미국 FCC의 결정에 대한 미국 법원의 행정청의 해석 존중의 원칙의 적용

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

One of the most venerable doctrines in administrative law is that a court will give great deference to an agency's interpretation of its own rules (In German administrative legal terms, Beurteilungsspielraum). This deference is even greater than that afforded an agency's interpretations of the statutes it enforces. However, courts have positively provided their own interpretations where they disagree with the agency. Although the doctrine requires deference, it does not require that courts give agency interpretations controlling effect; thus courts are free to substitute judgment if they strongly disagree with the agency's interpretation.
However, in the Chevron case, U.S. Supreme Court established a new regime that significantly altered the judiciary's role in reviewing agency statutory interpretations by referring to political accountability of the incumbent administration and the Chief Executive and political branch. And in Brand X case, U.S. Supreme Court has invoked the Chevron doctrine in reviewing an FCC statutory interpretation that implements a significant communications policy direction.
But It is desirable that a less deferential review standard should apply to independent regulatory agencies such as FCC, SEC and FTC. Because the ability of the President and Congress to influence the independent agencies in their own ways does not rise to the level of control that justifies ascribing political accountability of executive agencies.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 서론
• Ⅱ. 판단여지(判斷餘地)의 원칙과 Deference to Reasonable Agency Interpretations
• Ⅲ. Chevron Doctrine - Political Accountability
• Ⅳ. National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services (545 U.S. 967, 125 S.Ct. 2688, U.S. Jun 27, 2005)
• Ⅴ. 결론
• 참고문헌
• [Abstract]