	등재후보학술지 선정 (신규평가)
2017-12-01	평가	등재후보 탈락 (계속평가)
2016-12-01	평가	등재후보로 하락 (계속평가)
2012-01-01	평가	등재 1차 FAIL (등재유지)
2009-01-01	평가	등재학술지 선정 (등재후보2차)
2008-04-01	평가	등재후보 1차 PASS (등재후보1차)
2008-04-01	평가	등재후보로 하락 (기타)
2006-01-01	평가	등재 1차 FAIL (등재유지)
2004-01-01	평가	등재 1차 FAIL (등재유지)
2001-01-01	평가	등재학술지 선정 (등재후보2차)
1998-07-01	평가	등재후보학술지 선정 (신규평가)