적정세무조사제도 : 이론모형과 납세함수의 추정을 통한 검증 Models , and Evidences from a Tax Payment Function = An Optimal Tax Audit Mechanism

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Since tax evasion, a moral hazard rooted in information asymmetry, causes inefficiency as well as distorting income distribution, conscious policies are needed to abate its harm. Focusing on the self-employed, we explore 'Family Income and Expenditure Survey., We also examine : (1) tax payment factors (2) the income tax gap between self-employed(SELF) households(HHs) and 'pay-as-you-earn' (PAYE) employee HHs : and (3) the effect of the tax audit rule on compliance.
Though it saves audit resoures and seizes evaders' risk premium, a cutoff audit-currently adopted in korea featuring "reporting guidelines' is shown to lower social welfare due to its built-in regressive bias. The line drawing hinders self-compliance as well. An endogenous audit with the audit chance declining in reported income without truncation is desirable for inequality-averse society. At least, the cutoff must be kept secret to taxpayers.
The empirical analysis shows : (1) One-third of SELF HHs are outside tax enforcement ; (2) SELF HHs Pay less income tax than PAYE HHs by 46% to 60%, ceteris paribus. The tax gap widens with income ; (3) The elasticity with income tax payment to income is less than one for SELF HHs, conflicting with progressive tax shedule ; (4) SELF HHs' elasticity is lower around their mean income than at tails' which reflects the adverse of the cutoff audit ; and (5) Tax enforcement is ineffective to capital income.