(The)logic of British and American industry : a realistic analysis of economic structure and government

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• PREFACE = v
• Ⅰ. THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH
• § 1. THE QUESTION 'WHO?' AS A REALISTIC STARTING POINT = 1
• § 2. THE TECHNICAL BACKGROUND = 7
• § 3. THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY = 15
• § 4. THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF PLANTS AND FIRMS = 22
• § 5. PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL LOCATION = 37
• § 6. FORMS AND EXTENT OF INTEGRATION = 43
• Ⅱ. LOGIC AND FACT OF INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE
• § 1. THE MEANING, MECHANISM AND MEASURES OF EFFICIENCY = 48
• § 2. EFFICIENCY OF THE LARGE FIRM OF VARYING PATTERN. THE SURVIVAL OF THE SMALL FIRM = 55
• § 3. CONDITIONS OF EFFICIENCY OF LARGE AND SMALL PLANTS = 66
• § 4. THE INEFFICIENCY AND EFFICIENCY OF INTEGRATION = 74
• § 5. THE LOGIC OF LOCALIZATION AND DISPERSION = 83
• § 6. AGREEMENT AND DIVERGENCE OF LOGIC AND FACT. MANUFACTURING AND OTHER INDUSTRIES = 92
• Ⅲ. THE RELATIONS OF INDUSTRY AND CONSUMER
• § 1. PLANNED AND FREE CONSUMPTION. THE COSTS OF DISTRIBUTION = 98
• § 2. THE LOGIC AND ILLOGIC OF FREE CONSUMPTION = 102
• § 3. THE VAGARIES OF FREE PRODUCTION, DESIGN AND DISTRIBUTION FOR FREE CONSUMPTION = 107
• § 4. FORECASTING AND MARKET RESEARCH = 112
• § 5. COMPETITION AND COMBINATION, SALES PRESSURE AND ADVERTISING = 116
• § 6. MONOPOLISTIC STRUCTURE AND THEORY = 121
• § 7. DETECTING MONOPOLY = 130
• Ⅳ. RELATIONS WITHIN THE MODERN FIRM. MANAGEMENT AND TOP GOVERNMENT `
• § 1. THE TREND OF INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT. OVERHEAD COSTS = 136
• § 2. EVOLUTION OF SPECIALIZED MANAGEMENT = 140
• § 3. LOGIC OF HIERARCHICAL DELEGATION = 149
• § 4. LOGIC OF FUNCTIONAL DELEGATION = 154
• § 5. LOGIC OF LINE-AND-STAFF DELEGATION = 157
• § 6. THE CORE OF TOP GOVERNMENT = 162
• § 7. THE QUESTION WHO GOVERNS AT THE CORE, AND WHY : THE NEXT THREE CHAPTERS = 167
• Ⅴ. GOVERNMENT OF FREE ENTERPRISE CAPITALISM
• § 1. GROWTH OF THE CORPORATION AND JOINT STOCK COMPANY = 169
• § 2. THE SHAREHOLDERS' ACTUAL PART IN GOVERNMENT. LAW AND REALITY = 176
• § 3. GOVERNMENT BY BLOC-HOLDER = 186
• § 4. GOVERNMENT BY DIRECTOR OF EXECUTIVE = 203
• § 5. INTERESTS, PERSONALITIES AND COMPANY POLICIES = 214
• Ⅵ. NATIONALIZATION, CO-OPERATION AND STATE CONTROL
• § 1. WHY ALTERNATIVES TO CAPITALIST GOVERNMENT OF INDUSTRY? = 220
• § 2. BRITAIN'S MIXED ECONOMY = 226
• § 3. THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES = 235
• § 4. GOVERNMENT BY CONSUMERS' CO-OPERATION = 245
• § 5. THE TESTS OF MEETING NEEDS, CONSUMERS' SOVEREIGNTY AND ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY = 250
• § 6. COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY, STABILITY AND PROGRESS = 260
• § 7. SUMMARY : OVERALL STATE PLANNING AND CONTROL = 267
• Ⅶ. THE STIMULUS TO LABOUR, INVESTMENT AND ENTERPRISE
• § 1. LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE LARGER PLANT AND FIRM = 273
• § 2. THE STIMULUS TO INVEST : THE OUTSIDE INVESTOR = 282
• § 3. THE STIMULUS TO LARGE-SCALE ENTERPRISE = 292
• § 4. TYPES OF LEADER IN LARGE-SCALE BUSINESS GOVERNMENT = 298
• § 5. THE SHORT AND LONG-RUN SUPPLY AND SUPPLY PRICE OF LEADERSHIP- = 315
• § 6. RECRUITMENT AND EDUCATION FOR INDUSTRIAL GOVERNMENT = 324
• Ⅷ. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
• § 1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS = 335
• § 2. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH METHODS = 349
• § 3. SOME PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS = 351
• INDEX = 357