The financial crisis in late 1990's has forced many Korean businesses to undergo structural adjustment, and the government responded by implementing various measures in promotion of such efforts. In August of 2001, the Act on Promotion of Structural A...
The financial crisis in late 1990's has forced many Korean businesses to undergo structural adjustment, and the government responded by implementing various measures in promotion of such efforts. In August of 2001, the Act on Promotion of Structural Adjustment (hereinafter referred to as the "Structural Adjustment Act") was enacted to provide for comprehensive rules on structural adjustment programs. There have been claims from outside that a number of government initiatives aimed at facilitating structural adjustment are in violation of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereinafter referred to as the "Subsidies Agreement").
In light of such claims, the present article applies a legal analysis on whether certain structural adjustment measures constitute violations under the Subsidies Agreement It singles out the Hynix Semiconductor Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the "Hynix") case, while attempting to maintain the framework that allows a more general assessment of various like measures.
First, the present article examines whether financial support for the Hynix before the enactment of the Structural Adjustment Act falls under the definition of "subsidies"; whether it could be deemed "specific"; and whether it could be categorized under "export subsidies" or other types of "actionable subsidies". It concludes that, within the factual information available to the author, financial support for the Hynix before the enactment of the Structural Adjustment Act could be argued to have violated the Subsidies Agreement, and might warrant an institution of a WTO dispute or an imposition of countervailing duties.
The present article then examines whether the Restructuring Adjustment Act in itself and financial support based thereon violate the Subsidies Agreement. It concludes that the Restructuring Act itself does not violate the Subsidies Agreement, and that though debatable, financial support based on the Act does not fall under either export subsidies or other types of actionable subsidies.
With regard to the upcoming Doha Development Agenda negotiations, the present article recommends to make a proposal to explicitly classify restructuring adjustment subsidies as non-actionable subsidies.